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ABSTRACT In this thesis I examine the medical concept of informed consent and the 
philosophical concept of autonomy in conjunction with the relationship between them. This 
examination is complicated because autonomy can refer to decisions or persons. Further 
autonomy may have instrumental or intrinsic value. These differences mean autonomy may be 
respected in different ways. This examination is further complicated because whilst a vast 
wealth of medical literature exists on informed consent and mentions autonomy, very little of 
this literature does more than mention autonomy. As a result of my examination I argue for the 
following. 
Firstly I argue the form of autonomy underlying informed consent should be personal 
autonomy and to respect autonomy means accepting autonomous decisions. 
Secondly I show in certain contexts a surrogate decision maker cannot make a decision on 
behalf of an incompetent patient that would be generally agreed to be in his best interests. I 
will argue in such contexts a patient’s decision should always be accepted as the concept of 
competence becomes detached from the concept of informed consent. Thirdly I show a patient 
may make an autonomous decision based only on understanding the purpose of the procedure 
he is consenting to. I will argue it follows a patient should not be required to understand 
details of the nature of the procedure he is consenting to for his consent to be accepted. 
Fourthly I argue an autonomous decision must be one an agent identifies with and has some 
persistence. I will show these conditions are satisfied by an autonomous agent’s absence of 
restlessness to change his decision Lastly I argue informed consent decisions should be linked 
to a patient’s ability to understand the risk involved in his decision and not directly linked to 
the degree of risk involved in his decision. 
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                                               Preface 
This thesis grew out of an amateur interest in applied Philosophy. I am an unlikely candidate 
to write a thesis in applied philosophy having spent most of my life as a farmer. Whilst 
farming I completed an Open University degree concentrating mostly in mathematics. From 
this I developed an interest in the philosophy of mind. This lead me to The Centre for 
Continuing Education at Newcastle University where over several years I developed my 
philosophical interests further. I am particularly grateful to Mike Bavidge and Ian Ground for 
helping me develop these interests. During these classes I developed a particular interest in 
applied philosophy. As a result of this I decided to do a MA in applied philosophy under 
Brenda Almond at The University of Hull. I completed this in 1995. On completing my MA 
my interest in philosophy continued purely as a hobby. This state of affairs might have 
continued except one of the partners in the farm died. I now found myself in my late fifties 
without a farm and time on my hands. It was purely through surfing the web that I contacted 
David Over at Sunderland University which at that time had a philosophy department. David 
suggested I should enrol to do a doctorate. I originally thought of myself as too old to 
commence such a serious piece of work but David persuaded me otherwise for which I am 
grateful. The subject of this thesis originated the dissertation for my MA at Hull. My 
dissertation concerned living wills or advance directives. Superficially advance directives 
appear to a form of informed consent and concerned with personal autonomy. I questioned 
whether these connections are as clear-cut as it is usually assumed. These questions lead to 
this thesis exploring the relationship between autonomy and informed consent. In conclusion I 
must thank my wife for her patience with me whilst researching and writing this thesis.  
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Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between the philosophical concept 
of autonomy and the practical idea of informed consent. In medical practice a competent 
patient must give their consent before any treatment can lawfully take place. Historically a 
patient’s consent was necessary in order to obtain her co-operation regarding some proposed 
treatment. However since the 1960s informed consent has been more concerned with 
respecting a patient’s autonomy (Jackson, 2001, page 10). The General Medical Council 
expresses this concern for autonomy as follows. 
 
Successful relationships between doctors and patients depend on trust. To establish that trust 
you must respect patients’ autonomy - their right to decide whether or not to undergo any 
medical intervention even where a refusal may result in harm to themselves or their own 
death. (General medical Council, 2001, page 1) 
 
This thesis is concerned with applied philosophy with the practical implications of basing 
informed consent on respect for autonomy. It will investigate whether informed consent as 
currently practised is fully compatible with respecting autonomy. It will conclude it is not 
fully compatible and make some practical recommendations.  
This thesis assumes there is a lack of theoretical understanding about the concept of 
autonomy, practical ideas of competence and the relationship between autonomy and 
competence. Demarco supports this position. 
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This is especially true given the link between autonomy and well-being. Autonomy is too 
important, and paternalism too controversial, to be buried in the concept of competence. 
Nevertheless much about competence and autonomy is unclear. We do not have adequate 
notions of either. Developing adequate concepts and determining how informed consent 
should relate to paternalism requires more work (Demarco, 2002, page 244). 
 
Consent applies to all medical interventions that involve touching a patient. For instance a 
patient’s consent is required if a doctor wishes to take her blood pressure just as it is in the 
case of a proposed appendectomy. In practice if a patient consents they are usually presumed 
to be competent (General Medical Council, 1999, page 5). However in many cases if a patient 
refuses to consent to some proposed treatment her competence will not be assessed. For 
instance, if a patient refused to have her blood pressure taken, her competence would not be 
assessed. This is also true in more serious cases. Consider a patient, suffering from an arthritic 
knee, who is advised to have an operation to replace her knee joint. Let it be assumed that 
without this operation she will probably be confined to a wheelchair. In practice if this patient 
refused to consent her competence would not be assessed. The operation would simply be 
cancelled. 
Nevertheless in some circumstances if a patient refuses to consent to treatment, her 
competence would be assessed. Moreover, in these circumstances if she is found to be 
incompetent she might be treated against her will. The case of Ms B [2002] illustrates this. 
Legal judgments consider that refusals of consent vary in importance depending on whether 
there is a risk to the patient’s life or a risk of irreparable harm being done to her health see T, 
[1992]. This thesis is for the most part concerned with understanding the implications of 
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basing informed consent on respect for autonomy in these circumstances. The idea of patient 
competence is central to the practice of informed consent. Buchanan and Brock argue, that 
the central purpose in assessing competence is to determine whether the patient retains the 
right to accept or refuse a particular medical procedure. (Buchanan & Brock, 1989,page 28) 
 
It follows that the way risk, to a patient’s life or of irreparable harm being done to her health, 
affects the assessment of her competence must be central to this thesis. Intuitively a patient is 
competent to give or refuse informed consent to some proposed treatment if she possesses 
certain capacities. The risk to a patient’s health might affect the degree to which a patient must 
possess these capacities in order to be considered competent in two ways. Firstly, risk might 
indirectly affect the degree to which a competent patient must possess these capacities. For 
instance a competent patient might need additional capacities to understand the risks involved 
in some proposed treatments. Secondly, risk might directly affect the capacities a patient must 
possess if she is to be regarded as competent. In this scenario a patient would need additional 
capacities in order to be considered competent when the risk to her life or irreparable harm 
occurring to her health increases irrespective of whether she needs these extra capacit ies to 
understand the risks involved. The major conclusion reached in this thesis is that connecting 
the capacities needed by a patient to be considered competent directly to the risk involved, 
rather than to the capacities needed to understand the risk involved, is incompatible with 
respecting patient autonomy.  
It is implicit in British case law as set out by Lord Donaldson in the case of T that a 
competent patient’s capacities should vary directly with risk [1992]. It appears to follow that 
British case law is incompatible with respecting patient autonomy. In order to reach the above 
major conclusion, three supplementary questions must be considered. Firstly what exactly is 
   4 
 
 
meant by respecting autonomy? I will argue that respect for autonomy involves recognition of 
some persons as the kind of persons who can determine their own future. I will further argue 
that this recognition involves accepting autonomous decisions. Secondly, since there are 
various philosophical concepts of autonomy, as pointed out by Cuypers (2000,page 226) and 
Meyers (2004,page 106), the question as to which concept of autonomy should form the basis 
of informed consent must also be considered. I will argue for the use of Frankfurt’s concept of 
autonomy as the basis of informed consent. Thirdly, the question of why a patient’s 
competence is assessed will be raised. I will conclude that a patient’s competence is not 
assessed simply to respect her autonomy.  A patient’s competence is assessed in order to 
respect her autonomy and to ensure that if she is non-autonomous she receives beneficent care. 
I will argue that in practice this means giving precedence to respecting autonomy over acting 
beneficently. 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 are preparatory chapters that 
make it clear what is involved in the practice of informed consent. Chapter 1 examines the 
practice of informed consent from three separate but related points of view; official guidelines, 
a legal perspective and a bioethical perspective. Chapters 2 will examine autonomy. 2.1 will 
examine our intuitive ideas of autonomy. 2.2 will examine what it means to respect autonomy. 
Chapter 3 continues the consideration of autonomy, by questioning which concept of 
autonomy should form the basis for the practice of informed consent and why a patient’s 
competence is assessed. These questions will continue to be examined in chapter 4. The main 
task in chapter 4 is to examine the relationship between risk and competence assessment. In 
order to complete this task it is necessary to examine the concept of asymmetric competence 
assessment. The concept of asymmetric competence assessment holds that different standards 
of competence are needed for a patient to be considered competent when she consents to 
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treatment as compared to when she refuses to consent. The standard varies with the expected 
harms or benefits associated with the outcome of her decision. It follows that a patient might 
be considered competent to choose a safe option but incompetent to choose a dangerous 
option. 
 Chapter 4 shows that any system of risk related competence assessment based directly 
on risk means that acting beneficently must be given precedence over respecting autonomous 
decisions. This result will be used to show that connecting the capacities needed by a patient 
to be considered competent directly to the risk involved, rather than simply to the capacities 
needed to understand the risk involved, is incompatible with respecting patient autonomy. 
 Chapter 5 examines the various circumstances in which informed consent decisions are made. 
The circumstances in which a patient consents or refuses to consent to an appendectomy seem 
very different to those in which a parent consents or refuses to consent to the retention of a 
child’s organs for post mortem examination. It will be argued that these different 
circumstances have important implications for the practice of informed consent. I will 
conclude that in some circumstances assessing a patient’s competence does not serve the 
purpose of informed consent if that purpose is to respect patient autonomy whilst also acting 
beneficently towards non-autonomous patients. It will be concluded in these circumstances it 
is not useful to assess a patient’s competence and her decision should simply be accepted. The 
arguments used in chapter 4 to reach the major conclusion in this thesis that, connecting the 
capacities needed by a patient to be considered competent directly to the risk involved, rather 
than to understanding the risk involved, is incompatible with respecting patient autonomy, do 
not specify what capacities a competent patient requires. 
 Chapter 6 addresses this omission. This chapter assumes that, because informed consent 
is based on respecting autonomy and ensuring that non-autonomous patients receive 
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beneficent care by giving precedence to acting autonomously over acting beneficently, all 
autonomous decisions should be respected. It follows that the capacities a patient requires to 
make a competent informed consent decision cannot be greater than those someone requires to 
make an autonomous decision. Chapter 6 will examine how much information a patient must 
understand to enable her to make an autonomous consent decision. It will conclude that a 
patient must be informed about any changes to her lifestyle likely to be brought about by any 
proposed treatment. It will further conclude that a patient must also understand the purpose of 
the proposed treatment. This examination of how much information a patient must understand 
in order to make an autonomous consent decision leads to a minor conclusion of this thesis 
which is that a patient can make an autonomous decision to ask her doctors to make a decision 
on her behalf and that such a decision should be respected. Chapter 6 also examines the 
capacities for rationality a patient needs to make an autonomous consent decision. It will 
conclude that a patient must be able to use instrumental rationality in order to make an 
autonomous consent decision. It will further conclude that if a patient is to make an 
autonomous consent decision, then her goals and values must have some kind of simple 
structure. 
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Chapter 1 
Informed consent in practice 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to reach meaningful conclusions concerning the relationship 
between informed consent and respect for autonomy. To do this it must be clear what is 
entailed by both the practice of informed consent and respecting autonomy. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine how informed consent works in practice, by providing a critique of 
the practice of informed consent, intended to enable us to fully understand the practice of 
informed consent prior to examining the relationship between informed consent and respect 
for autonomy. Chapter 1 will also highlight some inconsistencies in this practice which appear 
to vary depending on the idea of patient competence adopted. Whether a patient’s consent is 
regarded as valid depends on whether she is regarded as competent or incompetent see 
(Buchanan & Brock, 1989,page 28). A patient is considered competent if she possesses certain 
capacities. Chapter 1 will examine informed consent in practice by examining these capacities. 
The chapter is divided into three subsections. 
 
1.1. Informed consent and medical guidelines 
 
The General Medical Council is a professional body set up as a result of the 1858 Medical 
Act. It has a duty to protect patients and is also responsible to the Privy Council for 
establishing a register of doctors. The Medical Act of 1983 confirmed these powers. The 
Council carries out these duties in three ways. Firstly, it sets the qualifications doctors must 
meet and appoints examiners to see these qualifications are met. Secondly, it provides 
guidance to doctors as to ethical standards they should employ by giving practical guidelines. 
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Lastly, it has the power to remove doctors from its register if they fail to meet its ethical or 
clinical standards. The ethical guidelines provided to doctors include guidelines on informed 
consent. These guidelines presume adult patients are competent to give consent: 
 
“You must work on the presumption that every adult has the capacity to decide whether to 
consent to, or refuse, proposed medical intervention, unless it is shown that they cannot 
understand the information presented in a clear way. If a patient’s choices appears irrational, 
or does not accord with your view of what is in the patient’s best interests, that is not evidence 
in itself that the patient lacks competence. In such circumstances it may be appropriate to 
review with the patient whether all reasonable steps have been taken to meet their information 
need.” (General Medical Council, 1999, section 19). 
 
If informed consent is practised according to the General Medical Council’s guidelines then 
the following should hold. 
Firstly, these guidelines make it clear that an adult patient making an informed consent 
decision must be fully informed and must understand the information supplied to her if she is 
to be regarded as competent. This thesis assumes informed consent is based on respect for 
autonomy. It follows that the question of how much information a patient needs to make an 
autonomous decision should be related to the question of how much information a patient 
needs to understand if she is to be regarded as competent according to the practice of informed 
consent. This relationship and how much information a patient needs to understand in order to 
make a competent decision will be dealt with in chapter 6. Secondly, these guidelines make it 
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clear that a patient’s competence need not normally be assessed when taking consent from a 
fully informed adult patient because adults are presumed to be competent. This presumption 
mirrors criminal law in that just as a defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proved 
otherwise, so a patient is presumed to be competent unless it can be shown otherwise. It 
follows if an adult patient is to be regarded as incompetent according to the General Medical 
Council’s guidelines then it must be possible to show the patient has either not been provided 
with enough information or fails to understand the information provided. Thirdly, the General 
Medical Council’s guidelines do not consider that the outcome of a patient’s decision should 
play any part in setting the standard by which her competence is judged. It is of course true 
that a patient’s decision may trigger an assessment of her competence. However these 
guidelines make it clear that the standard a patient must meet if she is to be regarded as 
competent should be determined solely by the capacities deemed necessary to understand the 
information provided to enable her to make her consent decision. This requirement is 
important when the asymmetric assessment of competence is discussed in chapter 4. 
All that is explicitly required by the General Medical Council’s guidelines for a patient to be 
considered competent is that she is fully informed and has the capacity to understand the 
information provided. The capacities to communicate, to reason and the possession of a set of 
beliefs and values are not mentioned explicitly. It will now be argued that these guidelines 
implicitly require that a patient possesses the above capacities and a set of beliefs and values if 
she is to be regarded as competent. 
If a patient’s decision is to be respected then she must be able to communicate this 
decision. It follows that it must be implicit in these guidelines that a competent patient has the 
capacity to communicate. The General Medical Council (1999, section 5) sets out the detailed 
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information which patients should be given and capable of understanding in order to give 
competent informed consent as follows. 
 
x Details of the diagnosis and prognosis, and the likely prognosis if left untreated. 
x Uncertainties about the diagnosis including options for further investigation prior to 
treatment. 
x Options for treatment or management of the condition, including the option not to 
treat. 
x The purpose of a proposed investigation or treatment, details of the procedures or 
therapies involved, including subsidiary treatment such as pain relief, how the patient 
should prepare for the procedure; and details of what the patient might experience 
during or after the procedure including common and serious side effects. 
x For each option, explanations of the likely benefits and the probabilities of success; 
and discussion of any serious or frequently occurring risks, and of any lifestyle 
changes which may be caused or necessitated by, the treatment. 
x Advice about whether the treatment is experimental.   
 
This list is extensive and it would be pointless to provide the patient with this detailed 
information unless she could use it to reflect upon when making her informed consent 
decision. If a patient is capable of reflection then she must have some degree of rationality. 
The General Medical Council’s guidelines (1999, section 13) also require a competent patient 
to be able to discuss any treatment. Discussion requires a patient’s active participation which 
requires some degree of rationality. It follows therefore that the General Medical Council’s 
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guidelines implicitly hold a competent patient must possess some degree of rationality. It 
further follows that the degree of rationality necessary for a patient to be considered competent 
is determined solely by the degree of rationality considered necessary for her to understand the 
information provided. 
It has been shown above that the General Medical Council implicitly requires that a 
competent patient must have some degree of rationality. However there are different types of 
rationality as is made clear by Over (Over in Koehler & Harvey, 2004, page 12). 
 
There is a distinction between what is often called epistemic rationality, on the one hand, and 
rationality of action, on the other. This distinction is between rational belief and rational 
inference, on the one hand, and rational action, on the other. A rational belief is based on a 
generally reliable mental process. A rational inference has a conclusion that is true, or at least 
probably true, given its premises. A rational action is a good one for us to perform, in a sense 
of “good” that has to be clarified. 
  
In this thesis the rationality of action will be referred to as instrumental or practical rationality. 
The definition of practical rationality used in here is based on Baron (1994, page 29) and is 
defined as whatever kind of thinking best helps people to achieve their goals. It is important to 
be clear what form of rationality is required by the practice of informed consent for the 
following reasons. It seems clear that whether a belief is rational or an inference is logical can 
be assessed by a third party. However, if informed consent is based on purely practical 
rationality, it is not immediately clear how the rationality of a patient’s actions can be assessed 
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by a third party. This creates a problem for the assessment of a patient’s competence to give 
informed consent. This problem will be examined in 5.4.1.  
The General Medical Council’s guidelines are concerned with a competent patient 
understanding the information provided rather than her goals and values. This might lead to 
the assumption that the type of rationality the General Medical Council requires competent 
patients to have is limited to instrumental rationality. However, it will be argued here that the 
above assumption is false. The General Medical Council’s guidelines require that a competent 
patient understands the information supplied to her. Clearly if a patient believes her wound is 
not gangrenous, when she had been informed it is gangrenous then she does not fully 
understand the information supplied to her. It follows that the General Medical Council’s 
guidelines are implicitly concerned with a patient’s epistemic rationality to some degree. It can 
be concluded that these guidelines are concerned with a patient’s instrumental rationality and 
her epistemic rationality. However the concern with a patient’s epistemic rationality is 
restricted to the truth of her representation of the world.  
It follows from above that the General Medical Council’s guidelines are not concerned 
with the rationality of a patient’s goals and values. However it will now be argued that these 
guidelines implicitly require that a competent patient must possess some goals and values. An 
agent’s goals and values may be regarded as her ideals. Frankfurt (1999) argues any decision 
of an agent who has no ideals is based on mere impulse and inclination. 
 
He can make whatever decision he likes and shape his will as he pleases. This does not mean 
that his will is free. It only means that his will is anarchic, moved by mere impulse and 
inclination. (quoted in Frankfurt, 1999, page 114, originally 1993.) 
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Let it be accepted that if a competent patient has no goals and values the decisions she makes 
are based on mere impulse and inclination. The General Medical Council’s guidelines (1999, 
section 5) require that detailed information must be given to a competent patient. It can be 
concluded that these guidelines implicitly require that a competent patient must have a set of 
goals and values in order to be able to use this information. This conclusion follows because if 
a patient has no goals and values, then her decision would be based on mere impulse and 
inclination. If a patient’s decision is based on mere impulse and inclination it seems pointless 
to supply the detailed information. Indeed if a patient bases her decision on mere impulse and 
inclination it might be questioned whether she has any need of practical rationality. To 
summarise, the above guidelines presume patients are competent unless it can be shown 
otherwise. These guidelines also require that a competent patient must understand the 
information relevant to her decision. It has also been argued these guidelines implicitly require 
that a competent patient must have the ability to communicate and possess a set of goals and 
values. In addition a competent patient must be able to use instrumental rationality and have 
no beliefs, relevant to her condition, that misrepresent the world. 
The Department of Health is responsible for implementing health and social care policy 
in the United Kingdom. It issues sets of health guidelines, among which is one on patient 
consent (Department of Health, 2001).This set of guidelines is more explicit than that of the 
General Medical Council. The Department’s guidelines, like those of the General Medical 
Council presume adult patients are competent unless it can be shown otherwise. 
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Adults are presumed to have capacity, but where any doubts exist the health professional 
should assess the capacity of the patient to take the decision in question. (Department of 
Health, 2001, Paragraph 2.1.) 
 
The Department of Health’s guidelines set out the capacities a patient must have in order to be 
considered competent as follows: 
 
For a person to have capacity, he or she must be able to comprehend and retain the 
information material to the decision, especially as to the consequences of having or not having 
the intervention in question, and must be able to weigh this information in the decision-
making process. (Department of Health, 2001, section 2.1) 
 
These guidelines also explicitly require that a competent patient must be able to communicate 
her decision (Department of Health, 2001, section 2.5).  
It has been argued above that it is implicit in The General Medical Council’s guidelines 
that a competent patient must possess a set of goals and values. The Department of Health’s 
guidelines do not explicitly state a competent patient must possess a set of beliefs and values. 
However these guidelines seem to implicitly presume a competent patient has a set of beliefs 
and values. 
 
Capacity should not be confused with a health professional’s assessment of the reasonableness 
of the patient’s decision. The patient is entitled to make a decision that is based on their own 
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religious beliefs or value system, even if it is perceived by others to be irrational, as long as 
the patient understands what is entailed in the decision. An irrational decision has been 
defined as one which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards 
that no sensible person who applied his or her mind to the question could have arrived at it 
(Department of Health, 2001, section 2.5). 
 
It follows according to the Department of Health’s guidelines that a patient is competent when 
she has the following capacities; the capacities to understand and retain the information 
provided, to weigh and communicate her decision. In addition these guidelines also presume 
that a competent patient has a set of beliefs goals and values. This set of beliefs and values is 
necessary to enable the patient to weigh the information provided.  
The Department of Health and The General Medical Council’s guidelines appear to be 
similar but there are two significant differences. Firstly, the General Medical Council’s 
guidelines seem to treat rationality in a Humean way. This means rationality is purely the 
slave of the passions (Hume 1978, Book II, Section III, originally published 1739 - 1740). 
However this is not the position adopted by the Department of Health’s guidelines, see above. 
The General Medical Council’s guidelines hold a competent patient must be able to use 
instrumental rationality and have no beliefs, relevant to her condition, that misrepresent the 
world. However the Department of Health’s guidelines seem to require that competent patients 
have a greater capacity for epistemic rationality. This follows because these guidelines 
connect irrationality with the outrageous defiance of accepted moral standards. Beliefs about 
accepted moral standards are not restricted to beliefs that misrepresent the world. It can be 
concluded these two sets of guidelines differ somewhat with regard to the type of rationality a 
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competent patient requires. This difference is important. Let it be assumed that informed 
consent is based on respect for autonomy. Let it be further assumed that an autonomous 
decision requires some form of rationality. It appears to follow that the capacity for rationality 
needed by a patient to make a competent consent decision should be identical with the 
capacity for rationality needed to make an autonomous decision. The following question then 
arises. Is connecting the capacity for rationality a patient needs to make a competent decision 
with logic and accepted moral standards compatible with respecting patient autonomy? This 
thesis will attempt to resolve this important question in section 5.4.1. 
The second difference in the guidelines issued by the Department of Health and The 
General Medical Council is connected to the first. This difference concerns the content of a 
patient’s goals and values. It was argued above that the General Medical Council’s guidelines 
implicitly require that a competent patient must possess a set of goals and values. However it 
seems unambiguous that these guidelines only require the existence of a set of goals and 
values and are not concerned with the content of these goals and values. The Department of 
Health’s guidelines hold the following, 
 
The patient is entitled to make a decision which is based on their own religious belief or value 
system, even if it is perceived by others as irrational, as long as the patient understands what is 
entailed by their decision. (Department of Health, 2001, section 2.3). 
 
However, the Department of Health’s guidelines also hold a decision may be irrational 
because it defies logic or accepted moral standards (Department of Health, 2001, section 2.3). 
It follows that if a patient bases her consent decision on her goals and values and these are not 
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based on accepted moral standards then her decision might be regarded as incompetent 
according to the Department of Health’s guidelines. It would seem that the Department of 
Health’s guidelines are ambiguous about whether the contents of a patient’s beliefs and values 
matters as far as her competence to give informed consent is concerned. In practice it might be 
argued that some patients are intuitively considered to be incompetent due to their beliefs, 
goals and values rather than a failure of understanding or an inability to use practical 
rationality. This thesis will use the fact that informed consent is based on respect for autonomy 
to investigate this ambiguity in section 6.4.2. In this section I will argue that some simple 
structure must be placed on an autonomous agent’s beliefs, goals and values. I will further 
argue that this structure resolves any ambiguity about whether the content of a patient’s 
beliefs, goals and values matter when assessing her competence to give informed consent. 
The guidelines of the Department of Health and the General Medical Council agree about the 
following. Adult patients should be presumed to be competent unless there are reasons to 
doubt this. It is not up to the patient to show she is competent. If her competence is doubted 
then the health professionals involved in her treatment must show why she is incompetent. A 
patient can be shown to be incompetent if she lacks one of the following. 
1) The capacity to understand and retain information provided. 
2) The capacity to communicate. 
3) The capacity to reason. 
4) A set of beliefs, goals and values. 
However these guidelines appear to differ concerning the importance of the content of a 
patient’s goals and values when assessing her competence to give informed consent. The 
General Medical Council’s guidelines only require that a patient possesses a set of goals and 
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values. The Department of Health’s guidelines seem to be slightly ambiguous about whether 
the content of a patient’s goals and values matter when assessing her competence to give 
informed consent. 
1.2. Informed consent and legal guidelines 
 
The legal position in the United Kingdom concerning informed consent has been developed 
over many years by case law. There are no specific statutes concerning informed consent 
Jones (1999, 105). Legal judgements presume every adult capable of making a choice is 
competent to consent unless it can be shown to be otherwise, see T [1992]. Legal judgements 
also hold that if a doctor treats a competent patient without her consent then the doctor 
commits an assault, see Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the 
Maudsley Hospital [1985]. Judge Cardozo classically expressed these positions as follows. 
 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
to his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without the patient’s consent 
commits an assault for which he is liable in damages. [Schloendorff v Society of New York 
Hospitals, 1914] 
 
This American judgement is important because it is usually quoted with approval in legal 
judgments and academic texts in The United Kingdom; see for instance Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland [1992] and MB [1997]. This presumption of a patient’s competence concurs with the 
guidelines issued by the General Medical Council and the Department of Health. Legal 
judgements also require that a competent patient possesses certain capacities. Justice Thorpe 
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set out the capacities legally required by a patient if she is to be considered competent in the 
case of C [1994]. If a patient possesses these capacities she is said to fulfil the conditions of 
the C test. According to the C test a competent patient needs these capacities to enable her to 
 
Comprehend and retain the information as to the proposed treatment, had believed it and had 
weighed it in the balance when making a choice. [C, 1994] 
 
It follows that if a patient is to be considered legally competent she must understand the 
information provided, believe it and be able to weigh it. This thesis assumes that to “weigh the 
information” means the patient can use reason to reflect on her decision. 
The same arguments which were used in 1.1 can again be employed to show that legal 
judgements implicitly require a competent patient must possess the capacity to communicate 
her decision and the set of goals and values on which her decision is based. It follows legal 
judgments for the most part concur with the guidelines issued by both the Department of 
Health and the General Medical Council. However legal judgments go further than the above 
guidelines because not only do they require that a competent patient must understand the 
information provided, but they also require that she must believe it [C, 1994]. In section 5.2 I 
will question whether a patient must believe the information provided. The C test requires that 
a competent patient must be capable of weighing the information provided. However it is not 
immediately clear what sort of balance between instrumental and epistemic rationality this test 
requires. Indeed in the case of Sidaway it might appear there is no legal requirement at all that 
a competent patient must be rational. 
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If the doctor making a balanced judgment advises the patient to submit to the operation, the 
patient is entitled to reject that advice for reasons that are rational, or irrational, or for no 
reason. [Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley 
Hospital, 1985] 
 
It seems improbable that there is no legal requirements concerning the rationality a patient is 
expected to possess in order give competent consent. If indeed patients had no need to possess 
rationality when giving competent consent then perhaps children or even the insane might be 
considered capable of giving consent. Further it would seem if Templeman’s judgment given 
in Sidaway had no requirement for competent patients to be rational, then legal judgments are 
inconsistent. Thorpe stated in the case of C [1994] that a competent patient must be able to 
weigh the information supplied. Prima facie it seems Thorpe’s judgment is inconsistent with 
that of Templeman. 
This apparent inconsistency can be explained if the following holds. When Templeman 
referred to reasons in the case of Sidaway he was referring to a patient’s goals and values, and 
Thorpe, in the case of C, regarded a patient as competent if she was able to use instrumental 
rationality and had no beliefs, relevant to her condition, that misrepresent her condition. If the 
above is accepted, then legal judgments do not require the goals and values on which 
competent patients base their decisions must be rational. However they do require that a 
competent patient must be able to use instrumental rationality in order to weigh the 
information provided and that she has no false beliefs concerning her condition. It follows that 
legal guidelines restrict the epistemic rationality a competent patient requires to beliefs 
concerning her condition. It can be concluded that the capacities a patient must have in order 
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to be considered legally competent concur with the capacities required by the General Medical 
Council’s guidelines with one exception. Legal judgements require not only that a patient must 
understand the information provided but also that she believes it [C, 1994]. It can be further 
concluded that the capacities considered necessary for a patient to be considered competent by 
the Department of Health’s guidelines exceed those considered necessary by legal judgments. 
The Department’s guidelines hold that a patient’s goals or values may sometimes be 
considered as irrational. It follows that the Department’s guidelines place greater importance 
on epistemic rationality than do legal judgements.  
These differences concerning the rationality of a patient’s goals and values matter when 
assessing her competence, and can be illustrated in practice by considering the case of B 
[2002]. Ms B was a tetraplegic patient who was kept alive by a ventilator and who decided she 
wished to have the ventilator switched off. Ms B had not consented to being placed on this 
machine. There was disagreement as to whether Ms B’s decision was competent. Ms B 
believed she would be better dead rather than continue to live on the ventilator. This belief 
concerned what Ms B cared about and was not a belief concerning the facts of her condition. It 
follows according to legal judgments and the General Medical Council’s guidelines that the 
rationality of this belief would be irrelevant when assessing her competence to give informed 
consent. Further, according to legal judgments and the above guidelines, if Ms B had a 
preference to die rather than to continue living on the ventilator then she would be 
instrumentally rational in wanting the ventilator switched off because this action would deliver 
the “good” she desired. It can be concluded that provided Ms B understood the information 
relevant to her decision to be removed from the ventilator, then her decision should have been 
regarded competent according to legal judgements and the General Medical Council’s 
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guidelines. However Ms B might not have been regarded as competent using the Department 
of Health’s guidelines because these place greater emphasis on epistemic rationality. The 
Department’s guidelines might agree that Ms B was instrumentally rational if she wanted the 
ventilator switched off when the “good” Ms B sought was to die. However, using these 
guidelines it might be argued that Ms B’s belief that she would rather die than continue on the 
ventilator was irrational as it was in defiance of generally accepted moral standards. It follows 
that even though Ms B was instrumentally rational, and had no false beliefs concerning her 
condition, that she might still have been regarded as incompetent using the Department of 
Health’s guidelines. In practice it might be argued that a patient’s belief that she would be 
better dead rather than continuing to live on a ventilator would not be assessed for rationality 
and that the differences concerning the scope of epistemic rationality outlined above are of 
purely theoretical interest. 
However such an argument would be unsound. These differences concerning the scope 
of epistemic rationality will be shown to be of practical importance by considering anorexic 
patients. An anorexic patient can be judged to be incompetent due to irrationality for two main 
reasons. Draper (2000) sets out these reasons as follows: 
  
There are two justifications for associating irrationality with incompetence in the case of 
anorexia, One is the desire to not to eat undermines an even stronger desire not to die. Another 
is that the desire not to eat may be an involuntary one, grounded in some deeply held, but 
false, belief about their body image – usually that they are fat. (Draper, 2000, page 129) 
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Firstly, an anorexic patient may have no clear conception of her own “good” because of her 
conflicting desires. It follows if she has no clear conception of her own “good” she will be 
unable to use instrumental rationality and hence is incompetent. Secondly, an anorexic patient 
may also be regarded as incompetent because she has an untrue belief concerning her 
condition. However, a sufferer from anorexia might be able to fully understand her condition. 
Further, she might prefer to die and see death as a “good” rather than continue to live the way 
she does now. It follows that such a patient would be capable of using instrumental rationality 
and she would have no false beliefs concerning her condition. It further follows that such a 
patient might be regarded as competent according to legal judgements and the General 
Medical Council’s guidelines. Draper supports this position and argues that 
 
It was noted earlier that many sufferers are not broadly incompetent. Granted that broad 
competence is intact we should be open to the possibility that the sufferers are actually as 
competent as anyone else to make decisions about the quality of their lives, and to assess the 
relative value of these lives in the light of this quality. For this reason, it is proposed that it 
may be wrong as well as unlawful, to force patients to comply with therapy just because they 
are anorexic. (Draper, 2000, page 133). 
 
It should be noted in this context that when Draper uses the term unlawful she is 
referring to the current law in the United Kingdom and is not just making a moral point. It 
might be argued that in practice an anorexic cannot unambiguously hold the belief that death 
is a “good” and so should not be considered competent (Giordao, 2003). The Department of 
Health’s guidelines would seem to hold that an anorexic’s goals and values are in defiance of 
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generally accepted moral standards and hence are irrational. It follows that even the possibility 
that a limited number of anorexic patients might be regarded as competent could not occur 
under the Department of Health’s guidelines. The example of anorexic patients clearly shows 
that the differences outlined above concerning the rationality of a patient’s goals and values 
are not purely theoretical but matter in practice. 
There is one further important legal judgment that must be considered in any 
examination of informed consent. Lord Donaldson stated in the case of T that 
 
What matters at the time was whether at the time the patient’s capacity was reduced below the 
level needed in a case of that importance, for refusals can vary in importance, some may 
involve a risk to life or irreparable damage to health, others may not [T, 1992] 
 
This judgment has two important consequences. Firstly, risk must be considered directly in 
any assessment of a patient’s competence. It follows that a patient will need greater capacities 
to be considered competent when giving informed consent to some treatment carrying a high 
risk as opposed to giving informed consent to some treatment carrying a lesser risk. It also 
follows that this increase in the capacities a patient needs in order to be considered competent 
occurs irrespective of whether these increased capacities are needed by the patient to 
understand the risk in question. Secondly, refusals of consent seem to require that a patient has 
greater capacities to be considered competent than when she consents. The General Medical 
Council’s guidelines consider risk to be important. However, these guidelines do not consider 
risk to be important in the way required by Donaldson. These guidelines only hold it is 
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important for a patient to understand the risks she faces (The General Medical Council, 1999, 
section 4). However, if a patient has the capacities to understand the risks she faces, then risk 
plays no further part in the assessment of her competence. It follows that considerations of risk 
only indirectly affect the capacities a patient needs to be considered competent. Legal 
judgements also require that a competent patient understands the risks associated with any 
proposed treatment [C, 1992]. However, according to Donaldson’s judgement in T, it is not 
sufficient that a patient merely understands the risks involved in order to be considered 
competent. Donaldson’s judgement means risk is somehow connected directly to the standard 
of competence and this standard increases automatically as risk increases. 
In order to make these issues clear, two examples will be used to show how the General 
Medical Council’s guidelines and legal judgements treat risk differently. The first example 
concerns a patient who needs an emergency appendectomy and the second a patient who needs 
a hip replacement. The General Medical Council’s guidelines require that a competent patient 
has the capacity to understand the information provided. This understanding includes both the 
risks involved in the procedure and in leaving the condition untreated. Let it be assumed that 
the capacities required by a competent patient to understand the details of each of these 
procedures are roughly equivalent. It follows, using the above guidelines, that a patient needs 
roughly the same degree of capacity to give competent consent for each of these procedures. 
However, this would not be the position according to Donaldson’s judgement. Using this 
judgement a patient giving competent consent to a hip replacement would need the capacity to 
understand details of the procedure and the risks involved. However, if a patient refused to 
consent to an emergency appendectomy then she would need additional capacities, above 
those needed to understand details of the procedure and the risks involved, in order to be 
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considered competent. Further the patient requires these additional capacities in order to be 
considered competent irrespective of whether these additional capacities are needed to 
understand the risk involved. This follows because Donaldson’s judgment means the 
capacities a patient needs in order to be considered competent increase directly with risk. It 
can be concluded that legal judgments and the above guidelines sometimes differ over the 
capacities a patient needs to be considered competent when making dangerous decisions. 
The fact that some treatment carries a great risk does not of necessity mean that the 
patient needs any additional capacities to understand this risk as shown by the example above 
and as pointed out by Buller (2001, page 100) and Wicclair (1991, page 96). This raises the 
following question. Is it always possible to justify requiring a patient to have additional 
capacities when making dangerous decisions in order to be considered competent, irrespective 
of whether these additional capacities are needed by her to understand the risk involved? 
Clearly if a patient’s decision seems likely to lead to harm then these additional capacities can 
be justified by beneficence. However, informed consent is based on respect for patient 
autonomy. It has been argued above that Donaldson’s judgment means the capacities a patient 
needs to be considered competent in a risky situation are directly tied to risk in some way. It 
will be argued in chapter 4 that this means giving precedence to acting beneficently over 
respecting autonomy. This will lead to the major conclusion of this thesis. It will be concluded 
that requiring patients to have additional capacities when making dangerous decisions in order 
to be considered competent, when these capacities are not needed to understand the decision, 
is incompatible with respect for autonomy. 
The second consequence of Donaldson’s judgement means that a patient’s refusal of 
consent is of greater importance when assessing her competence than her consent. It follows 
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that this judgement requires that the capacities a patient needs to be considered competent are 
not tied directly to the capacities she needs to her decision but are tied directly to the risk 
attached to the outcome her decision. It follows therefore that a patient’s competence may be 
assessed asymmetrically. This means that a patient may be considered competent to consent 
but incompetent if she refuses to consent. Chapter 4 will argue that the idea of asymmetric 
competence assessment is conceptually coherent. However it will also argue that the concept 
of asymmetric competence depends on giving precedence to acting beneficently over 
respecting autonomy. For the above reason it will be conclude that the concept of asymmetric 
competence assessment is incompatible with respect for autonomy. 
It can be concluded that in general, legal judgements concur with the guidelines of the 
Department of Health and the General Medical Council. However, there are two differences. 
Firstly, legal judgements additionally require that a competent patient must believe the 
information provided. Secondly legal judgements treat the way risk affects the assessment of a 
patient’s competence differently. The above guidelines only make it clear that a competent 
patient must have the capacity to understand the risks involved in her treatment. It follows that 
the capacities a patient needs to be considered competent only vary indirectly with the risk 
involved with her decision. Legal judgements mean the capacities a patient needs to be 
considered competent vary directly with the risk involved with the outcome of her decision. 
 
1.3. Informed consent and bioethics 
Most bio-ethicists adopt a similar approach to the assessment of patient competence to those 
outlined above. Bio-ethicists usually agree that adults should normally be presumed to be 
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competent, see Buchanan and Brock (1989, page 21). Buchanan and Brock outline the 
capacities they believe are needed for a patient to be considered competent. 
 
Two may be distinguished, the capacity for understanding and communication, and the 
capacity for reasoning and deliberation. Although these capacities are not entirely distinct, 
significant deficiencies in any of then can result in diminished decision-making competence. 
A third important element of competence is that the individual must have a set of values or 
conception of the good (Buchanan & Brock,1989, page 25). 
 
Wicclair (1991) agrees. 
 
According to the standard analysis decision making capacity requires; (1) a capacity to 
understand and communicate, (2) a capacity to reason and deliberate, and (3) possession of a 
set of values and goals. (Wicclair, 1991, page 91) 
 
Among bio-ethicists there is general agreement that in order to be considered competent a 
patient must be able to understand the information provided, be able to communicate, be able 
to reason and have a set of goals and values. However, there is no detailed agreement in two 
important areas. It was shown above that while legal judgements require the risk a patient 
faces to be linked directly to the standards she must meet in order to be considered competent, 
the official guidelines suggest the standards a competent patient must meet should only be 
indirectly connected to the risk she faces. There is a vigorous debate in bioethics as to whether 
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the risk a patient faces should be directly or indirectly involved in setting the standard she 
needs to meet in order to be considered competent. Buchanan and Brock (1989), (Drane, 
1985) and Wilks (1997, 1999) argue that risk should be directly connected to the standard of 
competence employed. Whilst Buller (2001), Cale (1999), Demarco (2002) and Wicclair, 
(1991) argue that risk should only be indirectly connected to the standard of competence 
employed. 
This disagreement concerning risk and the standards employed to assess patient 
competence extends into the debate about how much and what sort of rationality a competent 
patient requires. Wilks (1999) believes safety is a normative value and if a patient is to be 
considered competent she must be capable of recognising this value. If this position is 
accepted, then this has implications for the rationality required by a competent patient. A 
competent patient cannot simply be someone who is capable of practical rationality with no 
false beliefs about her condition. Others such as Wicclair (1991) believe the rationality needed 
by a competent patient should simply be as defined above. Both of these disagreements 
represent disagreements that seem to be part of the wider practice of informed consent. 
This chapter’s survey of different definitions of informed consent in practice makes it 
clear there is general agreement that a competent patient must be able to understand the 
information relevant to her condition, to communicate her decision and that she must have a 
set of goals and values. These specific details of these conditions will be examined in chapter 
5. In practice this definition of patient competency reaches incomplete agreement in two areas. 
Firstly, it is generally agreed that risk can affect the capacities a patient needs to be considered 
competent but there is disagreement as to whether risk should affect these capacities directly 
or indirectly. Secondly, it is generally agreed that a patient must be capable of reasoning but 
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there is a disagreement about the scope of this rationality. How far should rationality extend to 
a patient’s beliefs and values? It might be argued that the case of Ms B [2002] arose because 
of this disagreement. It might appear that with a little effort these disagreements could be 
resolved and a more complete definition of informed consent arrived at.  
In practice it is difficult to see how these disagreements could be resolved without 
resorting to an arbitrary definition. One way to avoid this difficultly might be to resolve these 
disagreements simply by considering these disagreements in the light of the health interests of 
patients. However accepting this proposal would mean informed consent becomes merely a 
means to ensure a patient’s co-operation with beneficent care. It should be noted that in the 
past this was indeed the purpose of consent, see Jackson (2001, page 10). Let it be accepted 
that informed consent is based on respect for autonomy. It follows that these disagreements 
can only be resolved, and a more complete definition of informed consent given, by examining 
both the concept of autonomy and the connection between informed consent and autonomy. 
This examination will take place in the following two chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
Autonomy 1 
 
The concept of autonomy must be examined for two reasons. The first is simply because 
informed consent is based on respect for autonomy. The second comes from the disagreements 
concerning the way informed consent is practised which I argued might be resolved by 
examining the concept of autonomy and the connection between informed consent and respect 
for autonomy. Unfortunately, as remarked in the introduction, there are various philosophical 
concepts of autonomy (see, e.g. Cuypers 2000, page 226 and Meyers 2004, page 106) which 
must be examined. This examination will involve three steps. Firstly, a concept of autonomy 
will be outlined. Secondly, the domain in which this concept of autonomy is applicable will be 
examined and thirdly the compatibility of this concept with our intuitive ideas of autonomy 
will be considered. 
The justification for the first step in the above examination of autonomy is self-
explanatory. The second and third steps in this examination may be justified as follows. The 
concept of autonomy originated in the idea that certain city-states in classical Greece were 
self-governing and the concept of personal autonomy is an extension of the concept of self-
governing states according to Beauchamp and Childress (1989, page 68).This thesis will 
examine the extension of the domain of autonomy from the political, to the moral, to personal 
government and in doing so attempt to resolve some of the conflicts between various concepts 
of autonomy in relation to informed consent. It will be argued that some concepts of autonomy 
cannot be extended to cover the sort of decisions involved in informed consent. This is 
because the domain in which some concepts are meaningful is limited and should not be 
extended too far. In this thesis I will ague that any concept of autonomy underlying informed 
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consent must account to some degree for our intuitive ideas of what it means to be self-
governing. Wittgenstein (1953, proposition 43) asserted that the meaning of a word is given by 
its use in language. If a patient believes the idea of autonomy being respected when he gives 
informed consent bears little resemblance to his intuitive ideas of self-government, then he 
may question whether his autonomy is indeed being respected. Chapter 3 will examine 
different concepts of autonomy in conjunction with our intuitive ideas. This chapter will 
clarify our intuitive ideas of autonomy and examine what it means to respect autonomy. 
 
2.1. Intuitive ideas of autonomy 
 
This section will set out the three conditions which seem to be necessary for our intuitive ideas 
of autonomy. In this section intuitive ideas of autonomy and self-government will be held to 
be equivalent. It will argued that intuitively self-government means an agent has the freedom 
necessary to make choices, he identifies with his choice and any choice he makes must have 
some persistence. 
Intuitively, autonomy can refer to either autonomous persons or to autonomous 
decisions. The first intuitive condition can refer to either an autonomous person or an 
autonomous decision. The second and third intuitive conditions refer only to an agent’s 
autonomous decisions. Autonomous decisions are important for two reasons. Firstly, the idea 
of autonomous persons seems to be partly parasitic on the idea of autonomous decisions (see 
Christman, 1991, page 3). Secondly, the concept of informed consent is concerned with a 
patient’s decisions. This does not of necessity mean informed consent is based on respect for 
autonomous decisions. However, it seems probable it will be easier to connect informed 
consent decisions to autonomous decisions rather than autonomous persons. 
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Intuitively, if someone is unable to make decisions about his future due to a lack of 
ability then he is incapable of self-government. Further, it seems intuitively that even if 
someone is able to make decisions about his future but is incapable of implementing his 
decisions, then he is incapable of self-government. It follows that an intuitively self-governing 
agent must of necessity have both the ability to make decisions and the ability to act on them. 
Waller (2001) argues that genuine autonomy is simply the ability of an agent to choose among 
various options and act on his choice. 
 
Genuine autonomy requires options available within our actual environment, options chosen 
on the basis of our conditional preferences and changing circumstances; not mysterious 
alternatives that transcend all causal and environmental influences. This natural biological 
view of autonomy with its mundane alternatives, has special value in the medical 
environment. (Waller, 2001, page 585). 
 
Let it be accepted that Waller is right and intuitively autonomy requires that autonomous 
agents have options. Implicitly it follows that autonomous agents must be able to make 
decisions about these options and have the ability to act on them. Waller gives a naturalistic 
account of autonomy. This naturalistic account requires that an autonomous agent has choices 
available to him and that he can choose and act on his choices. Furthermore he seems to 
believe this naturalistic account defines genuine autonomy. 
Intuitively, it seems Waller is correct to believe that an autonomous agent must have 
choices available to him and must be able to choose and act on his choices. However, it seems 
he is wrong to believe this naturalistic account is sufficient to account for even our intuitive 
ideas of autonomy. If autonomy is simply the ability to choose among various options and act 
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without any further conditions then even wild animals might be regarded as autonomous. 
Intuitively, wild animals are free but this does not mean they are intuitively autonomous. 
Waller appears to be committed to this position because he believes autonomy is a product of 
biological evolution (Waller, 2001, page 585). Let it be accepted that intuitively autonomy is 
equivalent to self-government. Let it be accepted that wild animals make choices. However 
such choices do not seem to be acts of self-government and hence are not intuitively 
autonomous. It must be pointed out in fairness to Waller that his position appears to be 
ambiguous because in a later paper he argues that dumping responsibility onto a patient who 
cannot act purposely is not an example of respecting autonomy (2002, page 259). This might 
be because there are other intuitive ideas connected to self-government. 
Intuitively if someone fails to identify with his decision then his decision is non-
autonomous. This follows because if someone fails to identify with his decisions it appears the 
self has gone out of his self-government. Let it be assumed that someone makes a decision on 
a mere whim without reflection. Let it be further assumed that this is a freely made decision. 
However such an unreflective decision does not seem to be an act of self-government. In 
making such an unreflective decision the self seems detached from the decision. Intuitively, 
self-government is not simply the agent deciding, but deciding what is best for him. It follows 
that if someone decides what is best for him then he is deciding with reference to what he 
cares about. It is argued by Frankfurt (1988, page 83, originally 1982) if someone cares about 
something, then he must identify with what he cares about. If Frankfurt is right then intuitively 
self-government is about decisions an agent thinks are good for him, decisions he cares about, 
and these must be decisions he identifies with. 
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It is important not to confuse intuitions concerning autonomy that apply to persons with 
intuitions concerning autonomy that apply to decisions. Let it be accepted that self-
government intuitively means the agent’s decisions are freely made decisions, decisions in 
which the decision-maker has meaningful choices and the power to implement his decisions. It 
would appear to follow that children and the mentally ill might be intuitively autonomous. 
Buller  (2001, page 101) argues that someone suffering from mild dementia might be 
intuitively self-governing to a degree that enables him to choose how to spend his day even if 
intuitively he would be incapable of self-government regarding his medical treatment. It seems 
clear that children and the mentally ill can make some autonomous decisions. Legal judgments 
seem to support this position. C was a schizophrenic confined to a mental institution. 
However, Justice Thorpe ruled that because C understood his situation he was competent to 
give consent [C, 1994]. The case of children is illustrated by Gillick v West Norfolk and 
Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986]. However, it seems intuitively apparent that children 
and the mentally ill are not always autonomous. The reason for this becomes apparent if we 
focus on autonomous decisions rather than autonomous persons. Intuitively a decision is only 
autonomous if an agent identifies with his decision. Children and the mentally can identify 
themselves with some decisions but they cannot identify themselves with these other decisions 
if they cannot understand the background and consequences of these decisions. This follows 
because when they cannot understand the consequences of their decision it is impossible for 
them to fully relate any decisions they make to what they cares about. It can be concluded that 
intuitively an autonomous decision is a decision an agent must identify himself with. 
The importance of agents identifying with their choices can be illustrated in practice. 
Consider a survey of women’s attitude to consenting to screening for BRAC 1 and 2 gene 
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mutations which predispose them to breast and ovarian cancers (Hallowell, Foster, Arden-
Jones, Murray and Watson, 2003). All the women involved in this survey had or were 
suspected to have cancer. It follows that the screening made no clinical difference to them.  
However this screening might alert their relatives to the need to be screened themselves and 
perhaps to take preventative action. The participants had the choice to consent to the screening 
and could also choose whether or not to pass the results of the screening on to their female 
relatives. The authors of the survey found the women felt they had no choice. 
 
Thus, as far as most women concerned, they did not make an explicit decision whether they 
went to mutation screening, because, in a fundamental sense they felt that they had no real 
choice – in practice their actions are constrained by their need to care for other family 
members. (Hallowell, Foster, Arden-Jones, Murray and Watson. 2003, page 81) 
 
These women’s choice was constrained and it appears they had only one meaningful option. 
Clearly these women made an intuitively autonomous decision. This example raises the 
question of how autonomous agents may make intuitively autonomous decisions which may 
be in some way constrained.  
Constraints may be imposed internally or externally. Let it be accepted that someone 
cannot be intuitively regarded as autonomous if his decisions are externally constrained. In the 
survey used above the women felt their actions were constrained by a need to care for other 
family members. Their feeling that they must care for others was an internal constraint. 
Intuitively these women’s decisions were autonomous. It follows the internally constrained 
decisions of some agents are also intuitively autonomous. Clearly not all decisions that are 
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internally constrained are intuitively autonomous; consider for instance an unwilling drug 
addict. The question that must now be asked is this. Why are some internal constraints 
compatible with our intuitive ideas of autonomy whilst others are not? The women consenting 
to gene mutation screening clearly identified with their internally constrained choice. The 
unwilling drug addict does not identify with his internally constrained choice to take drugs. 
Intuitively, if someone’s decision is subject to internal constraints and he identifies himself 
with these internal constraints then these particular constraints do not give reason to believe 
his decision is non-autonomous. 
It been argued above an agent’s identification with a decision is a necessary condition 
for that decision to be regarded as intuitively autonomous. The example used above 
demonstrates that in practice an agent’s ability to identify with his decisions sometimes might 
be more important to him than the range of options open to him. Indeed, sometimes 
identification means an agent’s decision is constrained from his viewpoint. The case of the 
women consenting to screening for gene mutations clearly illustrates this. However, from the 
viewpoint of a third party these women had the option of not consenting. This leads to the 
following conclusion. Intuitively an autonomous decision must be one in which the agent has 
options. However, internal constraints, with which the agent identifies might mean these 
options are reduced to a single option from the agent’s viewpoint. 
It has been argued that an agent’s identification with a decision is a necessary condition 
for this decision to be regarded as intuitively autonomous. Unfortunately it is by no means 
clear what it means for an agent to identify with his decision. Identification might simply be 
thought to mean an agent has some desire and acts rationally to achieve his desire. Clearly this 
would be an insufficient condition for identification because the desire might be one the agent 
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wishes he did not have. The example of a drug addict used above clearly illustrates this. The 
addict might act quite rationally to obtain money to serve his desire to buy drugs, however this 
is not an autonomous act. It follows that even if an agent acts rationally to serve his desires 
this does not mean he identifies himself with these desires. The above position might be 
modified. Identification meant an agent had some desire and acts to achieve his desire. In 
addition the agent must also approve of this desire. This idea was developed by Dworkin, 
(1988, page 15) but later rejected by him. If such a definition were accepted then there are 
theoretical problems connected to regress or circularity which appear to be an intrinsic part of 
such a definition. The problem of how an agent identifies with his decisions is important. This 
problem will be examined in greater detail in chapters 3 and 5. However, even if there are 
theoretical problems associated with an agent identifying with his decisions, it still seems an 
agent’s identification with his decisions is part of what it means to be intuitively autonomous. 
It has been argued above that an intuitively autonomous decision only makes sense when 
the agent identifies with this decision. It was then pointed out that exactly what is meant by an 
agent’s identification with his decision is not clear. However, it was suggested that an agent’s 
identification with his decision must depend on what the agent cares about and cannot be 
based merely on impulse or inclination. If this was not so, wild animals might be thought to be 
autonomous. Let it be accepted that an intuitively autonomous decision must be a decision the 
agent cares about. It will now be argued that if someone cares about something then what he 
cares about must have persistence over time. Frankfurt (1988 originally 1982) argues the 
notion of “caring about” something requires persistence. 
Desires and beliefs have no inherent persistence; nothing in the nature of wanting or of 
believing, requires that a desire or a belief must endure. But the notion of guidance, and hence 
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the notion of caring, implies a certain consistency or steadiness of behaviour, and this 
presupposes some degree of persistence. (quoted in Frankfurt, 1988, page 84 originally 1982) 
 
Frankfurt’s concept of “caring about” something will be discussed in detail in section 3.5. If 
someone fails to persist with a decision and continually changes his mind when his 
circumstances remain constant, then intuitively he either does not care about or is unable to 
care about his decision. It follows that the persistence of a decision seems to be intuitively a 
necessary condition for that decision to be regarded as autonomous. Indeed, without even 
introducing ideas of “caring about”, intuitively such a decision does not seem to be an act of 
self-government. Governance of any sort requires some persistence of purpose. 
The case of MB [1997] can be used to illustrate the importance of the persistence of a 
decision if that decision is to be regarded as an act of self-government. MB was twenty-three 
years old and was thirty-three weeks pregnant. She visited her local health clinic twice and on 
each occasion was asked for a sample of blood. On both occasions she refused consent saying 
she was frightened of needles. At a later visit to the health clinic it was suspected that her baby 
was in a breech position and this was later confirmed by ultrasound.  Breech position carries 
the risk of prolapse. If prolapse occurs there is a risk that the baby’s umbilical cord might get 
entangled in the membranes after they have ruptured causing the baby’s blood supply to be 
obstructed during birth. This obstruction might cause death or brain damage to the baby due to 
lack of oxygen. The above was explained to MB and she was admitted to hospital where she 
consented to a caesarean section but she again refused to consent to a venepuncture to provide 
blood samples. However, when she was taken to operating theatre and the anaesthetist wished 
to insert a veneflon, MB refused consent and was returned to the ward. Later, when her GP 
visited her, she again consented to the caesarean section. However she again refused consent 
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when taken to operating theatre. The Hospital trust applied to the courts and MB was found to 
be of unsound mind due to her ambivalence caused by her needle phobia and hence was 
considered incompetent to give consent. 
The purpose of using this case is not to consider this particular legal judgement but to 
illustrate the need for persistence in decision-making if someone’s decision is to be considered 
intuitively self-governing. MB kept changing her mind and as result her decisions had no 
persistence. It has been argued we would not intuitively regard someone’s decision as part of 
his self-government if he did not care about or was unable to care about his decision. It was 
further argued that someone does not care about or was unable to care about with his decision 
unless he persists with the decision. It is of course quite compatible with our intuitive ideas of 
self-government for someone to change his mind when the circumstances change. However 
MB kept changing her decision whilst her situation remained unaltered. If the above is 
accepted then she could not identify with her decisions and so was intuitively not self-
governing. It might be suggested that the ideas of an agent identifying with his decision and 
persisting with that decision are connected. This thesis will examine this connection in chapter 
5. However, at an intuitive level the concepts seem distinct and will be treated as such in the 
examination of more philosophical concepts of autonomy which occurs in chapter 3. 
To summarise it seems someone is intuitively self-governing, autonomous only if he 
fulfils all of the following conditions.  
1) The agent has the capacity to choose and there are no external constraints affecting 
his choice.  
2) The agent identifies with his decisions.  
3) A self-governing decision must have a degree of persistence unless the circumstances 
in which the decision was made change. 
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2.2 Respect for autonomy 
 
It is generally agreed that the concept of informed consent is based on respect for autonomy 
(see the General medical Council’s guidelines to doctors, 2001, introduction 1). It follows that 
prior to examining, in detail the manner in which informed consent is based on respect for 
autonomy, what it means to respect autonomy should be examined. This examination is 
complicated by two factors. Firstly there are some concepts of autonomy that refer to 
autonomous persons (see Dworkin, 1988, page 15), and some concepts that refer to 
autonomous decisions (see Christman, 1991, page 3). It seems clear that the ways in which an 
autonomous person and an autonomous decision are respected might differ. Secondly, 
autonomous decisions possess both instrumental and intrinsic value (see Dworkin, 1988, pages 
111). The way in which these different values are respected might also differ. In this section I 
will firstly examine what it means to respect an autonomous person and secondly what it 
means to respect an autonomous decision. 
However, prior to carrying out this examination of respect for autonomy the idea of 
respect must be clarified. This idea entails there is something which is respected and there is a 
respecter who does this respecting. It will be assumed in this thesis a respecter is always a 
human being. Respect entails if a respecter respects something then his behaviour is in some 
way constrained with regard to what he respects. All sorts of things may be respected such as 
the countryside or a person. Clearly respecting the countryside places different constraints on 
someone to those placed on him when he respects a person. This thesis is only concerned with 
respecting persons. Not all persons are respected in the same way. For instance someone’s 
behaviour towards the Prime Minister may be constrained by a feeling of awe. Someone’s 
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behaviour towards a gangster may be constrained by a feeling of fear. This thesis is not 
concerned with respecting a particular person. It is only concerned with respecting persons in 
general irrespective of their particular character or station in life. In particular it is concerned 
with what constraints are placed on us when we respect an autonomous person. 
An autonomous person is someone who is self governing. The concept of an autonomous 
person will be dealt with in greater detail in sections 3.3 and 3.5. It has been argued above that 
intuitively an autonomous person must be free, within the law, from external constraints. He 
must identify with his decisions and these decisions must have persistence. The question now 
that must now be answered is this. What constraints are placed on someone when he respects 
an autonomous person? In order to facilitate answering this question, two subsidiary questions 
must be answered. Firstly, why do we respect autonomous persons in general? It seems clear 
we do not respect autonomous persons because we are in awe of them as might be possible in 
the case of the Prime Minister or fear someone as might happen in the case of a gangster. In 
this section I will argue that we respect autonomous persons because we believe the exercise 
of autonomy has value. However, it seems clear that we should also respect non-autonomous 
persons such as children and the mentally incapacitated because we believe they have intrinsic 
value. This leads to the second question. How does respecting autonomous persons differ from 
respecting persons in general? In order to answer this second question I will examine the 
constraints imposed on someone when he respects autonomous and non-autonomous persons. 
I will conclude that the intrinsic value of autonomy imposes an additional type of constraint 
on someone when he respects an autonomous person as opposed to respecting a non-
autonomous person. 
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Respect for persons is usually considered with reference to Kant’s ideas. Kant’s practical 
imperative requires we should always treat a person as an end in himself (Kant, 1948, page 91, 
originally 1785). Let it be accepted that to respect any person, autonomous or non-
autonomous, means we must at least treat him as an end in himself. Accepting this leads to a 
further question. What constraints are imposed on our behaviour by treating someone as an 
end in himself? Buss (1999, page 536) argues treating someone as an end in himself means we 
must take that person’s ends into account. However, before we can answer how we take 
someone’s ends into account, a further question must be answered. What is meant by a 
person’s ends? In the context of medicine a limited definition of someone’s ends must include 
their health needs, goals and values. If this limited but diverse definition of someone’s ends is 
accepted then we can try to answer the question of what is entailed by taking these ends into 
account? Let it be accepted that someone’s ends include his health needs and we have a duty 
to take these ends into account. Accepting the above does not mean our behaviour is 
constrained by a duty to provide for all his health needs. This clearly follows because our 
resources are finite. However, if treating someone as an end in himself means we must take 
that person’s ends into account and that we cannot ignore these ends by simply acting 
beneficently with regard to what we perceive to be his interests, it follows that to take 
someone’s ends into account means we are constrained to act beneficently with regard to these 
ends. This means promoting these ends provided we are able. O’Neill expresses this position 
as follows. 
 
However the Kantian conception of beneficence is from the start antipaternalistic. The duty to 
seek others’ happiness is always a duty to promote and share others’ ends without taking them 
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over, rather than a duty to provide determinate goods and services to meet others’ needs, or to 
see that their ends are achieved. Beneficence of this sort presupposes others who are at least 
partly agents and have their own ends. (O’Neill, 1989, page 116) 
 
It is important to be clear about what is meant by beneficence. O’Neill is referring to acting 
beneficently with regard to the ends of others, as perceived by these others. Acting 
beneficently in this sense means promoting the ends of others. However it is possible to act 
beneficently with regard to other’s interests. Acting beneficently with regard to the ends of 
others, as perceived by these others, might be incompatible with acting beneficently with 
regard to other’s interests. This can be clearly seen by considering children. Moreover there is 
nothing intrinsic to the nature of either acting beneficently to the ends of others or with regard 
to other’s interests which would give priority to acting beneficently in one of these ways. In 
spite of this difficulty it can be concluded that to respect a person means we should promote 
his ends provided this is possible.  
The above definition is a definition of what it means to respect persons. This definition 
applies to all persons, including children and the mentally incapacitated, and not just to 
autonomous persons. It follows that we are constrained to promote the ends of children and the 
mentally incapacitated in our dealings with them. It does not automatically follow of course 
that we have a duty to meet these ends as pointed out above. The question now arises what 
additional constraints does respecting an autonomous person place on the respecter as opposed 
to when he respects a non-autonomous person? Let it be assumed that respecting autonomous 
and non-autonomous persons places the same type of constraint on the respecter. He must 
consider and promote if possible the ends of both kinds of person. However, whilst the type of 
constraint may remain the same for both kinds of person, it may be harder for the respecter to 
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satisfy this constraint in the case of an autonomous person. It might be argued that this 
position is analogous to medical practice. A doctor is constrained to promote the health of all 
his patients. However differences in the degree of a patients’ condition might make it harder to 
satisfy this constraint in some cases. 
It might be argued that the above assumption, that respecting autonomous and non-
autonomous persons imposes the same type of constraint on a respecter, is unsound. Dworkin 
(1988, page 20) regards autonomy as the capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their 
first-order desires. It might then be argued that the possession of this capacity for autonomy 
places an additional type of constraint on someone respecting autonomous persons as opposed 
to someone simply respecting persons. Let it be accepted that respecting this capacity of 
autonomous persons does impose an additional constraint on someone respecting autonomous 
persons. A patient’s recently diagnosed angina may place an additional constraint on a doctor. 
However, even if this is so it does not automatically follow that this is an additional type of 
constraint. The doctor is still only constrained to promote the health of his patient. It might 
then be argued, by analogy, that even if it is accepted that autonomous persons possess 
additional capacities compared to non-autonomous persons, this does not of itself mean an 
extra type of constraint is imposed on someone respecting autonomous persons. Respecting 
this extra capacity might still be simply regarded as requiring the promotion of the 
autonomous person’s extended ends. It would appear to follow the promotion of this capacity 
does not impose an additional type of constraint on someone respecting an autonomous 
person. It might be argued that respecting autonomous and non-autonomous persons places the 
same type of constraint on the respecter. It might of course be harder for someone to promote 
the ends of an autonomous person in practice. When considering autonomy, Buller (2001, 
   46 
 
 
page 101), Beauchamp and Childress (1989, page 69) and the judgement in Gillick v West 
Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, [1986] believe self-government can be 
graduated. If the above assumption were accepted then this would provide an explanation of 
how it is possible to respect graduated autonomy. 
In this thesis I will accept that to respect autonomous persons means accepting the same 
type of constraints needed to respect persons. However, I will also conclude that the 
assumption, that respecting autonomous and non-autonomous persons only places the same 
type of constraint on the respecter, is unsound. Rejecting this assumption means accepting that 
respecting an autonomous person places an additional type of constraint on a respecter to those 
imposed when he respects a non-autonomous person. I will present two arguments to justify 
my conclusion. Firstly, I will argue that if respecting autonomous and non-autonomous 
persons imposes the same type of constraints on respecters then this would mean specifically 
respecting autonomous persons has only a limited usefulness. Secondly, I will argue that if 
respect for autonomous and non-autonomous persons imposes the same type of constraints on 
respecters, then the intrinsic value of autonomy is ignored. 
Let it be assumed that respect for both autonomous and non-autonomous persons 
imposes the same type of constraints on the respecter. I will now examine the usefulness of the 
idea of respecting autonomous persons in the specific context of informed consent. I will then 
apply the result of this examination to respecting autonomous persons in other contexts. Let it 
be accepted that informed consent is based on respect for autonomy. This places various 
constraints on health professionals in that they must seek to promote a patient’s ends if 
possible. The details of these constraints need not be fully developed here for the following 
argument to be valid. Among these constraints must be some requiring that health 
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professionals do not deceive or coerce patients. In addition, health professionals must be 
constrained to supply a patient with sufficient information to enable him to understand his 
situation when this is possible. These constraints apply equally to respecting autonomous and 
non-autonomous persons because it has been assumed respect for both autonomous and non-
autonomous persons imposes the same type of constraints on the respecter. These constraints 
also form an important part of the practice of informed consent. However, the idea of 
assessing a patient’s competence is also part of the practice of informed consent (see 
Buchanan and Brock, 1989, page 28). Respecting the above constraints alone is unconnected 
to the idea of assessing a patient’s competence. It can be concluded that if respect for a patient 
only requires promoting his ends, then the requirement to respect a patient seems unconnected 
to any assessment of his competence 
Let it be accepted that informed consent is based on respect for patient autonomy. Let it 
be further assumed that respect for patient autonomy means a decision made by an 
autonomous patient must be accepted. It follows that an autonomous patient should not be 
treated against his will. However, it has been assumed that respecting autonomous and non-
autonomous persons places the same type of constraint on the respecter. It has also been 
previously assumed that all persons should be respected irrespective of whether they are 
autonomous or non-autonomous. Using these assumptions leads to my second conclusion. If it 
is accepted that an autonomous person should not be treated against his will then a non-
autonomous person also should not be treated against his will. This further conclusion seems 
to concur with Law (2003, page 54) who doubts the fact, that a patient is not autonomous can 
be used to justify treating him against his will. Accepting the above conclusion leads to my 
third conclusion. If informed consent is based solely on respect for autonomy and neither 
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autonomous nor non-autonomous patients should be treated against their will, then informed 
consent should not be concerned with the assessment of a patient’s competence. It is still of 
course true that informed consent is necessary to enable patients to make competent decisions. 
If my arguments are accepted then in practice in difficult decisions, like that faced by Ms B 
[2002], the patient’s decision should simply be accepted. My arguments appear to show a 
patient’s autonomy has very little connection, if any, to the idea of informed consent. 
Accepting the above leads to two further conclusions. If an autonomous or non-autonomous 
patient is capable of understanding his situation and he is fully informed about his situation 
then his decision should always be accepted. It might then be further concluded that informed 
consent might be better based on respect for persons rather than respect for autonomy. 
The above conclusions mean it is difficult to justify basing the practice of informed 
consent on respect for patient autonomy. It might be thought this difficulty could be resolved 
if informed consent was based on respect for autonomy but not solely on respect for 
autonomy. It might be argued this is the current position as far as informed consent is 
concerned (see O’Neill 2002, page 26). If the above proposal was accepted, then informed 
consent might be concerned with enabling a patient to make a competent decision in order to 
respect his autonomy. In addition, informed consent would be concerned with assessing a 
patient’s competence for some other reason. In section 3.1 and chapter 4 I will argue that 
informed consent is designed to respect patient autonomy whilst at the same time ensuring 
beneficent care is given to non-autonomous patients. However, even if the above proposal is 
accepted, it gives no reason as to why informed consent should be partially based on respect 
for autonomy as opposed to being partially based on respect for persons. I have argued in the 
context of informed consent that, if it is accepted that respecting autonomous and non-
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autonomous persons places the same type of constraints on the respecter, then there is no 
difference except perhaps in degree between respecting autonomous and non-autonomous 
persons. It follows in the context of informed consent that respect for an autonomous person 
appears to be an unnecessary additional concept. Furthermore if, in all contexts, there is no 
difference in the type of constraints imposed when respecting autonomous and non-
autonomous persons, that respect for autonomous persons is an unnecessary concept in all 
contexts. 
I will now argue the above conclusions are unsound. I believe the above arguments are 
valid. However, I believe the premise on which all of these arguments depend is false. This 
premise holds that respect for both autonomous and non-autonomous persons imposes the 
same type of constraints on someone. This premise is compatible with accepting that respect 
for an autonomous person may impose these constraints to a greater degree than in the case of 
a non-autonomous person. I will now argue that the intrinsic value of autonomy imposes an 
additional type of constraint on someone when he respects an autonomous person as opposed 
to when he respects a non-autonomous person. However, I will still argue in chapter 5 that 
decisions such as that made by Ms B [2002] should simply be accepted in certain contexts. It 
is widely accepted there are different concepts of autonomy (see Beauchamp and Childress, 
1989, page 68). Two of the reasons underlying the existence of these different concepts are as 
follows. Firstly, the concept autonomy is applied in different domains. I believe the domain in 
which the concept of autonomy is applied has ramifications for the concept itself. I will deal 
with some of these ramifications in the next chapter. The second reason for the different 
concepts of autonomy is that the value of autonomy has two distinct sources. 
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Dworkin (1988,page 112) argues autonomy has both instrumental value and intrinsic 
value. 
 
But there is a value connected with being self-determining that is not a mater of either of 
bringing about good results or the pleasure of the process itself. This is the intrinsic 
desirability of exercising the capacity for self-determination. We desire to be recognized as the 
kind of creature capable of determining our own destiny. (1988, page 112) 
 
Frankfurt (1999, page 163) believes that the basis of autonomy is caring about something. He 
regards caring about something as having intrinsic value due to its essential role in making us 
the distinctive kind of creatures we are. It seems that any complete account of respect for 
autonomy must consider respect for both of these two sources of the value of autonomy. In 
what follows I will argue that the constraints, imposed on someone respecting the intrinsic 
value of autonomy, are of a different type to the constraints involved with respecting persons. 
This will lead me to conclude that it is simply not enough just to promote a patient’s ends in 
order to respect his autonomy. 
I have shown above that both Dworkin and Frankfurt believe autonomy gains its intrinsic 
value because it makes us the distinctive kind of people we are. Dworkin (1988, page 112) 
also believes the intrinsic value of autonomy is connected to us exercising our capacity for 
self-determination when determining our own destiny. This involves us in making decisions. I 
have shown above Frankfurt believes autonomy is concerned with us caring about something. 
Frankfurt (1988, page 83 originally 1982) further believes caring about something consists in 
guiding oneself along a distinctive path. This also involves us in making decisions. It follows 
that according to Dworkin and Frankfurt autonomy only gains its intrinsic value by the 
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autonomous agent exercising his capacities to make and implement decisions concerning his 
future. 
Clearly, if someone respects the intrinsic value of someone else’s autonomy, this places 
various constraints on the respecter. For instance it seems clear that if I deceive or coerce 
someone I will damage his capacity to make and implement decisions concerning his future. It 
follows that if I respect the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy I am constrained from 
behaving in such a way. However, observing such constraints alone is insufficient to respect 
the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy if Dworkin and Frankfurt are correct in their belief 
that autonomy only gains its intrinsic value by being exercised. Let it be accepted that the 
intrinsic value of autonomy is only realised by an autonomous agent making and 
implementing decisions concerning his future. It follows that if I stop someone from 
implementing such decisions I fail to respect the intrinsic value of his autonomy. This leads to 
two important conclusions. If I respect the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy I have a 
duty to accept the decisions with which he determines his future. Let it be further accepted 
that to respect an autonomous decision means accepting autonomous decisions. Accepting this 
leads to my second conclusion. If respecting autonomous persons means respecting the 
intrinsic value of their autonomy then respecting autonomous persons is identical with 
respecting autonomous decisions. In the following discussion, for clarity of expression, an 
autonomous decision will simply be defined as a decision with which an agent determines his 
future. A more precise definition of an autonomous decision will be given in the next chapter. 
I have argued respecting a person means we have a duty to promote his ends if possible. This 
promotion might be roughly characterised as a duty to act beneficently towards ends 
undetermined by us. The duty to accept the autonomous decisions of a person is a different 
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type of constraint to those outlined above. I assumed above that there is no difference in the 
type of constraints imposed when respecting autonomous and non-autonomous persons. This 
assumption points to the conclusion that respect for autonomous persons is an unnecessary 
concept. I have now shown both this assumption and the resulting conclusion are unsound. 
Even if the above is accepted, it might still be questioned whether we have a duty to 
accept all of an agent’s autonomous decisions? After all Dworkin(1988, page 114) believes the 
promotion of autonomy in the long run might require sacrificing autonomy in the short term. 
Furthermore he also believes that autonomy is a concept that can only be assessed over an 
extended portion of a person’s life (1988, page 15). I have shown above that Dworkin believes 
the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy is linked to him exercising his capacity for self-
determination. Someone exercises his capacity for self-determination by the decisions he 
makes which help to determine his future. It appears to follow that when Dworkin refers to 
autonomy in the short term, he must be referring to decisions which might be loosely defined 
as autonomous decisions. It might be argued that my interpretation of Dworkin is incorrect 
and he is not committed to the idea of autonomous decisions. However, I believe that when he 
refers to autonomy in the short term he must be referring to decisions by which an agent helps 
determine his future. Such decisions are intuitively autonomous and in the rest of this section 
will be referred to as autonomous decisions. It seems at least plausible to assume that 
respecting someone’s autonomy in the long term might require not accepting some of his 
autonomous decisions. It might be tentatively concluded that provided some of the agent’s 
decisions are accepted, the above assumption is perfectly compatible with respecting the 
intrinsic value of his autonomy. 
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The above conclusion is true in a trivial sense. Respect for the intrinsic value of 
someone’s autonomy does not mean all his autonomous decisions must be accepted. If I 
respect the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy I do not have to accept any of his 
autonomous decisions which might harm myself or others. Clearly not all the autonomous 
decisions of a serial killer need be accepted. Let it be accepted that the domain of autonomous 
decisions in which all autonomous decisions might need to be respected is limited to 
autonomous decisions doing no harm to others. In the following discussion the meaning of an 
autonomous decision will be limited to this domain. The question posed above might now be 
asked again in our modified domain. If we respect the intrinsic value of autonomy, do we have 
a duty to accept all autonomous decisions? 
It will now be argued that in order to respect the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy 
all of his autonomous decisions must be accepted. Dworkin (1988, page 112) believes that the 
intrinsic value of autonomy is connected to the desire to be recognised as the kind of creature 
capable of determining his own destiny. Frankfurt (1999, page 163) adopts a similar position 
because he believes “caring about” has intrinsic value due to its role in making us the 
distinctive kind of creatures we are. Let it be assumed that Dworkin and Frankfurt are correct 
in believing that the exercise of autonomy gains its intrinsic value by allowing us to 
recognised as the kind of creatures capable of determining their own destiny. Let it also be 
assumed that some of an agent’s autonomous decisions are respected and some are not. It 
follows that the agent is not recognised as someone who determines his own destiny. The 
above appears to lead to the conclusion that if only some of an agent’s autonomous decisions 
are respected, then none of his autonomous decisions possess any intrinsic value. It might be 
argued that my conclusion is too simplistic. However, let it be accepted that if someone is to 
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be regarded as autonomous, at least some of his decisions must be accepted. However we 
cannot completely determine our future. In reality we can at best only partially determine our 
future or incompletely guide it. It might then be argued that if some of an agent’s autonomous 
decisions are accepted and others are not then the agent is recognised as someone who partly 
determines his future. Accepting this would lead to the following conclusion. If others accept 
some of an agent’s decisions, by which he partly determines his future, then the intrinsic value 
of his autonomy is partly respected. This conclusion would concur with the belief of Buller 
(2001, page 101) and Beauchamp and Childress (1989, page 69) that autonomy can be 
graduated. 
I believe the above conclusion is unsound for the following reasons. Let it be accepted 
that Dworkin and Frankfurt are correct when they argue that the intrinsic value of autonomy is 
connected to the desire to be recognised as the kind of creature capable of determining his own 
destiny. I will now argue that if only some of an agent’s autonomous decisions are respected, 
then none of his autonomous decisions possess any intrinsic value. My argument depends on 
exactly what is meant by “the kind of creature capable of determining his own destiny”. If it is 
accepted that some persons are more capable of self-government than others, it follows 
persons have varying degrees of ability to determine their own destiny. I will now show that 
this partial ability of an agent to determine his own future is on its own insufficient to give an 
agent’s autonomous decisions any intrinsic value. It has been accepted that the intrinsic value 
of autonomy is connected to someone being recognised as the kind of creature capable of 
partially determining his own destiny. However, it would appear both that Dworkin and 
Frankfurt believe that what matters as far as the intrinsic value of autonomy is concerned is 
not simply someone’s ability to partially determine his own future. Dworkin and Frankfurt 
believe that what matters is the recognition that someone is the kind of creature capable of 
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determining his own destiny. It is interesting to note that they both use the word creature in 
this context. The recognition that someone is the kind of creature capable of determining his 
own future cannot be graduated. Clearly someone is either recognised as the kind of creature 
who is capable of determining his own future or as someone who is not. Let it be assumed that 
some of an agent’s autonomous decisions are accepted and others are not. It follows that the 
agent’s autonomous decisions are subject to additional constraints. It would appear that these 
additional constraints on accepting his decisions are applied precisely because he is not 
recognised as the kind of creature capable of determining his own future. It can be concluded 
that if the intrinsic value of autonomy is connected to someone being recognised as the kind of 
creature capable of determining his own destiny, then subjecting the acceptance of someone’s 
decisions to additional constraints means that even his autonomous decisions, which are 
accepted, do not confer any intrinsic value on him. 
I have argued that the reason we respect autonomy is not arbitrary. We respect autonomy 
because we value it. I have further argued that autonomy has two sources of value, intrinsic 
and instrumental. I have argued above that in order to respect the intrinsic value of someone’s 
autonomy we must accept all of his autonomous decisions. It follows that respecting the 
intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy means we cannot promote his autonomy in the long 
term, provided the promotion of his autonomy in the long term means not accepting some of 
his autonomous decisions as seems to be required by Dworkin (1988, page 114). One solution 
to this problem might be to argue that respect for autonomy means only respecting someone’s 
instrumental autonomy. 
At the beginning of this section I posed the following question are there any real 
differences between respecting autonomous and non-autonomous patients, (see Law 2003, 
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page 54)? I argued that a different type of constraint is imposed on someone when he respects 
autonomous as opposed to non-autonomous persons. The need for this different type of 
constraint was dictated by the need to respect the intrinsic value of autonomy. However, if 
respecting autonomy, simply means respecting instrumental autonomy this question could 
again be posed. I will now argue that if we simply respect someone’s instrumental autonomy 
we would fail to account for the importance of autonomy in his life. 
Let it be assumed that respecting autonomy simply means respecting the instrumental 
value of autonomy. Baron (1988, page 29) defines instrumental rationality as the kind of 
thinking that best helps an agent to achieve his goals including heuristics. Let it be accepted 
that autonomy is connected to the capacity of persons to reflect on and change their desires 
together with the ability to implement at least some of these changed desires (see Dworkin, 
1988, page 20) and (Frankfurt, 1988, page 83 originally 1982). It might now be argued that an 
agent’s use of his capacity for autonomy is of instrumental value to him. However accepting 
this would seem to mean that there is little point in simply respecting the instrumental value of 
an agent’s autonomy. The goods obtained by respecting an agent’s instrumental autonomy 
might be more simply obtained by respecting his instrumental rationality. If the above 
argument is accepted, and respecting an agent’s autonomy simply means respecting the value 
of his instrumental autonomy, then respecting an agent’s autonomy seems at best unimportant 
and at the worst pointless. However autonomy is not unimportant but central to our lives 
according to both Dworkin (1988) and Frankfurt (1999). 
 
What makes an individual the particular person he is his life-plan, his projects. In pursuing 
autonomy, one shapes one’s life, one constructs its meaning. The autonomous person gives 
meaning to his life. (Dworkin, 1988, page 31) 
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Caring is important to us for its own sake, insofar as it is the indispensably foundational 
activity through which we provide continuity and coherence to our volitional lives. (Frankfurt 
1999, page 162) 
 
The instrumental value of autonomy is not is not foundational to our lives by giving us a life-
plan. The value of autonomy that is central to our lives is intrinsic autonomy. It can therefore 
be concluded that respecting the value of autonomy must include respecting the intrinsic value 
of autonomy cannot simply mean to respect the value of someone’s instrumental autonomy. 
I have argued that to respect the intrinsic value of an agent’s autonomy, his autonomous 
decisions must be accepted. It might be argued by some such as O’Neill (2002, page 26) this is 
an impoverished view of the value of autonomy. This criticism would be true if the value of 
autonomy is considered alone. However the idea of personal autonomy does not exist in 
vacuum. The idea of personal autonomy is of necessity connected to persons. I also argued 
above that to respect persons means we must act beneficently towards other’s perceived ends. 
It follows that when considered in context, the idea of personal autonomy becomes a richer 
concept. However, even if this is accepted it is still true, because respecting autonomy 
fundamentally depends on respecting the intrinsic value of autonomy, giving priority to 
accepting the decisions by which an agent partially determines his future over acting 
beneficently towards him. I will deal with this in greater detail in section 4.5. This does not of 
course mean that I must accept all of an agent’s decisions in order to respect his autonomy. 
Someone’s choice of ice cream flavour is not a decision by which he determines his future for 
example. It follows that if I am to respect someone’s autonomy I must be able to determine 
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which of an agent’s decisions are decisions by which he determines his future. This will be 
one of the main topics of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
Concepts of autonomy 
 
The purpose of my thesis is to investigate the relationship between informed consent and 
respect for autonomy. In chapter 1 I examined the practice of informed consent. In chapter 2 I 
examined our intuitive ideas of autonomy and what it means to respect autonomy. Chapter 3 
examines what is entailed by different concepts of autonomy. This chapter completes my 
preparation for the detailed investigation of the relationship between informed consent and 
respect for autonomy which will be carried out in chapters 4, 5, and 6. This examination is 
necessary because there are different philosophical concepts of autonomy and these different 
concepts might yield different results when applied to the practice of informed consent. I 
argued in section 2.1that any meaningful concept of autonomy must account for our intuitive 
ideas of autonomy. For this reason my examination will be carried out by comparing these 
different concepts of autonomy with our intuitive ideas. This comparison will take place 
against the background of informed consent in practice. Chapter 3 will be divided into five 
subsections. 
 
3.1. Mill and autonomy 
 
Modern ideas of respect for autonomy in the practice of informed consent have their 
philosophical origins in the works of Kant and Mill, see (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989, 
page 71), (see Gauthier, 1993, page 25 and 2002, page 273) and (Mathews, 2000, page 62). 
Mill wrote about liberty rather than autonomy. This creates difficulties if his ideas are to be 
applied directly to respecting autonomy. For this reason, in this section I will not examine 
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Mill’s concept of autonomy, for such a concept does not exist but I will examine autonomy in 
conjunction with the philosophy of Mill. It is clear from Mill’s writing that he was concerned 
with self-government. 
 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (Mill, 1974, page 68) 
 
To be sovereign over oneself means to be self-governing. Intuitively self-government is at the 
heart of what it means to be autonomous. In what follows, autonomy and self-government will 
be held to be equivalent. I will argue that if Mill’s ideas concerning liberty are used to define a 
concept of autonomy, then this concept of autonomy is incomplete. I will also argue that 
Mill’s ideas concerning liberty define conditions in which respect for autonomous decisions is 
possible. This section will be divided into two sub-sections. 
 
3.1.1. Mill’s concept of liberty 
 
Mill wrote about liberty not autonomy. In this subsection I will examine how an account of 
autonomy might be based on Mill’s ideas on liberty. Mill believed people should be free to act 
as they please provided their actions do not harm others and 
 
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant (Mill, 1974, page 69). 
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I argued in section 2.1 that freedom from external constraints is a necessary condition for self-
government but that it is not a sufficient condition. I will not repeat this argument here but 
assume liberty is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for self-government. 
Mill believed his idea of liberty should not apply to all and placed a restriction on to 
whom it should apply by saying 
 
It is, perhaps hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant only to apply only to human 
beings in the maturity of their faculties (Mill, 1974, page 69). 
 
I have argued that liberty alone is an insufficient condition to define autonomy. It seems 
possible that an adequate account of autonomy based on the work of Mill might utilise the 
above restriction. It follows that we must ask what Mill meant by “human beings in the 
maturity of their faculties” in order to consider the above restriction. One possible answer to 
this question might be that Mill was simply referring to adults. However this possibility must 
be rejected as too simplistic because it would include the mentally ill. Another possibility is 
that Mill was referring to adults capable of self-government. It might then be argued the social 
condition of self-government is the ground on which the right to liberty is based. If this 
possibility is accepted then it would seem the idea of liberty cannot be used to define 
autonomy. Another possibility would be Mill was defining the domain of liberty. Liberty 
should only apply adults capable of self-government. Once again if this possibility is accepted 
it would seem the idea of liberty cannot be used to define autonomy. 
It is clearly difficult to define exactly what Mill meant by persons in the maturity of their 
faculties. However, it seems clear that Mill would not have regarded someone suffering from 
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mental illness as a person in the maturity of her faculties. This being so I will assume the fact 
that someone is a sane adult can safely be considered to be the minimum requirement for her 
to be regarded as a human being in the maturity of her faculties. This assumption would mean 
that any adult would be presumed to be free to choose unless she could be shown to be insane. 
This position concurs with the practice of informed consent. An adult patient’s consent 
decision cannot simply be overruled because she is deemed incompetent, but only because she 
is incompetent due to insanity under the Mental Health Act of 1983 (Department of Health, 
2001, section 2.3). However, even if freedom is restricted to sane adults a question remains. 
Are all freely made decisions by sane adults, autonomous decisions or does freedom only 
create the conditions in which sane adults can make autonomous decisions? I will argue that 
only the latter is true. 
Mill believed that the freedom to choose creates the conditions necessary for self-
government in mature adults. He also believed that this condition alone was insufficient to 
guarantee self-government. If someone is to be self-governing Mill believed she must use her 
faculties: 
 
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no need of 
any faculty other than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself 
employs all his faculties (Mill, 1974, page 123). 
 
It seems Mill would have believed that if a sane adult was free to choose, and used her reason 
and other faculties when choosing, then she would have been self-governing. However, the 
fact, that someone is a sane adult and free to choose does not automatically mean she must use 
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her reason and other faculties to choose her life plans. It follows that the fact that someone is a 
sane adult free to make her own decisions, does not of necessity mean that all her decisions are 
autonomous. This conclusion concurs with our intuitive ideas of autonomy. A sane adult does 
not of necessity have to identify with her freely made decisions. Nor do her decisions have to 
have persistence.  It follows that the fact that an adult is free to choose and sane are necessary 
conditions for self-government, autonomy. However these conditions alone are insufficient to 
guarantee self-government. It can be concluded that any account of autonomy based on sane 
adults freely choosing their life plans, permits autonomy, promotes autonomy, but is an 
incomplete account of autonomy. 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Mill’s concept of liberty and respect for autonomy  
 
Mill never defined when a decision freely made by a person in the maturity of her faculties 
was autonomous. The reason for this might simply be that he was only concerned with liberty. 
I argued in section 3.3.1 that freedom is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a sane 
adult to be regarded as autonomous. I will now argue that Mill provides an answer as to why 
freedom matters to individuals as well as to society. I will then argue that this answer means it 
is possible to respect autonomous decisions by respecting Mill’s concept of liberty. 
Mill was a utilitarian and believed freedom maximised benefits to society. 
Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. 
Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each to live as seems good to themselves, than by 
compelling each to live as seems good to the rest (Mill, 1974, page 72). 
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The following discussion will be based on utilitarian principles. Let my contention be accepted 
that Mill believed all decisions freely made by sane adults should be respected. Let it also be 
accepted that these decisions are justified because they benefit society. In the following 
discussion a “freely made decision” will specifically refer to a member of the set of all 
decisions freely made by sane adults unless stated otherwise. However caution is needed with 
this definition. Consider the case of MB introduced on page 39. It seems unlikely Mill would 
have believed MB’s refusal of consent should have been accepted even if made freely because 
he would not have regarded her as a sane adult. It would appear to follow a sane adult must be 
regarded as someone free from some internal controlling influences. If the above is accepted it 
might then be argued that the set of all autonomous decisions is a subset of the set of all 
“freely made decisions” as defined above. I will further examine the relationship between 
autonomous decisions and “freely made decisions” when considering the purpose of informed 
consent on page 174. I also argued in section 2.2 that to respect an autonomous decision 
simply means to accept that decision. It then appears to follow that if all “freely made 
decisions” are accepted in order to benefit society, then the set of all autonomous decisions 
would be automatically respected. It might then be concluded that there is no need to 
understand which conditions are sufficient to define autonomous decisions in order to respect 
autonomous decisions. Autonomous decisions could be respected automatically and efficiently 
by simply respecting the set of all “freely made decisions”. 
Such a conclusion would be attractive in practice because it seems difficult to ascertain 
whether a particular decision is autonomous. I argued in section 2.1 that intuitively an 
autonomous decision is a freely made decision the agent identifies with and which has 
persistence. It should be relatively easy to determine when an agent’s decision is “freely 
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made” and has persistence. I further argued in section 2.1 that it is difficult in practice to 
determine which internal controlling influences are compatible with a patient identifying with 
her decision and which are not. It follows that it is difficult to ascertain whether an agent 
identifies with her decision in difficult cases. It further follows that it is not always easy to 
determine precisely if an agent’s decision is an autonomous decision. It might be concluded 
that in practice it would be advantageous if autonomous decisions could be respected by 
simply respecting the set of all freely made decisions. I will now examine the implications of 
the above conclusion before arguing such a conclusion would not truly respect autonomy. 
Let it be accepted that respecting all freely made decisions is justified by its utility to 
society. It follows that a patient’s freely made decision should be respected because doing so 
is good for society, even if this decision damages her. For example, the freely made decision 
of an adult to refuse to give consent to an emergency appendectomy without which she will 
probably die should be respected in order to benefit society. Mill would have accepted this 
position (1974, page 69). Let it be accepted that, in general utilitarianism based purely on the 
utility of actions to society is wrong. However, accepting this does not mean that if informed 
consent is based purely on respect for autonomy, that it would be wrong to automatically 
accept all freely made decisions in the practice of informed consent. Indeed, in the context of 
informed, consent such a practice would seem to be the most efficient way to respect 
autonomy. Prima facie it might be concluded that the freely made decision of an adult to 
refuse consent to treatment without which she might be harmed should be respected in order to 
respect autonomy. 
One way to counter the above conclusion might be to argue that respecting autonomy 
cannot simply be reduced to accepting autonomous decisions. Let it be accepted that 
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respecting the set of all freely made decisions automatically entails respect for autonomous 
decisions. It might then be argued that if autonomy is considered to be a global concept, such 
as the second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically on their desires, as suggested by 
Dworkin (1988, page 20), that respecting the set of all freely made decisions fails to respect 
autonomy.  It might be further argued that sometimes respecting someone’s freely made 
decision might damage her as an autonomous person. The following example appears to 
support this argument. Firstly consider a battered wife who has the freedom to decide whether 
or not to prosecute her abusive husband. Secondly let it be assumed that this freedom is 
removed and her husband will be automatically prosecuted if he abuses her. In the first 
scenario the freedom she has to decide whether to prosecute or not might leave her open to 
coercion at a later date hence damaging her capacity for autonomy However in the second 
scenario her capacity for autonomy would be unchanged. 
I accept the argument that respecting autonomy cannot simply be reduced to accepting 
autonomous decisions. However, accepting this argument does not entail accepting that not all 
autonomous decisions should be respected. In section 2.2 I argued that respecting an 
autonomous person places a different type of constraint on someone compared to respecting a 
non-autonomous person. I further argued that respecting someone as an autonomous person 
involves respecting the intrinsic value of her autonomy. It follows that to treat someone in a 
certain way is insufficient to respect her as an autonomous person. Respecting the intrinsic 
value of autonomy is of necessity connected to the recognition that someone is the kind of 
creature capable of determining her own future. If I do not accept someone’s autonomous 
decisions then I do not recognise her as the kind of creature capable of determining her own 
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future. It follows that by not accepting her autonomous decisions, I do not respect her as an 
autonomous person. 
I have argued that respecting someone’s autonomy of necessity means respecting all of 
her autonomous decisions. This might be efficiently achieved by accepting all of her freely 
made decisions. It does not of course follow that simply respecting someone’s freely made 
decisions is sufficient to fully respect her autonomy. For instance, in the context of informed 
consent, a patient may need to be fully informed about her condition in order to make an 
autonomous choice. However, it still follows that if informed consent is based purely on 
respect for autonomy the prima facie conclusion, that the freely made decision of an adult to 
refuse consent to treatment without which he might be harmed should be respected in order to 
benefit society also respect autonomy, is true. I do not believe that informed consent is based 
purely on respect for autonomy. I believe the purpose of informed consent is to respect 
autonomy whilst at the same time ensuring that beneficent care can be given to non-
autonomous patients. If this was not so, then the idea of assessing a patient’s competence 
seems pointless and all of a patient’s consent decisions should simply be accepted. 
Let it be accepted that the purpose of informed consent is to respect autonomy whilst at 
the same time ensuring beneficent care can be given to non-autonomous patients. It follows 
that if autonomy is to be respected one of the following options must be possible. Firstly, if 
autonomy is to be respected by respecting the set of all freely made decisions, then these 
decisions must benefit individuals in addition to society. Provided that respecting the set of all 
freely made decisions benefits individuals, then the above prima facie conclusion would be 
true. Secondly, autonomy could be directly respected. The latter will only be possible if 
autonomous decisions can be adequately defined. 
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Gauthier argues that the consequences of accepting Mill’s ideas on liberty are good for 
individuals as well as society: 
 
Mill’s argument then is primarily based on consequentialist reasoning. Allowing each person 
in society to action his or her opinion of what is right is necessary for both human 
development and happiness. The individuality that results from respecting this kind of liberty 
is good both for each member of a society and for the society as a whole (Gauthier, 1993, page 
23). 
 
If Gauthier is correct then it might be argued that the set of all freely made decisions should be 
respected on the grounds of personal utility. It appears to follow that if all freely made 
decisions are respected then autonomy would also be respected automatically because 
autonomous decisions form a subset of the set of freely made decisions. It might be concluded 
that provided Gauthier is correct, respecting the set of all freely made decisions is perfectly 
compatible with the purpose of informed consent being to respect autonomy whilst ensuring 
beneficent care can be given to non-autonomous persons.  
However, I believe the above conclusion is unsound for two reasons.  Firstly I have 
argued above that respect for autonomy means accepting autonomous decisions. I accept that 
respecting an autonomous decision means to accept that decision. However I do not accept 
that respect for autonomy simply means accepting autonomous decisions. In certain contexts 
respect for autonomy means enabling agents to make autonomous decisions by providing them 
with information. This provision of information is particularly important in the context of 
informed consent, as I will argue in section 5.1. Secondly, I believe the premise on which the 
above argument is based is false. This premise states that all freely made decisions should be 
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respected because by so doing we benefit individuals. Consider again the patient facing an 
emergency appendectomy. Without this operation she will probably die. It follows that in 
almost all circumstances any calculation of her individual utility would conclude that 
accepting her refusal of consent would not benefit her. It follows that the premise that the set 
of freely made decisions should be respected because it benefits individuals cannot always be 
justified on the grounds of personal utility. 
It might be possible to justify respecting the set of all freely made decisions on non-
utilitarian grounds. For instance it might be argued that all freely made decisions, like all 
autonomous decisions, have intrinsic value. It might then be further argued that this value 
should be given preference over other values. However exactly why all freely made decisions 
should have intrinsic value is not immediately clear. Frankfurt (1999, page 106 originally 
1992) points out that someone who merely chooses without any reasons, is a wanton and his 
decisions are wanton decisions. It would seem to be hard to attach any intrinsic value to a 
wanton decision. Moreover a wanton decision might be a freely made decision. It follows that 
the set of all freely made decisions contains some decisions which prima facie appear to have 
no intrinsic value.  
If a decision is not a wantonly made decision then the agent must either care about the 
decision or how it affects the things he cares about. This appears to mean that an agent’s freely 
made decision can only have intrinsic value if she cares about her decision. If someone cares 
about her decision it follows she identifies with her decision according to Frankurt (1988, page 
83 originally 1982). I argued in section 2.1 that if an agent identifies herself with her a freely 
made persistent decision then intuitively this is an autonomous decision. The above seems to 
suggest that the only reason why the set of all freely made decisions is intrinsically valuable to 
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persons, is not simply because they are freely made but rather because respecting this set 
respects autonomous decisions. 
Let it be accepted that the set of all freely made decisions only gains its value because it 
contains autonomous decisions. Respecting this set means some non-autonomous decisions 
will also be respected. It follows that respecting this set in the context of informed consent 
means some non-autonomous decisions would be respected even if these decisions have no 
intrinsic value and harm patients.  It can be concluded that even though it is possible to 
indirectly respect autonomous decisions by respecting all freely made decisions it would be 
preferable if autonomous decisions could be directly respected. This conclusion would be 
impossible to implement with autonomous decisions in general. However it might be possible 
to implement it in some contexts like that of informed consent. This would permit patient 
autonomy to be respected whilst permitting non-autonomous patients to receive beneficent 
care. 
This section outlining Mill’s work on liberty has reached the following conclusions. 
1) Mill does not define a concept of autonomy. 
2) Respecting Mill’s concept of liberty would allow us to respect autonomous decisions 
indirectly without the need to precisely define autonomy. 
3) Respecting Mill’s concept of liberty would allow us to respect autonomous decisions 
but respecting Mill’s concept of liberty does not necessarily mean we respect 
autonomy. 
4) Respecting autonomous decisions by respecting Mill’s concept of liberty in the context 
of informed consent might mean some non-autonomous patients are denied beneficent 
care. 
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3.2. Kant and autonomy 
Kant based his concept of autonomous action on his idea of the Categorical Imperative. 
 
Act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law. (Kant, 1948, page 84, originally 1785) 
 
This principle is central to Kant’s concept of autonomy. Kant gave several formulations of the 
Categorical Imperative all of which he regarded as equivalent. This equivalence might be 
questioned according to Beauchamp and Childress (1989, page 28). However in this section it 
will be accepted that Kant was correct and all of his formulations are at least roughly 
equivalent. It follows that any conclusions reached using the above formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative also applies to all Kant’s other formulations. 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative means that when an agent makes an autonomous decision 
she ought to base her decision on laws she has chosen for herself. These laws must be 
applicable to all and based on reason. This reason should be pure reason untouched by what 
the agent cares about or desires as pointed out by Mathews (2000): 
 
For Kant, then, a person is choosing autonomously when he or she chooses something, not on 
the basis of its attractiveness (appeal to the person’s own desires and wishes), but as an act of 
pure will, on the basis of impersonal general laws (Mathews, 2000, page 60). 
 
According to Kant an autonomous action cannot be a purely instrumental action serving the 
agent’s personal interests. Kant of course believed someone could make decisions based 
   72 
 
 
purely on what he desired or cared about. However he would not have regarded these 
decisions as autonomous decisions. This was because he believed the domain of autonomy 
was strictly limited to what an individual ought to do morally as pointed out by Secker (1999): 
 
Kant’s conception is not of individual or personal autonomy, where the central question is, 
“what do I really want, and is it best for me?”; rather, it is of moral autonomy which applies 
universally, and asks the question “Is this what I ought to do ?”, morally speaking (Secker, 
1999, page 48). 
 
It will be accepted here that Kant’s concept of autonomy is concerned only with 
decisions that have moral implications. It is of course true that what an individual desires and 
what an individual ought to do morally are sometimes connected. However there is part of an 
individual’s life in which his desires are purely personal. 
Kant’s concept of autonomy raises a problem when applied to informed consent. 
Accepting this fact does not mean that Kant’s concept of autonomy is unimportant in other 
areas of bioethics. It seems to me that Kant’s concept might be particularly relevant to issues 
concerning reproduction. The problem concerning informed consent is linked to the domain of 
Kant’s autonomy. Autonomy originally referred to self-governing city-states in ancient 
Greece. The domain of autonomy was extended by Kant to include all rational beings making 
moral decisions. Self-government in moral matters means the agent choosing laws to govern 
herself by using pure will untainted by her personal preferences. However, if the domain of 
autonomy is extended still further to include personal self-government unconnected to moral 
concerns, then the agent’s personal preferences seem to matter. It might then be argued that 
Kant’s insistence that autonomous actions cannot be purely instrumental actions serving an 
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agent’s personal desires or wishes makes it impossible to extend the domain of his concept of 
autonomy to personal autonomy. This point is made by Frankfurt (1999): 
 
The will can only be one that incorporates what Kant calls a ‘pure’ will. … Now this pure will 
is a very peculiar and unlikely place in which to locate an indispensable condition of 
individual autonomy. After all its purity consists precisely in the fact that it is wholly 
untouched by any of the personal features that make people distinctive and charecterize their 
specific identities (quoted in Frankfurt, 1999, page 132, originally 1994.) 
 
These difficulties in extending the domain of Kant’s concept of autonomy can be illustrated by 
the use of an example. 
Mathews (2000) uses an end of life example to illustrate the difficulties involved in 
extending the domain of Kant’s autonomy. He considers a terminally ill cancer patient whose 
life might be extended slightly by the use of chemotherapy. Let it be assumed that this patient 
decides on a shorter life with only palliative care rather than a longer life with the discomfort 
of chemotherapy. Mathews (2000) argues that if a patient made such a decision then she 
would not be acting autonomously according to Kant’s concept of autonomy: 
 
The patient in our example would thus not be acting ‘autonomously’ in the Kantian sense, but 
simply expressing the way she happened to feel about pain and death. There would thus, on 
Kantian principles, be no morally compelling reasons for those caring for this patient to 
accede to her wishes: indeed, if the maxim that doctors should seek to prolong life wherever 
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possible is universalisable, then they would have compelling Kantian reasons for acting 
paternalistically (Mathews, 2000, pages 61, 62) 
Intuitively, it seems in this case that the patient should be able to make a choice about how to 
spend the rest of her life. Intuitively it further seems such a decision about whether to prolong 
her life or enjoy a shorter but higher standard of life concerns is about self-government. 
It is probable that Kant (1948, page 67, originally 1785). would have approved of a 
maxim prohibiting the shortening of life because he believed it was possible to have a maxim 
prohibiting suicide It follows that Kant would not have regarded the request to the courts by 
Mrs Pretty  [2002] to permit her husband to assist her to die as an autonomous request. 
However, not prolonging life is different to shortening life, and there is no clear reason why a 
maxim requiring us to seek to prolong life wherever possible would be universalisable. It 
follows that Mathews is correct and Kant’s concept of autonomy would have nothing to say 
about his example. Let it be accepted that many informed consent decisions are personal 
decisions unconnected to the domain of Kant’s concept of autonomy. Prima facie it might be 
concluded if informed consent is based on respect for autonomy then it cannot be based on 
respect for Kant’s concept of autonomy. 
The above conclusion results from Kant’s concept of autonomy being applied to a set of 
decisions Kant did not intend it being used on. Kant believed rational beings should use the 
Categorical Imperative when deciding what they ought to do. It follows that Kant’s concept of 
autonomy only refers to moral decisions, as pointed out by Secker (1999) above. However, as 
Frankfurt (1988, originally 1982) points out, ethics is not the only thing people care about: 
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It can hardly be disputed that, for most of us the requirements of ethics are not the only thing 
we care about. Even people who care a great deal about morality generally care still more 
about other things. They may care more, for instance, about their own personal projects, about 
certain individuals and groups, and perhaps about various ideals (quoted in Frankfurt, 1988, 
page 81, originally 1982). 
 
Decisions about personal projects, which career to follow, and what we value are decisions by 
which we govern ourselves. Intuitively, these decisions are autonomous decisions. Kant’s 
concept of autonomy cannot be extended to cover these decisions because the Categorical 
Imperative excludes such personal interests. It might be argued that informed consent is only 
concerned with moral decisions. It would follow then that even if some personal decisions are 
autonomous decisions, and these decisions fall outside the domain of Kant’s autonomy, this 
does not apply to informed consent decisions. The example of Mathew (2000) clearly shows 
this argument is unsound. Further, it would seem that the basis for almost all informed consent 
decisions concerns what the patient personally cares about. It seems that the prima facie 
conclusion that Kant’s concept of autonomy cannot be used as the basis of informed consent 
should be accepted because to do so would extend the domain of Kant’s concept of autonomy 
too far. 
I have argued that the domain of Kant’s concept of autonomy cannot be extended to 
cover all informed consent decisions. However, accepting the above does not necessarily mean 
the above prima facie conclusion is true. This conclusion will only be true if it is also accepted 
that all informed consent decisions must be autonomous decisions. Let it be accepted that if 
informed consent is based on respect for autonomy, then all autonomous decisions must be 
respected. However the acceptance of this fact does not of necessity mean that only 
   76 
 
 
autonomous decisions should always be respected. I pointed out in section 2.2 that Law (2003, 
page 54) doubts the justification of treating a non-autonomous person against her will. In 
chapter 5 I will examine whether some decisions made by non-autonomous persons should 
always be accepted. I will conclude that some such decisions should always be accepted and 
set out the contexts in which this should occur. Let it be accepted that in some contexts of 
informed consent all of a patient’s consent decisions should be accepted while in all other 
contexts only autonomous decisions should of necessity be accepted. It follows that if all 
personal decisions, such as that used by Mathews, fall into the first set of contexts then 
theoretically it is still possible for informed consent to be based on respect for Kant’s concept 
of autonomy. 
I will now argue that it is impossible to base informed consent on respect for Kant’s 
concept of autonomy. I will present two arguments. Firstly let it be accepted that not all 
informed consent decisions need be autonomous decisions but some must be. I argued in 
section 2.2 respecting autonomous decisions means accepting autonomous decisions. I also 
argued in section 3.1 that the purpose of informed consent is to respect autonomy whilst at the 
same time ensuring beneficent care can be given to non-autonomous patients. It follows that it 
must be possible to ascertain whether certain decisions are autonomous or not. Because Kant’s 
concept of autonomy is based on the Categorical Imperative it is difficult to see how this could 
be achieved in practice. The Categorical Imperative requires an autonomous agent to act on 
maxims she has chosen for herself and which are universalisable. However Secker (1999, page 
55) points out an agent’s maxims are not observable. It follows we cannot evaluate an agent’s 
maxims except by what she tells us and observation of her actions. It might be concluded that 
Kant’s concept of autonomy gives us reasons for why we should respect patient autonomy but 
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does not give us effective means to do so. It follows that it is impossible to base informed 
consent on respect for Kant’s concept of autonomy. 
A second reason might be advanced as to why informed consent cannot be based on 
respect for Kant’s concept of autonomy. Let it be accepted that Secker (1999, page 48) is 
correct and Kant’s concept of autonomy is concerned with moral decisions. It follows that if 
informed consent is to be based on respect for Kant’s autonomy, then at least some meaningful 
proportion informed consent decisions must be moral decisions. However this does not seem 
to be true except in a limited number of cases such as women consenting to an abortion. 
Informed consent is usually concerned with a patient deciding what is in his best personal 
interest. It follows that informed consent and autonomous decisions, based on Kant’s concept 
of autonomy, have little in common. It can again be concluded that it is impossible to base 
informed consent on respect for Kant’s concept of autonomy. 
 
3.3 Dworkin and autonomy 
 
In this section I will examine the two concepts of autonomy developed by Dworkin. Kant and 
Mill’s works were completed before the idea of informed consent existed, see (Jackson, 2001, 
page 10). However Dworkin’s ideas on autonomy were developed concurrently with the 
growth of this idea. Dworkin (1988, chapter 5) also specifically linked autonomy to informed 
consent. It is important to note that Dworkin developed two different concepts of autonomy, 
both of which will be examined here. My examination of Dworkin’s concepts of autonomy 
will take place in three subsections. 
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3.3.1. Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy 
 
Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy is defined solely by two conditions (Dworkin, 1976). 
Dworkin’s first condition requires that an autonomous agent’s second order desires must 
concur in some way with her first order desires for these first order desires to be  regarded as 
autonomous. Dworkin (1988, page 15) defined this concurrence as follows. Someone’s first 
order desires are autonomous if her second order identifications are congruent  with her first 
order motivations. Dworkin defined congruence as follows. Let it be assumed that an agent 
has a first order desire x and a second order desire y. If the desire y desires that the agent has 
the first order desire x then these desires are congruent. Second order identifications are 
desires about desires. First order motivations are simply desires for action and are not 
concerned with other desires. Dworkin’s second necessary condition for a desire to be 
regarded as autonomous requires that the agent acquired his second order desires in a 
procedurally independent way. The purpose of procedural independence is to eliminate the 
possibility that forces external to the agent, using means such as coercion or manipulation, 
could influence her second order desires. Procedural independence is of particular importance 
if respect for Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy forms the basis of informed consent. This 
follows because a patient may be in a weakened state whilst her doctors proposing treatment 
for her consent may be seen as figures of authority. 
Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy has three important properties. Firstly Dworkin’s 
first concept is concerned with autonomous decisions rather than autonomous persons. 
Secondly it is a hierarchical account of autonomy. Lastly it is a purely structural account of 
autonomy. It is a structural account due to the two conditions that define it. Firstly there is 
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congruence between the agent’s autonomous decisions and her second order desires. Secondly 
her second order desires must be acquired in a procedurally independent way. It follows any 
autonomous decision need have no particular content. 
Dworkin (1988) rejected his first concept of autonomy because he regarded 
identification as being an insufficient reason to consider a desire autonomous: 
 
It is not the identification or the lack of identification that is crucial to being autonomous, but 
the capacity to raise the question of whether I identify with or reject the reasons for which I 
now act (Dworkin, 1988, page 15). 
 
The “identification” Dworkin is rejecting is clearly identification defined simply as the 
congruence between first and second order desires. It is important to note this idea of 
“identification” is not the same as our intuitive idea of identification outlined in section 2.1 in 
connection with our intuitive ideas of self-government. I will now examine why 
“identification” defined simply as meaning congruence is insufficient to guarantee that a 
decision is autonomous. I argued in section 2.1 that any meaningful concept of autonomy must 
be able to account for our intuitive ideas of what it means to be self-governing. I will argue 
that “identification” fails to define autonomous decisions because it fails to account for our 
intuitive ideas of autonomy. These intuitive ideas include the idea that an agent must identify 
with her autonomous decisions and these decisions must have some persistence. 
It is possible according to Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy that even if an agent is 
not autonomous, she could become so by altering her second order desires. I will argue that 
this means a decision may be autonomous according to Dworkin’s first concept even if the 
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agent does not identify with her decision in the intuitive sense outlined in section 2.1. 
Secondly I will argue because desires can change rapidly, any decision based purely on desires 
need have no persistence. It follows that an agent’s autonomous decisions as defined by 
Dworkin’s first concept can also change rapidly counter to our intuitive ideas of autonomy. 
Each these arguments will be made by using an example. 
Consider a young woman who is about to commence a sexual relationship and desires to 
use contraception in the form of the birth control pill. This example is not directly concerned 
with the young woman’s competence to give consent. It will only consider the conditions 
under which her decision to use this means of contraception would be considered autonomous 
using Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy. Let it be assumed that the young woman has this 
first order desire simply because of the proved efficacy of this method of contraception. Let it 
be further assumed that she also has a second order desire wishing she did not have the first 
order desire to use this method of contraception. Perhaps this second order desire is due to the 
beliefs and values she acquired during her catholic upbringing. These beliefs and values hold 
that using this method of contraception is wrong. According to Dworkin’s first concept of 
autonomy, if this young woman decides to take the birth control pill then her decision is not an 
autonomous decision. This follows because her first and second order desires are incongruent.  
However it appears that this young woman could make her first order decision 
autonomous simply by changing her second order desires according to Dworkin’s first concept 
of autonomy. Let it be assumed she is in a quandary about whether to implement her first 
order desire due to her conflicting second order desire. Let it be further assumed she has an 
additional desire to resolve this quandary. Let it be still further assumed that she changes her 
second order desire in order to satisfy this additional desire. According to Dworkin’s first 
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concept of autonomy, because this young woman now “identifies” with her first order desires, 
due to her first and second order desires being congruent, her decision to take the birth control 
pill is now autonomous.  
However Dworkin’s definition of “identification” seems to be an insufficient definition 
because it does not explain our intuitive ideas of identification. Intuitively an autonomous 
decision is one, with which an agent identifies herself, because it reflects what she cares about. 
This identification of necessity involves an agent’s values. An agent’s values are things she 
cares about and values cannot be changed at will (Frankfurt, 1988, page 84 originally 1982). It 
follows that if this young woman changes her second order desires at will then she does not 
identify herself with her decision to choose this method of contraception in the intuitive sense, 
and so her decision is still intuitively non-autonomous. The above leads to two conclusions. 
Firstly, if identification is simply defined as congruence between first and second order desires 
then this definition is inadequate to account for our intuitive ideas of autonomy. It follows that 
because Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy fails to account for our intuitive ideas of 
autonomy that this concept is not a meaningful concept of autonomy. Secondly, it might be 
concluded that Dworkin is wrong to believe identification is not crucial to a decision being 
autonomous. What is crucial is what is meant by identification. 
Consider again the young woman who desires to use contraception by taking the birth 
control pill. Let it be assumed that she decides to take this pill for a month and then changes 
her mind the next month even though her circumstances remain unchanged. Let it be further 
assumed this process is repeated several times, as in the case of MB [1997]. Let it be still 
further assumed when she makes these decisions there is always congruence between her first 
and second order desires. It follows according to Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy that all 
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of these decisions would be autonomous. However these decisions are not decisions that form 
part of her self-government. Clearly any child she conceived could not be called a planned 
child. I argued in section 2.1 that any meaningful concept of autonomy must account for our 
intuitive ideas of autonomy. I further argued in section 2.1 that our intuitive ideas of autonomy 
require that an autonomous decision must have persistence unless the circumstances in which 
that decision is made change. The young woman’s decisions in my example do not have 
persistence and hence would not be regarded as intuitively autonomous. It can be concluded 
from the above that Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy does not concur with our intuitive 
ideas of autonomy and so is not a meaningful concept of autonomy. It can be further 
concluded that this concept could not form a useful basis for the practice of informed consent. 
3.3.2 Dworkin’s second account of autonomy 
 
Dworkin (1988) abandoned his first concept of autonomy. He redefined autonomy as the 
second-order capacity of a person to reflect on her first order desires:  
 
Autonomy is conceived as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their 
first-order, desires, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in the 
light of higher-order preferences and values (Dworkin, 1988, page 20). 
 
In addition to an autonomous agent’s need for second-order capacities to reflect on her first 
order desires and the ability to change these desires, Dworkin (1988) also retained the need for 
procedural independence: 
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Spelling out the conditions of procedural independence involves distinguishing those ways of 
influencing people’s reflective and critical faculties which subvert them from those which 
promote and improve them. It involves distinguishing those influences such as hypnotic 
suggestion, manipulation, coercive persuasion, subliminal influence, and so forth and doing so 
in a non ad hoc fashion. (Dworkin, 1988, page 18) 
 
Law (1998, page 54) points out that this is an excellent list of factors that might inhibit 
procedural independence. However he argues it fails to suggest how procedural independence 
might be defined. 
I argued in section 3.2 that it is impossible to base a concept of personal autonomy on 
pure reason because any concept of personal autonomy based on pure reason cannot account 
for our intuitive idea that an agent must identify herself with her autonomous decisions. It 
follows that any concept of personal autonomy must involve an agent’s desires or values. It 
further follows that the question of how an agent acquires her desires or values is of critical 
importance in any investigation of personal autonomy. This means that the problem of 
whether it is possible to define procedural independence is critical to all concepts of personal 
autonomy. Indeed if it is impossible to define procedural independence it would seem to be 
impossible to define any concept of personal autonomy. I believe this problem can be 
overcome. For instance it is hard to define innocence positively. However it can be defined 
negatively by defining guilt. Procedural independence might also be defined negatively. If 
procedural independence is defined negatively then someone would be presumed to have 
acquired his second order desires in a procedurally independent way unless it can be shown 
that the acquisition of these second order desires was influenced by factors on a specific list. 
Such a list must include coercive persuasion, lying and any form of manipulation of the 
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agent’s desires and values which she actively resists. It might be argued such a solution to the 
problem of procedural independence is an ad hoc solution. This would not be the sort of 
solution Dworkin would favour. However, if the concept of personal autonomy is to be useful 
in applying philosophy then perhaps sometimes such solutions must be employed. In what 
follows I will assume procedural independence is possible in practice. 
Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy differs from his first because it is concerned 
with a person’s capacity to reflect on the decisions she makes rather than congruence between 
her first and second order desires. It follows that Dworkin’s (1988) second concept of 
autonomy also differs from his first because it seems to be applicable to persons rather than 
decisions: 
 
First, autonomy seems intuitively to be a global rather than a local concept. It is a feature that 
evaluates a whole way of living one’s life and can only be assessed over an extended portion 
of a person’s life, whereas identification is something that may be pinpointed over short 
periods of time (Dworkin, 1988, page 15). 
 
In the rest of this thesis global autonomy will refer to autonomous persons, as defined by 
Dworkin above, unless stated otherwise. Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy raises two 
important questions because it is concerned with autonomous persons.  Firstly, what does it 
mean to respect this concept of autonomy? It seems clear it must be possible to respect any 
meaningful concept of autonomy. Secondly, how are informed consent decisions connected to 
respecting autonomy? These questions are vital if Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy is 
to form the basis of informed consent. These questions will be examined in section 3.3.3. 
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I argued in section 3.3.1 that Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy could not form a 
meaningful basis for the practice of informed consent. It would be pointless to investigate the 
above questions without first examining whether it is at least possible that Dworkin’s second 
concept of autonomy might form a meaningful basis for the practice of informed consent. I 
will now compare Dworkin’s two concepts of autonomy. I will then use this comparison to 
examine whether Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy might form a meaningful basis for 
informed consent. This will be done by examining the examples used in section 3.3.1, in 
conjunction with Dworkin’s second concept. 
Both of Dworkin’s concepts of autonomy are hierarchical and structural. However, 
second order desires in his first concept have become higher-order preferences and values in 
his second concept. Secondly, the relationship between the hierarchies has changed from 
congruence in his first concept to the capacity to reflect critically in his second. Lastly, in 
Dworkin’s first concept all that mattered for a desire to be autonomous was congruence 
between this desire and second-order desires together with procedural independence. It 
follows that it would be possible for someone to have an autonomous desire under Dworkin’s 
first concept even if she was unable to satisfy her desire. For instance, using Dworkin’s first 
concept, a slave’s decision could be fully autonomous even if she was unable to implement her 
decision. This is not the position Dworkin (1988) adopts in his second concept where 
 
The idea of autonomy is not merely an evaluative or reflective notion, but includes as well 
some ability both to alter one’s preferences and make them effective in one’s actions 
(Dworkin, 1988, page 17). 
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According to Dworkin’s second concept, an autonomous agent must have both the capacity to 
reflect on his desires and the possibility of satisfying these desires. 
In section 3.3.1 I argued that Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy fails to concur with 
our intuitive ideas of autonomy. This failure was due to two reasons. Firstly his first concept 
fails to account for our intuitive ideas about the need for an autonomous agent to identify with 
her autonomous decisions. Secondly his first concept is concerned purely with desires. It 
follows that this concept does not require that autonomous decisions have persistence counter 
to our intuitive ideas of autonomy. I will now examine Dworkin’s second concept of 
autonomy to see if these problems remain. 
In my examination of Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy I used the example of a 
young woman who desires to use contraception by taking the birth control pill. I argued that if 
autonomy was defined by using Dworkin’s first concept of autonomy, then this young 
woman’s desire was non-autonomous because it was not congruent with her second order 
desires. I argued that she could make this desire autonomous by changing her second order 
desires and that such a change runs counter to our intuitive ideas of autonomy. Such a change 
would be impossible using Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy. Using this concept the 
young woman could only reflect on and change her first-order desires. She would be unable to 
change her preferences and values at will. It is of course true that she could change her 
preferences and values over time or if her circumstances change. However such a change 
could not be arbitrary. If she arbitrarily changed her preferences and values  it might be 
questioned whether what she was changing were indeed preferences and values. It follows, 
because she is unable to change her preferences and values at will, she is unable to make her 
desire to use contraception by taking the birth control pill autonomous. Prima facie it can be 
concluded that Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy concurs better with our intuitive ideas 
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of autonomy than his first. However it is not clear from this example how his second concept 
deals with the intuitive idea that an agent must identify with her autonomous decisions. 
I will now examine Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy in conjunction with our 
intuitive idea that autonomous decisions must have some persistence. In this examination I 
will use the example of MB [1997] previously used in section 2.1. I argued in section 3.3.1 
that any decision, which was repeatedly changed when the circumstances of the decision-
maker remained unchanged, could not be considered to be intuitively autonomous. MB 
repeatedly changed her consent decisions and intuitively not all her decisions to refuse consent 
could be considered autonomous (see section2.1). If, after reflection, some of MB’s consent 
decisions did not reflect her preferences and values, then these decisions would be non-
autonomous according to Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy. However, let it be assumed 
that after reflection all MB’s consent decisions reflected her preferences and values. It follows 
that because her consent decision changed repeatedly, then her preferences and values must 
also have changed repeatedly. I have argued above that an agent’s preferences and values 
cannot be arbitrarily changed if the agent’s circumstances remain constant. It follows that if an 
agent’s preferences and values cannot be arbitrarily changed that the above assumption is 
false. It further follows after reflection that not all MB’s consent decisions reflected her 
preferences and values. It still further follows that not all of MB’s decisions would have been 
considered autonomous using Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy. It can again be 
concluded that Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy concurs better with our intuitive 
concepts of autonomy than his first. 
However the above conclusion must be treated with caution. Dworkin’s second concept 
of autonomy is primarily concerned with autonomous persons. It is far from clear how an 
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autonomous agent is related to and identifies with his decisions using Dworkin’s concept. It is 
also unclear what it means to respect autonomy. 
  
3.3.3. Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy and decisions 
 
If Dworkin’s concept of global autonomy can only be evaluated over an extended portion of a 
person’s life, as he proposed, then two key questions must be answered. Firstly what does it 
mean to respect global autonomy and secondly how are decisions connected to global 
autonomy?  These questions are of particular importance if respect for informed consent is 
based on respect for global autonomy.  
Dworkin (1988, page 20) believes autonomy is the second-order capacity of someone to 
reflect critically on her first-order desires together with the ability to act on these desires. He 
further believes whether someone is autonomous can only be assessed over an extended 
portion of her life (Dworkin, 1988, page 15). It follows that Dworkin’s second concept of 
autonomy is a global concept. In the rest of this thesis global autonomy will always refer to 
Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy unless stated otherwise. Global autonomy is 
concerned with persons rather than individual decisions. In other concepts of autonomy I have 
examined so far it is reasonably clear what is required of someone if she is to respect someone 
else’s autonomy. However it is not immediately obvious what it means to respect global 
autonomy. Moreover if Dworkin’s concept of global autonomy is to be a useful concept, it 
must be clear what it means to respect this concept. In this section I will examine what is 
meant by respect for global autonomy. 
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I argued in section 2.2 that to respect autonomy means accepting all autonomous 
decisions. However if autonomy is defined solely in terms of autonomous persons, this option 
is unavailable. There are no autonomous decisions only autonomous persons. I argued in 
section 2.2 that if someone respects something or someone then this means accepting 
constraints are imposed on her behaviour. It might be asked what constraints are imposed on 
someone who respects an autonomous person when autonomy is defined by Dworkin’s second 
concept? There seem to be two possible answers to this question. Firstly, respecting an 
autonomous person might mean to respect her capacity for autonomy. Respecting this capacity 
could mean acting in a way to protect or promote this capacity. Respect in this sense would 
include constraining the respecter to be truthful and non-coercive. Secondly, respecting an 
autonomous person might mean simply accepting her decisions. 
Let it be assumed that to respect someone’s global autonomy means to respect her 
capacity for autonomy. Respecting this capacity could mean acting in a way to protect or 
promote her capacities to reflect critically on her first-order desires and to implement the 
results of her reflections. If the above assumption is accepted, then it follows that when a 
decision does not affect someone’s capacity for autonomy there is no reason based directly on 
respect for autonomy to respect her decision. Of course there may be other reasons why 
someone’s decisions should be respected. In practice the exercise of decision-making should 
enhance an agent’s capacity to make reflective decisions and hence promote her autonomy. It 
follows that there is a prima facie case to respect someone’s decisions. 
I have argued that the above assumption means no decisions made by an autonomous 
person should be respected when they damage her capacity for autonomy. I will now present 
two arguments to show that the assumption that to respect someone’s global autonomy solely 
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means to protect or promote her capacity for autonomy, should be rejected. Firstly in section 
2.2 I argued that respect for an autonomous person means some of her decisions must be 
accepted even if these decisions damage her capacity for autonomy. These decisions are 
decisions the agent governs herself by. The reason for this is that it seems impossible to 
respect the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy without accepting such decisions. It follows 
that respecting an agent’s autonomy, by protecting and promoting her capacity for 
autonomous action, fails to respect the intrinsic value of her autonomy. Such behaviour would 
however respect the instrumental value of her autonomy. Secondly, let it be assumed that I 
respect someone’s rationality. I do not respect her rationality by protecting or promoting her 
capacity for rationality. I do so by respecting the decisions she makes. It might then be argued, 
by analogy, that the same should hold for respecting someone’s autonomy. 
I have suggested that one way of respecting a person’s global autonomy might simply be 
to accept her decisions. I argued in my introduction that if informed consent is based on 
respect for autonomy as required by the General Medical Council (2001, introduction 1), then 
the concept of autonomy adopted and what it means to respect that concept has important 
ramifications for the practice of informed consent. Let it be assumed that Dworkin’s concept 
of global autonomy forms the basis of informed consent. It follows that a patient can only be 
assessed as autonomous over an extended portion of her life as required by Dworkin (1988, 
page 15). Let it be further assumed that to respect someone’s global autonomy simply means 
accepting all her decisions. Accepting both of these assumptions would mean major changes 
would need to be made to the current practice of informed consent. In informed consent, as it 
is currently practiced, a patient’s competence is judged by her ability to make an autonomous 
decision. This practice seems to be based on the assumption that only autonomous decisions 
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must always be accepted. However, if informed consent is based on respect for global 
autonomy and respecting someone’s global autonomy entails accepting her decisions, it 
follows that provided a patient has led a normal life, then it might be concluded that all her 
consent decisions should simply be accepted in order to respect her autonomy. Accepting this 
conclusion would cause major problems for the practice of informed consent for it would 
mean accepting intuitively non-autonomous decisions such as that of MB to refuse a caesarean 
section. 
It might be argued, again by analogy, that the above conclusion is false. If I respect 
someone’s rationality I do not have to accept all her decisions. However, it does seem that if I 
respect her rationality I am committed to accepting her rational decisions. Dworkin believes 
autonomy may be sacrificed in some circumstances: 
 
It is also possible that the promotion of autonomy in the long run requires sacrificing 
autonomy in the short run (Dworkin, 1988, page 114). 
 
Accepting that it is possible to sacrifice autonomy in the short term seems incompatible with 
simply accepting all of an autonomous agent’s decisions. It might be argued that my second 
assumption above should be modified as follows. Respect for global autonomy would now 
mean accepting all of an autonomous person’s decisions provided these decisions are the 
product of reflection and reached in a procedurally independent way. In this way respecting 
someone’s autonomy would be analogous to respecting her rationality. In addition such a 
modified conclusion would concur with the ideas developed in section 2.2 concerning what it 
means to respect autonomy. It would also mean that intuitively non-autonomous decisions, 
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such as that of MB to refuse a caesarean section, would not have to be automatically accepted 
in order to respect autonomy. However, it seems that Dworkin would not accept this modified 
conclusion. If it is possible to sacrifice autonomy in the short term then this is incompatible 
with simply accepting all of an autonomous person’s decisions made in a certain way even if 
these decisions are the product of reflection and reached in a procedurally independent way. It 
might be concluded that Dworkin holds it would be wrong to respect global autonomy by 
either respecting an agent’s autonomy, or by protecting or promoting her capacity for 
autonomy or automatically accepting any of her decisions. 
It might be argued that the difficulties with what it means to respect global autonomy are 
caused because Dworkin defines his concept of global autonomy solely in terms of 
autonomous persons. Prima facie Dworkin’s (1988, page 114) assertion that the promotion of 
autonomy in the long term may require sacrificing autonomy in the short term appears to be 
completely plausible. However, as has been shown above this apparently straightforward 
assertion causes great difficulties. It would be clear what Dworkin meant if he argued 
decisions might be sacrificed in order to promote autonomy in the long term. It would also be 
clear what Dworkin meant if he argued autonomous decisions might be sacrificed to promote 
global autonomy. I will argue below that the latter is impossible if autonomy is to be fully 
respected. However it is not immediately clear what Dworkin means by sacrificing autonomy 
in the sort term to promote autonomy in the long term if autonomy is seen solely as the 
capacity of someone to reflect critically on her desires and her capacity to accept or attempt to 
change these desires in line with her preferences and values. 
It might be argued that even if Dworkin does not explicitly believe there are autonomous 
decisions, his assertion that autonomy may be sacrificed in the short term implicitly requires 
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that there are autonomous decisions. Let it be assumed that autonomy solely refers to 
someone’s capacity to reflect critically on her desires and her ability to satisfy at least some of 
her desires resulting from this reflection. Clearly it is possible to promote one decision at the 
expense of another. It is also possible to promote one capacity at the expense of another. For 
instance it might be possible to promote someone’s capacity for intellectual excellence whilst 
failing to promote her capacity for sporting prowess. However if the above assumption is 
accepted it seems that Dworkin believes it is possible to promote someone’s capacity for 
autonomy whilst at the same time attempting to sacrifice the same capacity. This appears to 
cause difficulties. However it seems possible to promote someone’s long-term happiness by 
denying her short-term happiness. It follows it might be possible to respect someone’s 
autonomy in the long-term by sacrificing her autonomy in the short-term. Whatever 
Dworkin’s exact position it is clear an agent’s decisions matter when they affect her capacity 
for autonomy. 
Dworkin never defines autonomous decisions with reference to his concept of global 
autonomy. If Dworkin implicitly believes autonomous decisions exist these might simply be 
defined as any decision made by an autonomous person. It would follow that the concept of an 
autonomous decision is parasitic on the concept of an autonomous person. This reverses the 
position adopted by Christman (1991, page 3) with which I will deal in section 3.4. Secondly, 
an autonomous decision might be defined as any decision based on reflection and reached in a 
procedurally independent way. Each of these definitions means it would be possible to 
promote autonomy in the long term and sacrifice some autonomous decisions. 
I argued in section 2.2 that if someone’s autonomous decisions are not respected then the 
intrinsic value of her autonomy is not respected. I further argued that it is impossible to respect 
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some of an agent’s autonomous decisions and fail to respect others whilst respecting the 
intrinsic value of her autonomy. I argued that the above holds because the intrinsic value of 
autonomy is based on the recognition of someone as the kind of person capable of determining 
her own future. It seems to be impossible to recognise someone as the kind of person capable 
of determining her own future whilst failing to respect all decisions she makes concerning her 
future. It might of course be argued that it is wrong to tie the intrinsic value of autonomy to the 
recognition of someone as the kind of person capable of determining her own future. However 
it would appear that this position is not open to Dworkin. Frankfurt (1999, page 163) ties the 
intrinsic value of autonomy to the recognition of someone as the kind of creature capable of 
determining her own destiny. I still further argued in section 2.2 that respect for autonomy 
must include respect for the intrinsic value of autonomy. It might be concluded that because 
Dwokin’s concept of global autonomy permits autonomous decisions to be sacrificed in order 
to promote global autonomy in the long term that his concept fails to respect the intrinsic value 
of autonomy. It might then be further concluded that Dworkin’s concept of global autonomy is 
an incomplete account of autonomy. 
It might be argued that I am wrong to suppose Dworkin implicitly believes in 
autonomous decisions. Dworkin might believe there are no real autonomous decisions. It 
might be concluded that he believes there are only intuitively autonomous decisions and it is 
these decisions that might be sacrificed in order to promote autonomy in the long term. I 
argued in section 2.1 that any meaningful concept of personal autonomy must be able to 
account for our intuitive ideas of autonomy. This is of particular importance in the context of 
informed consent. Autonomous decisions are part of our intuitive ideas of autonomy. It can be 
concluded even if even if my supposition is incorrect that because Dworkin’s concept of 
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global autonomy is unable to account for intuitively autonomous decisions, his concept is an 
incomplete account. 
In order to make clear the importance of the value of intrinsic autonomy, consider the 
case of a young woman who is told she has leukaemia. She had wished to have a child of her 
own in the future. Her best medical option is to have radiotherapy to destroy her bone marrow 
followed by a bone marrow transplant provided a suitable donor can be found. This option will 
render her infertile. A second option is to take drugs which will hopefully hold her leukaemia 
in remission for a period. If she chooses this second option she may try to have a child and the 
possibility of a bone marrow transplant later. This is a dangerous option. A donor becomes 
available and she must decide which option to choose. Let it be assumed that this young 
woman chooses the second option. Her decision is clearly a decision by which she determines 
her future. Let it be further assumed that she fully understands the risks involved and still 
chooses the second option. Intuitively her decision is an autonomous decision. However, 
Dworkin believes autonomy in the short term may be sacrificed to promote autonomy in the 
long term. It seems possible that irrespective of whether Dworkin regarded this young 
woman’s decision as autonomous or not he might believe her decision should not be 
respected.  Intuitively decisions about how much risk a patient is prepared to accept seem to 
be the patient’s responsibility. I will deal with the topic of risk in greater detail in the next 
chapter. It can be concluded that Dworkin’s second concept of autonomy is unable to account 
for our ideas concerning respect for autonomy developed in section 2.2 or our intuitive ideas 
of informed consent. 
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3.4. Christman and autonomy 
 
In sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 I examined Dworkin’s concept of global autonomy and showed that 
there are differences between his concept and our intuitive ideas of autonomy. These 
differences would raise difficulties if informed consent were based on respect for Dworkin’s 
concept. Many of these difficulties arise because Dworkin sees autonomy as a global concept 
that can only be assessed over an extended portion of someone’s life. I argued that this 
concept makes it difficult to respect the intrinsic value of autonomy. In this section I will 
consider the concept of autonomy as proposed by Christman, (1991). Christman specifically 
proposed his concept to answer some of the other problems raised by Dworkin’s concept, 
namely problems of regress and procedural independence. 
Hierarchical theories of autonomy such as those of Dworkin and Frankfurt are concerned 
with the relationship between an autonomous agent’s first order desires and her higher order 
desires or values. Christman’s concept of autonomy, as pointed out by Jennings (2000) is 
concerned with an agent’s attitude to the way she acquires her desires: 
 
However, there is a significant difference between Christman’s view and subjective theories in 
that for Christman it is not the agent’s attitude to their desires that confers autonomy. Rather it 
is the agent’s attitude to the process that led them to having the desires they do. (Jennings, 
2000, page 159)  
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It follows that Christman’s account of autonomy is a historical account. This history is the 
history of how the agent acquired her desires. The important thing as far as his concept of 
autonomy is concerned is not whether the agent identifies with her desires or has certain 
capacities, but the way she acquired her desires. This section will split into three subsections. 
 
3.4.1. Christman’s historical concept of autonomy 
 
Dworkin’s (1988) account of autonomy is concerned with an autonomous agent’s capacity for 
critical reflection based on her higher-order preferences and values. Dworkin also specifies 
that these higher-order preferences and values must be procedurally independent. It follows 
that Dworkin’s account of autonomy is also partly a historical account because it is concerned 
with how an agent acquired her higher-order preferences and values. The main concern of 
Christman’s (1991) account of autonomy is how an agent acquires his desires and his account 
is not concerned with the content of these desires nor does it differentiate between first and 
second order desires:  
 
1) Christman’s concept of autonomy is defined by the following three conditions. 
2) A person P is autonomous relative to some desire D if it is the case that P did not 
resist the development of D when attending to this process of development, or P 
would not have resisted the that development had P attended to the process. 
3) The lack of resistance to the development of D did not take place (or would not have) 
under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection. 
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4) And the self-reflection involved in condition (1) is (minimally) rational and involves 
no self-deception. (Christman, 1991, page 11) 
 
In what follows it will be assumed that if an agent has an autonomous desire then any action or 
decision flowing from this autonomous desire is an autonomous action or decision. 
Christman’s account of autonomy can be illustrated by two related examples. Let it be 
assumed that two patients are involved in accidents and each patient requires a blood 
transfusion. Let it be further assumed that both patients refuse to give consent to the 
transfusion. Let it be still further assumed that the first patient is a Jehovah’s Witness who did 
not resist the development of her desire not to have the transfusion. Christman would regard 
her decision as autonomous. However let it be assumed that the second patient’s desire not to 
have the transfusion is based on an irrational phobia of needles, as in the case of MB [1997]. 
In this case if the patient unsuccessfully resisted the development of this desire not to have the 
transfusion, Christman would regard her decision as non-autonomous. 
I will now examine and comment on each of Christman’s three conditions. Christman’s 
first condition requires the following. An agent is autonomous relative to some desire if he did 
not resist the development of this desire or would not have resisted the development of this 
desire. The hypothetical lack of resistance is a necessary part of the condition. Consider a man 
who is HIV positive and engages in unprotected intercourse. Clearly if such a man was aware 
of the consequences of his actions, and did not consciously resist the development of his desire 
for unprotected intercourse, Christman would regard his desire as autonomous. Let it  be 
assumed this man did not consciously attend to the development of this desire. In this scenario 
there are two possibilities. Firstly, had he attended to the development of his desire, he would 
not have resisted its development. Once again Christman would have regarded his desire for 
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unprotected intercourse as autonomous. Secondly, had he attended to the development of his 
desire, he would have resisted its development. In this case Christman would have regarded 
his desire as non-autonomous. 
Christman’s second condition for a desire to be autonomous is that the lack of resistance 
to the development of this desire did not take or would not have taken place under the 
influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection. It is important to distinguish between desires 
which are non-autonomous due to Christman’s first condition and those that are non-
autonomous due to his second condition. Christman’s first condition refers to whether an agent 
resisted the formation of a desire. This resistance or lack of resistance concerns the agent. 
Christman’s second condition refers to the conditions in which this resistance or lack of 
resistance took place. These conditions must be ones in which the agent is able reflect on the 
formation of her desires. This reflection must be rational in some sense because Christman’s 
third condition requires reflection must be minimally rational. However, it must be noted that 
Christman (1991, page 13) only requires the conditions are such that an agent is able to reflect 
on the formation of her desires. He does not require that the agent actually reflects on her 
desires in line with the second part of his first condition. 
Christman’s third condition for the formation of autonomous desires requires that any 
self-reflection involved is minimally rational and involves no self-deception. This condition 
has two parts. Part one is concerned with rationality, and part two is concerned with self-
deception. Hierarchical accounts of autonomy, such as the first concept of Dworkin and that of 
Frankfurt, appear to be purely structural definitions of autonomy. It follows that whether a 
decision is autonomous according to some hierarchical account of autonomy can be solely 
determined by examining the relationship between this decision and some other elements 
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required by the concept.  The content of the agent’s desires, preferences or values plays no 
part in determining her autonomy. I will argue below that minimal rationality as defined by 
Christman is also a purely structural definition.  However I will argue that the second part of 
Christman’s third condition for the formation of autonomous desires requiring that any self-
reflection involves no self-deception must consider the contents of an agent’s desires, 
preferences or values. It follows that Christman’s account of autonomy is not a purely 
structural account. 
Christman regards minimal rationality as having two conditions. Firstly, minimal 
rationality requires internal consistency. According to Christman this means that an agent’s 
beliefs and desires form a consistent set: 
 
I would defend the claim that only minimal ‘internal’ conditions for rationality (like 
consistency of beliefs and desires) would be plausible conditions for autonomy (Christman. 
1991, page 14) 
 
Minimal rationality as defined above is a structural requirement only requiring that an agent’s 
beliefs and desires be internally consistent. It would appear that this requirement is not 
concerned with any externally imposed standards which might be concerned with the contents 
of an agent’s beliefs and desires. People have a great many beliefs and desires and in practice 
do not check these for consistency. For this reason Christman only requires an agent’s beliefs 
and desires are not manifestly inconsistent. 
What this requirement must capture, though, is the necessity that an autonomous person 
is not being guided by manifestly inconsistent desires or beliefs (Christman, 1991, page 16). 
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It should be noted here that Christman considers an autonomous person in addition to 
autonomous desires without previously defining autonomous persons.  Dworkin believes 
autonomy is a global concept, and I have argued that the concept of an autonomous decision is 
dependent on the concept of an autonomous person.  Christman (1991, page 3) reverses this 
dependence believing the idea of an autonomous person is parasitic on the idea of autonomous 
decisions. It might be presumed that Christman implicitly believes that an autonomous person 
is simply someone who has autonomous desires. However, if this is accepted, it is difficult to 
see how the concept of an autonomous person does any useful work. The second condition 
Christman  (1991)believes is necessary for minimal rationality requires that an autonomous 
agent must be capable of calculating the utility of her decisions and maximising this utility: 
 
These conditions should not be seen as less stringent than, for example, the axioms of standard 
decision theory, wherein the agent is rational if she chooses the action that will maximise her 
expected utility (Christman, 1991, page 15). 
 
If an agent maximises her utility any calculation she uses is based on her internal preferences 
and values. It might be concluded that minimal rationality is not concerned with any externally 
imposed standards which might be concerned with the contents of an agent’s beliefs and 
desires. 
The second part of Christman’s third condition necessary for autonomous desire 
acquisition concerns self-deception. This condition is connected to the idea that a person’s set 
of beliefs and values are transparent to her: 
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If the ‘self’ doing the ‘governing’ is dissociated, fragmented, or insufficiently transparent to 
itself, then the process of self-determination sought for in a concept of autonomy is absent or 
incomplete (Christman, 1991, page 17). 
 
In might appear that this condition follows directly from the first part of Christman’s third 
condition requiring the agent is not manifestly inconsistent. Clearly, if an agent has a 
manifestly inconsistent set of beliefs and desires, her self may not be transparent to her. 
However the fact that someone does not have a manifestly inconsistent set of beliefs and 
desires not mean she is not deceiving herself. Consider a gambler who has had a run of bad 
luck. Let it be assumed that she convinces herself that her luck is about to change and she is 
about to win a large amount of money. Because of this conviction she gambles a large amount 
of money she cannot afford. It would appear to be conceivable that once the gambler has 
convinced herself that her luck is about to change she does not have a manifestly inconsistent 
set of beliefs and desires. Moreover it is quite possible to imagine circumstances in which a 
gambler might welcome rather than resist the development of such a belief. The example of 
the gambler shows that it is not enough that an agent’s beliefs and desires are not manifestly 
inconsistent for her not to be self-deceiving. 
 
3.4.2. A comparison between Christman and Dworkin’s concept of autonomy 
 
 
In this section I will compare Christman and Dworkin’s accounts of autonomy in the context 
of informed consent. Firstly I will argue that both Christman and Dworkin hold that a patient 
should be able to base an autonomous decision on a restricted amount of information. 
Secondly I will argue that due to the problem of infinite regress, Christman’s account of 
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autonomy might form a better basis for the practice of informed consent than hierarchical 
accounts of autonomy. Thirdly Christman believes his concept eliminates the need for 
procedural independence which is needed in both of Dworkin’s concepts. I will argue that this 
belief might be false. Lastly I will argue that because Dworkin is concerned with autonomous 
persons and Christman with autonomous desires, then Christman’s concept of autonomy 
concurs better with both our intuitive ideas of autonomy and informed consent.  
Christman’s concept of autonomy means it is possible for a patient to make an 
autonomous decision requesting that she is not to be fully informed about her course of 
treatment. This is possible because what matters as far as his concept of autonomy is 
concerned is how and in what conditions an agent acquires her desires. It seems possible to 
imagine a patient not resisting the acquisition of such a desire. She might be squeamish about 
hearing details of her medical condition for instance. It also seems possible to imagine the 
acquisition of this desire taking place in conditions which do not inhibit reflection and in 
which the patient is minimally rational. Dworkin (1988, page 118) also holds that it is possible 
for a patient to make an autonomous decision requesting she is not to be fully informed or 
consulted about her course of treatment. Such a request seems unlikely to damage a patient’s 
capacity for autonomy. However a request by a patient that she is not to be fully informed 
about her condition runs counter to the ethos of informed consent. One of the main purposes 
of informed consent, as the name implies, is to inform a patient about her condition. It follows 
if informed consent is based on respect for either of these concepts of autonomy the practice of 
informed consent might need to be revised. It is argued by some that a patient should be able 
to make a request that she is not fully informed about her condition (see Clarke, 2001). Section 
5.1.1 will examine this question in detail. 
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Most concepts of personal autonomy have a hierarchical structure. This means an agent’s first 
order desires must be endorsed at a higher level if these first order desires are to be considered 
autonomous. It might be argued that this might not be true of Dworkin’s concept of global 
autonomy as this concept is primarily concerned with an agent’s capacity for autonomy. 
However, I argued in section 3.3.3 that Dworkin’s concept of global autonomy is still 
implicitly committed to the idea of autonomous decisions. This means that his concept might 
still have a hierarchical structure. The question may be asked what makes these higher-order 
desires, beliefs or values autonomous? Law (1998) states the problem as follows: 
 
Chief among these is the thought that if it is appropriate to ask of any first order-desire 
whether it is endorsed by the agent’s second-order desires, then it seems equally correct to ask 
of those second order desires whether they themselves are desires that the agent is happy to 
have and act on… For instance, I might have a desire for chocolate and a second-order desire 
not to have this first-order desire. But I may also have a third order desire to be rid of this 
annoying second-order desire (Law, 1998, page 52). 
 
The problems associated with regress may seem to be trivial in the case of chocolate. 
However this would not be true in the case of chemotherapy. Consider again the case of a 
patient facing a decision whether to extend her life slightly by chemotherapy or to opt for 
shorter life with palliative care (Mathews, 2000, pages 61, 62). Let it be assumed that this 
patient’s first order desire is to avoid discomfort and to do so she feels she should not consent 
to chemotherapy. On reflection this patient decides it is her best option to undergo treatment 
and as a result of this reflection she consents to chemotherapy. Let it be further assumed that 
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this patient has the capacity for critical reflection and the ability to change her first-order 
desires. It follows under most hierarchical accounts of autonomy that, without the problem of 
regress, the above patient’s decision would be considered autonomous. However, it is possible 
to imagine that this patient has a still higher order desire that she does not have the second 
order desire to undergo chemotherapy. This appears to lead to an infinite regress. If the above 
is accepted it follows that hierarchical concepts of autonomy offer incomplete accounts of 
autonomy. Theoretically this might mean that if informed consent were based on respect for a 
hierarchical concept of autonomy, then in practice it would be hard to decide whether a 
patient’s consent decision was truly autonomous. Christman’s concept of autonomy avoids the 
problem created by regress because he concentrates solely on the way an agent acquires her 
desires, rather than the way she identifies with her desires. Prima facie it might be concluded 
that Christman’s concept of autonomy would form a better basis for the practice of informed 
consent than hierarchical concepts of autonomy. 
A problem related to infinite regress is procedural independence.  Procedural 
independence is a requirement in both of Dworkin’s concepts of autonomy. Procedural 
independence requires that an agent acquires her second order desires, beliefs or values 
without being unduly influenced by outside forces. Dworkin (1988, page 18) believes this can 
be achieved but does not specify how. I suggested in section 3.3.2 that it might not be 
necessary to specify all the conditions necessary for procedural independence. I argued that it 
might be better to define procedural independence negatively by assuming procedural 
independence is possible in some circumstances and listing all the circumstances which make 
procedural impossible. Christman (1991, page 19) claims his concept of autonomy eliminates 
the need for procedural independence. 
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It might be argued that Christman is wrong and that the way someone acquires his 
autonomous desires might be manipulated, and that this gives rise to the need for procedural 
independence to be part of his concept of autonomy. I believe such an argument would be 
wrong. Christman’s second condition, that reflection takes place in circumstances that do not 
inhibit self-reflection, appears to rule out the manipulation of an agent’s desires. However if 
Christman’s concept of autonomy is to be meaningful it must be possible to specify the factors 
that inhibit self-reflection. It might then be argued that specifying the conditions that inhibit 
reflection is identical to specifying the conditions needed to define procedural independence 
negatively. It might then be concluded that Christman’s concept of autonomy only eliminates 
the need for procedural independence if this is defined positively. It might be further 
concluded that if procedural independence is defined negatively then Christman’s concept of 
autonomy does not eliminate the need for procedural independence. It might be still further 
concluded that if the idea of procedural independence is defined negatively then this idea is 
built into Christman’s concept of autonomy.  
Christman’s concept of autonomy also differs from that of Dworkin because Christman 
is concerned with how desires are acquired and Dworkin is concerned with the capacities of 
autonomous persons. I agued in section 3.3.3 that because Dworkin’s concept of global 
autonomy is primarily concerned with an agent’s capacity for reflection that this gives rise to a 
problem with respecting the intrinsic value of autonomy. I argued in sections 2.2 and 3.3 that 
this problem occurs because the intrinsic value of autonomy is tied to the recognition of 
someone as the kind of creature that can determine her own future. However this problem does 
not occur when autonomy is associated with autonomous desires as required by Christman. If 
autonomous decisions are respected by simply accepting these decisions then the makers of 
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these decisions are automatically accepted as the kind of creatures that can determine their 
own future.  
In section 3.3 I used the example of a young woman who is told she has leukaemia and 
wishes to delay treatment in order to try to have a child of her own. I suggested that if 
informed consent is based on respect for Dworkin’s concept of global autonomy then the 
above patient’s decision to postpone treatment in order to have a child might be considered 
non-autonomous. I argued that if this suggestion were true, it would be at variance with both 
our intuitive ideas of autonomy and informed consent. However, if Christman’s concept of 
autonomy was applied in the above case, these difficulties do not occur. According to 
Christman’s concept of autonomy whether a decision is autonomous depends on the 
conditions in which the agent acquired her desires and whether she resisted the development 
of the desires underlying her decision. It is quite clear in the above case that the young woman 
did not resist the development of her desire to postpone treatment in order to try to have a 
child. The development of her desire did not take place in conditions that inhibited her self-
reflection. Further she had a manifestly consistent set of beliefs and was not deceiving herself. 
It is clear then that Christman would regard this young women’s decision as autonomous. It 
can be concluded that Christman’s concept of autonomy appears to concur better with our 
intuitive ideas of autonomy than that of Dworkin in some difficult cases. 
 
3.4.3. Christman’s concept of autonomy and our intuitive ideas of autonomy 
 
 
Christman’s concept of autonomy concerns personal autonomy. It is not primarily concerned 
with the good of society, as was Mill, or with what someone ought to do morally, as was Kant. 
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Informed consent decisions are personal decisions. It follows that Christman’s concept of 
autonomy can be directly connected to informed consent decisions. In practice this direct 
connection would seem to be preferable to an indirect connection through the concept of an 
autonomous person. Prima facie it follows that Christman’s historical account of autonomy 
would appear to form a better basis for informed consent than Dworkin’s global concept of 
autonomy. I argued in section 2.1 that any meaningful concept of autonomy must concur to 
some degree with our intuitive ideas of autonomy. In this section I will compare Christman’s 
concept of autonomy with the intuitive ideas of autonomy developed in section 2.1. 
In section 2.1 I argued that an intuitively autonomous decision is subject to three 
conditions. Firstly an autonomous agent must have the capacity to choose and there must be 
no external constraints controlling his choice. Secondly he must identify with his autonomous 
decisions. Lastly his autonomous decisions must have a degree of persistence unless there are 
changes in the circumstances in which the decision was made. It seems clear that Christman’s 
concept of autonomy meets the first of these conditions. Clearly, if an agent’s decision is 
constrained then this decision was made under the influence of factors that inhibit self-
reflection. It follows, according to Christman’s second condition, that such a decision is non-
autonomous. 
In section 2.1 I argued that the idea of an agent identifying with his desires is important 
because it allows us to identify which internal constraints are compatible with autonomy and 
which are not. Consider again the case of MB [1997]. Recall that MB was twenty-three years 
old with a needle phobia and was expecting her second child. It seems clear that, according to 
Christman’s historical account of autonomy, MB’s decisions to consent to the caesarean 
section would be autonomous. This follows because she did not resist the formation of her 
preference for the section, there were no reflection inhibiting factors and she appeared to be 
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minimally rational. However, according to Christman’s historical account of autonomy, MB’s 
decisions would not be autonomous when she refused consent because in these circumstances 
her phobia of needles inhibited her self-reflection. This follows because her desire to refuse 
consent originated in conditions that would be incompatible with Christman’s second 
condition. 
 In section 2.1 I also considered the attitude of women consenting to screening for 
BRAC 1 and 2 gene mutations (Hallowell, Foster, Arden-Jones, Murday and Watson, 2003, 
page 81). Intuitively these women’s decisions were autonomous even if these decisions were 
internally constrained by a desire to care for other family members. Christman would regard 
these women’s choices as autonomous because they did not resist the formation of their 
preferences for screening, there were no factors inhibiting reflection, and they appeared to be 
minimally rational. It seems that Christman’s concept of autonomy is able to differentiate 
between internal constraints that are intuitively compatible and incompatible with autonomy. 
However this ability to differentiate between internal constraints does not mean that 
Christman’s concept of autonomy automatically concurs fully with regard to our intuitive 
ideas about the need for an agent to identify with his autonomous desires. 
It would seem, according to Christman, that any desire acquired by an agent without him 
resisting the acquisition of this desire, and subject to Christman’s two further conditions would 
be autonomous. It follows that an agent might acquire a great many autonomous desires he 
does not believe are important. The question then may be asked whether a desire that an agent 
does not believe is important to him can be a decision an agent identifies himself with. For 
instance, someone may have a desire for ice cream. It is perfectly possible he did not resist the 
formation of this desire, there were no factors inhibiting reflection, and he was minimally 
rational. It follows according to Christman that the agent’s desire for ice cream would be an 
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autonomous desire. Such a desire is a freely made desire and as such should normally be 
respected. However, intuitively it would seem to be absurd to argue that an agent identifies 
himself with a desire for ice cream. Even if the above is accepted it would be wrong to base 
philosophical arguments solely on our intuitions, although these intuitions may of course 
guide our arguments. 
Let it be assumed for the sake of argument that an agent can identify himself with a 
trivial desire such as the desire for ice cream. Such a desire need have no persistence. For 
instance a diner might substitute his desire for ice cream with a desire for an alternative sweet. 
I will now argue that if an agent has a desire and this desire has no persistence then he does 
not identify himself with this desire. Let it be accepted that if a person identifies himself with 
something this identification forms part of the definition of that person as a particular person. 
Let it also be accepted definitions must have some persistence. It follows that a particular 
person cannot be defined by reference to mere whims because these whims have no 
persistence. It can be concluded that if an agent’s desire has no persistence then the agent does 
not identify himself with this desire. I argued in 2.1 that intuitively an autonomous decision is 
one with which the agent identifies and which has persistence. The above conclusion suggests 
that these two conditions are linked. I will further explore this linkage in section 5.4.2. 
The above conclusion would create a problem if informed consent were based on respect 
for Christman’s concept of autonomy because then some desires which a patient neither cares 
about nor identifies himself with would be regarded as autonomous. Furthermore these desires 
should be respected even if respecting these desires harms the patient. It follows that 
Christman’s concept of autonomy leads to a similar position to that which would occur if 
Mill’s ideas on liberty were to form the basis of informed consent (see section3.1.2). It might 
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be concluded that if informed consent was based on either Mill’s account of liberty or 
Christman’s historical account of autonomy then some decisions that an agent neither cares 
about nor identifies with should be respected. It might be further concluded that Christman’s 
concept of autonomy, like that of Dworkin, cannot deal adequately with the problem of 
identification. I will now argue that an agent identifying with his decisions is central to any 
meaningful concept of autonomy. 
 
3.5. Frankfurt and autonomy 
 
I concluded in section 3.4.3 that the way an agent identifies with his autonomous decisions 
must be accounted for in any meaningful account of personal autonomy. In this section I will 
examine an account of autonomy as envisioned by Frankfurt in which an agent’s identification 
with his desires is central to the account. Crucial to Frankfurt’s account of autonomy is an 
agent caring about something. Frankfurt believes caring about something depends on 
reflection: 
 
Caring insofar as it consists in guiding oneself along a distinctive or in a particular manner, 
presupposes both agency and self-consciousness. It is a matter of being active in a certain way, 
and the activity is essentially a reflexive one (quoted in Frankfurt, 1988, page 83, originally 
1982). 
 
It follows that Frankfurt’s account of autonomy is in some ways related to that of 
Dworkin(1988, page 20) who sees autonomy as the second order capacity of persons to reflect 
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on their first order desires. Both Frankfurt and Dworkin’s accounts of autonomy concerning 
personal autonomy are hierarchical and purely structural. I will examine Frankfurt’s concept 
of autonomy in four sub-sections. 
 
3.5.1. The central features of Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy 
 
 
The defining feature of autonomy according to Frankfurt is how an agent relates to his 
autonomous concerns by caring about them. 
 
The formation of a person’s will is most fundamentally a matter of his coming to care about 
certain things, and of his coming to care about some of them more than others (quoted in 
Frankfurt, 1988, page 91, originally 1982). 
 
It must be made clear exactly what Frankfurt means by “to care about”. He does not simply 
mean to take care of something. Someone can take care of something without caring about 
what he is taking caring of. For example a shepherd must take care of his sheep but this does 
not of necessity mean he must care about them in the way Frankfurt means. Perhaps he only 
cares about making a living. An agent’s taking care of something may be purely instrumental 
in obtaining some other good he seeks. The shepherd’s identity need not be tied to his taking 
care of his sheep. For instance the shepherd may become a tractor driver and make his living 
by this means and need never take care of sheep again. However caring about something 
according to Frankfurt cannot be a purely instrumental means used in order to obtain some 
other good. Caring about something means the agent cares about the thing for its own sake. 
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Furthermore the good of what the carer cares about is tied to the carer’s own good, and if what 
he cares about is harmed then he is harmed too. 
 
A person who cares about something is, as it were invested in it. He identifies himself with 
what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to 
benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced (quoted in 
Frankfurt, 1988, page 83, originally 1982). 
 
It is argued by Zimmerman (2000) that Frankfurt’s idea of caring about something can be 
passive. I believe that any such argument is unsound because caring about something by its 
nature involves activity (see Frankfurt, 1988, page 83, originally 1982). Intuitively it seems 
that Frankfurt is correct and “caring about something” is connected to autonomy. If this was 
not so, it would be hard to imagine anyone ever being self-governing in personal matters 
because he would have no consistent means of decision-making. 
Frankfurt believes that by caring about something we act autonomously. Frankfurt also 
believes that autonomy can be defined in terms of what we love (Frankfurt, 1999, page 132, 
originally 1994). Frankfurt’s ideas concerning both caring about and loving differ from our 
intuitive ideas. Both caring about and loving are not concerned with emotions according to 
Frankfurt but are concerned with an agent’s volitional structure. 
 
That a person cares about something or that he loves something has less to do with how things 
make him feel, or his opinions about them, than the more or less stable motivational structures 
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that shape his preferences and guide his conduct (quoted in Frankfurt, 1999, page 129, 
originally 1994). 
 
In the above quotation Frankfurt defines caring about as being based on an agent’s stable 
motivational structure rather than his desires. An agent’s desires are of course be part of her 
motivational structures. However because her desires need have no persistence these may not 
form part of any stable motivational structure by which she guides her life. It follows that 
Frankfurt believes an autonomous action is an action which flows from this stable 
motivational structure. It follows from this that if an autonomous agent has a stable 
motivational structure then he must be able to prioritise what he cares about (Frankfurt, 1988, 
page 91, originally 1982). Sometimes Frankfurt seems to treat caring about something and 
loving something as equivalent, as in the above quotation. However, elsewhere Frankfurt 
(1999, page 155) speaks of loving as being a particular mode of caring. Frankfurt  sees 
autonomy as the formation of a person’s will being based on caring about (1988, page 
91,originally 1982) and on loving (1999, page 129, originally 1994). In what follows it will be 
held that to care about something and to love something are roughly equivalent and that either 
can form a basis for personal autonomy. To be autonomous according to Frankfurt means the 
following. Firstly an autonomous decision or action flows from what the agent cares about or 
loves. Secondly this caring about something requires her to identify with his decision or 
action. Thirdly an autonomous agent must be able to prioritise the things she cares about. 
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3.5.2. The practical consequences of Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy 
 
Frankfurt defines autonomy in terms of what a person cares about. In the rest of this thesis “to 
care about” will be taken to mean what Frankfurt means by caring about as outlined in section 
3.5.1, unless stated otherwise. This section will examine the practical consequences of 
Frankfurt’s ideas on caring. In order to make these consequences clear, I will examine them in 
connection with the idea of informed consent. 
Let it be assumed that informed consent is based on respect for Frankfurt’s concept of 
autonomy. I argued in section 2.2 that to respect personal autonomy means accepting an 
agent’s autonomous decisions provided these decisions do not harm others. It follows that to 
respect Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy means to accept all decisions the agent cares about 
provided these decisions do not harm others. Medicine is a practical discipline and prima facie 
it is difficult to see how the idea of informed consent could be of much practical use if it were 
based purely on Frankfurt’s ideas on caring about as outlined in section 3.5.1. The reason for 
this is that the idea of caring about appears to be too vague a concept to be of much practical 
use. However the use of Frankfurt’s ideas on caring about would have three major 
consequences in practice. These consequences might permit his concept of autonomy to form 
the basis of informed consent. In this section I will examine these consequences. Firstly I will 
argue that Frankfurt’s ideas on autonomy mean an autonomous decision can only be made by 
an agent who has some values. Secondly I will argue that Frankfurt’s ideas on autonomy 
require that if someone cares about something this caring about must have persistence. Lastly I 
will argue that Frankfurt’s ideas on autonomy means that only an agent who is wholehearted 
can make an autonomous decision. 
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The first consequence of adopting Frankfurt’s ideas on autonomy is that only an agent with 
values can make an autonomous decision. Frankfurt (1999) argues if someone has no ideals 
then his decisions are moved by mere impulse and inclination. 
 
He can make whatever decision he likes and shape his will as he pleases. This does not mean 
that his will is free. It only means that his will is anarchic, moved by mere impulse and 
inclination. For a person without ideals, there are no volitional laws he has bound himself to 
respect and to which he unconditionally submits. He has no inviolable boundaries. Thus he is 
amorphous with no fixed shape or identity. (quoted in Frankfurt, 1999, page 114, originally 
1994) 
 
Intuitively personal autonomy concerns self-government and if someone’s decisions are based 
purely on impulse and inclination then these decisions are not normally part of his self-
government. It follows that Frankfurt is correct and if a decision is autonomous then the agent 
making this decision must have some ideals. It will be assumed here that ideals means values 
and that values must be something the agent cares about. Let it be accepted that if informed 
consent is based on respect for autonomy, then a competent decision must be an autonomous 
decision. It then further follows that if informed consent is based on Frankfurt’s concept of 
autonomy that only a patient with a set of values can make a competent decision. This concurs 
with informed consent in practice. The General Medical Council, the Department of Health 
and legal guidelines all require that a competent patient must have a set of values (see sections 
1.1 and 1.2). In bioethics it is also generally agreed that a competent patient must have a set of 
values (for example see Wicclair, 1991, page 91); (Buchanan and Brock, 1989, page 25). 
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The second consequence of adopting Frankfurt’s ideas on caring about something as the basis 
for defining autonomy is that autonomous decisions must have some persistence. Frankfurt 
argues that someone can only care about something over time. 
 
Desires and beliefs have no inherent persistence; nothing in the nature of wanting or of 
believing, requires that a desire or a belief must endure. But the notion of guidance, and hence 
the notion of caring, implies a certain consistency or steadiness of behaviour, and this 
presupposes some degree of persistence (quoted in Frankfurt, 1988, page 84, originally 1982). 
 
Prima facie it might be concluded that autonomous decisions must also have some persistence. 
Dworkin (1988, page 15) believes that autonomy is a feature defining a whole way of living 
one’s life and can only be evaluated over an extended portion of a person’s life. It follows that 
Dworkin’s ideas on autonomy concur with those of Frankfurt by holding autonomy must have 
some persistence. Dworkin is primarily concerned with an autonomous agent’s capacity for 
autonomy. According to Frankfurt (1999, page 129 originally 1994) considering someone’s 
stable motivational structure is important when considering his autonomy. It might then be 
assumed that an agent’s capacity for autonomy and his stable motivational structure are 
roughly equivalent. It might then be further assumed that Dworkin and Frankfurt’s concerns 
about the persistence of autonomy are similar. This second assumption would be false. It is 
true that Frankfurt is concerned with an agent’s stable motivational structure but his primary 
concern is with the actions that flow from this structure. These actions are partly reflexive 
(Frankfurt 1988, page 83, originally 1982) but it would be wrong to assume that Frankfurt 
believes autonomous actions can be wholly reflexive. 
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No one can properly be said to care about something unless, at least to some degree, he guides 
his conduct in accordance with the implications of his interest in it. This means paying 
attention to it and to what concerns it; it means making decisions; it means taking steps. Thus, 
with respect to those things of whose importance to him derives from the fact that he cares 
about them, the person is necessary active (quoted in Frankfurt, 1999, page 87, originally 
1982). 
 
It follows that Frankfurt believes autonomy is concerned with decisions flowing from what the 
agent cares about. What an agent cares about defines his stable motivational structure which 
by definition must have some persistence. It can be concluded that the prima facie conclusion 
reached above is true and if a decision is autonomous, then this decision must have some 
persistence. 
The importance of the persistence of autonomy can be illustrated in practice by 
considering the case MB [1997]. Recall that MB had a needle phobia and was pregnant. Due 
to complications expected in her delivery she was advised to have a caesarean section. MB 
consented to the section but later withdrew her consent due to her phobia. This process of 
consenting and then refusing to consent was repeated several times. MB’s consent decisions 
were not persistent. It follows that MB’s decisions would not have been considered as 
autonomous decisions according to Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy. It further follows that if 
informed consent was based on respect for Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy, and a competent 
decision must be an autonomous decision, then MB’s decisions would not have been 
considered as competent decisions. 
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The third consequence of adopting Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy is that an autonomous 
agent’s volitional structure must be wholehearted. Frankfurt (1988, page 91, originally 1982) 
believes caring about things means coming to care about some things more than others. He 
believes caring about some things more than others unites an autonomous agent’s will making 
him wholehearted.  This property is defined by Cuypers (2000) as follows; 
 
If a persons’ will is wholehearted, then it is true of him that his will has a particular unity of 
attitude, preference and goal. His personality is coherently organised around such a volitional 
unity. Hence the wholehearted person has a will with a pattern of his own. (Cuypers, 2000, 
page 236) 
 
It is important to note that the fact that a wholehearted person must care about things and care 
about some things more than others, only means he has stability in what he cares about. The 
fact that an agent’s will is wholehearted does not mean he must have unity in his desires. For 
example, someone may have a stable volitional structure and care about not smoking. 
However he might be unable to overcome his desire for a cigarette. This smoker would still be 
wholehearted because he has a stable volitional structure even though he does not have unity 
of desires. Wholeheartedness only refers to an agent’s volitional structure and is concerned 
solely with what the agent cares about. However it would be a mistake to believe that 
Frankfurt would regard someone who wholehearted and persistent in what he cares about, but 
is unable to act on what he cares about, as autonomous. Frankfurt (1999, page 87, 
originally1992) regards autonomy as being connected to action. 
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This thesis is concerned with applying philosophy in the context of informed consent. 
It follows that if the idea of wholeheartedness is to be a useful idea in this context it must be 
possible to determine in practice whether an agent is wholehearted. Frankfurt defines 
wholeheartedness as follows; 
 
In what does his wholeheartedness with respect to these physic elements consist? It consists in 
his being fully satisfied that they, rather than others that inherently (i.e., non contingently) 
conflict with them, should be among the causes and considerations that determine his 
cognitive, affective, attitudinal and behavioral processes (Frankfurt, 1999, page 103, originally 
1992). 
 
If wholeheartedness is to be a useful idea, we might ask exactly what is meant by satisfaction. 
Frankfurt defines satisfaction as follows: 
 
What satisfaction does entail is an absence of restlessness or resistance. A satisfied person 
may be willing to accept a change in his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing 
about a change (quoted in Frankfurt, 1999, page 103,). 
 
Frankfurt believes an autonomous agent must be wholehearted. He also connects an agent’s 
wholeheartedness with an absence of restlessness or resistance to his volitions. It might then 
be argued that because Frankfurt’s ideas on wholeheartedness are connected to a lack of 
resistance, these ideas are similar to Christman’s ideas on autonomy. Recall that Christman 
would regard an agent’s desire as autonomous provided that the agent did not or would not 
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have resisted the development of the desire had he attended to the desire’s formation, subject 
to his two other conditions. However it is important to be aware of the differences between 
Christman’s and Frankfurt’s ideas. Firstly the lack of resistance applies in different domains. 
Christman is concerned with an agent’s lack of resistance to the acquisition of his desires. 
Frankfurt is concerned with an agent’s lack of resistance to what he cares about. This lack of 
resistance applies to an agent’s volitional or stable motivational structure which may be 
distinct from his desires, see page 114. It might be argued Christman is concerned with how an 
agent acquires his motivations whilst Frankfurt is concerned with an agent’s stable 
motivational structure. Secondly, Frankfurt would regard an autonomous agent’s lack of 
resistance to what he cares about as actually occurring. Christman connects an agent’s lack of 
resistance to his desire acquisition as either occurring or possibly occurring if he attended to 
his desire acquisition. It might be concluded that in practice it should be possible to determine 
if an agent is wholehearted about some decision by asking two questions. Firstly, does the 
agent care about his decision? Secondly, is he satisfied with his decision? His satisfaction 
would be indicated by a persistent absence of restlessness to accepting his decision. 
Frankfurt’s idea of wholeheartedness is connected to the idea of ambivalence. Cuypers 
(2000) defines a volitionally ambivalent person as follows: 
. 
He is torn in two opposite directions and thus suffers from volitional division, the ambivalent 
person is threatened by disintegration and personality disorder (Cuypers, 2000, page 236). 
 
It must be noted that in the above context, ambivalence like wholeheartedness only refers to an 
agent’s volitional structure and not to his desires in general. In order to avoid confusion, when 
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it only concerns an agent’s volitional structure, ambivalence will in future be referred to as 
volitional ambivalence and, when it concerns an agent’s desires will be referred to as 
psychological ambivalence. It seems clear that if someone is not satisfied with what he cares 
about he must suffer from volitional division. It follows if someone is not satisfied with what 
he cares about he must be volitionally ambivalent. Let it be accepted that Cuypers is right and 
a person who is volitionally ambivalent is threatened by disintegration and personality 
disorder. Intuitively such a person is non-autonomous. It can be concluded that if a decision is 
autonomous, then this decision must be wholehearted. 
If the ideas of wholeheartedness and ambivalence are to be meaningful in the context of 
informed consent then the implications of applying these ideas in this context must be clear. I 
will now use three examples based on the case of Ms B [2002] to make these implications 
clear. Recall that Ms B was a tetraplegic patient being kept alive on a ventilator which she 
wished to have switched off. Ms B had no desire to continue living on the ventilator. It follows 
that Ms B’s wish to have the ventilator switched off was not psychologically ambivalent. In 
addition Ms B cared about her wish to have the ventilator switched off and was not restless 
with, or did not resist the formation of, this wish. Because of this it further follows that Ms B’s 
wish to have the ventilator switched off was not volitionally ambivalent and hence she was 
wholehearted. It still further follows that Frankfurt would have regarded Ms B’s wish as 
autonomous. It can be concluded that in the context of informed consent, because respect for 
autonomy means accepting autonomous decisions as argued in section 2.2, Ms B’s wish to 
have her ventilator switched off should have been accepted. 
Secondly, consider an imaginary Mr B. Mr B’s medical condition is identical to that of 
Ms B. However his volitional structure is different. Mr B cares about both continuing to live 
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and not wanting to spend the rest of his life on the ventilator. Mr B’s caring about continuing 
to live and having the ventilator switched off are both elements of his volitional structure and 
not simply desires. Let it be assumed that Mr B is unable to give priority to either wanting to 
continue to live or not wanting to spend the rest of his life on the ventilator. It follows that Mr 
B’s volitional structure is split and hence he is volitionally ambivalent. It further follows that 
he is non-autonomous. It still further follows that because, like MB, Mr B is unable to make a 
persistent decision he is incompetent to give informed consent. In this situation a surrogate 
decision maker must make a decision on Mr B’s behalf. It can be argued that the fact that 
someone is non-autonomous does not mean his decisions should simply be ignored (see Law, 
2003, page 54). It can also be argued that just because a patient is incompetent his decisions 
can simply be ignored (see Buller, 2001, page 109). However, in this context, because Mr B is 
volitionally ambivalent there are no clear-cut decisions made by Mr B to which a surrogate 
decision maker can give additional weight. It follows that in this situation a surrogate decision 
maker should make a decision based purely on what he believes to be in Mr B’s best interests.  
Thirdly consider Mrs B who is in an identical situation. Mrs B cares about having the 
ventilator switched off and sometimes desires to continue living. Mrs B persistently cares 
about not living the rest of her life on a ventilator and wishes to have it switched off. It follows 
that she is not volitionally ambivalent. However, when the time comes to switch the ventilator 
off, even though Mrs B continues to care about having it switched off, she is frightened and 
has a temporary desire to continue living. This desire overwhelms her continuing volition. It 
follows that Mrs B is psychologically ambivalent. It seems clear that because, like MB, Mrs B 
is unable to make a persistent decision, she is incompetent to give informed consent and a 
surrogate decision maker must make a decision on her behalf. However Mrs B’s wish to have 
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the ventilator switched off is volitionally un-ambivalent. In section 5.4.2 I will argue that the 
persistence of an autonomous agent’s volitions are of greater importance than the strength of 
his desires as far as self-government is concerned. It follows that in this situation Law and 
Buller’s concerns can be addressed. It further follows that a surrogate decision maker should 
give special weight to Mrs B’s wishes when deciding on her behalf.  
If it is accepted that informed consent is based on respect for autonomy and 
wholeheartedness is an integral part of any meaningful concept of autonomy, then this leads to 
three conclusions. Firstly, if a patient’s decision is both volitionally and psychologically un-
ambivalent, then this decision must be accepted. Secondly, if a patient’s consent decision is 
both volitionally and psychologically ambivalent, then a surrogate decision maker should 
make a decision on behalf of the patient based purely on the surrogate’s view of the patient’s 
best interests. In this situation, the surrogate decision maker acts purely as a patient’s 
representative. Lastly, if a patient’s consent decision is volitionally un-ambivalent and 
psychologically ambivalent, then a surrogate decision maker should make a decision on behalf 
of the patient giving special weight to the patient’s wholehearted decision. In this scenario a 
surrogate decision maker should act as the patient’s agent rather than his representative as far 
as possible. 
 
3.5.3. Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy and the problem of regress 
 
 
Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy raises three major theoretical problems. Firstly, Frankfurt’s 
concept would seem to regard some non-voluntaristic acts as autonomous. Secondly, it might 
be argued that by concentrating solely on what an autonomous agent cares about as opposed to 
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other features such as his desires Frankfurt is dealing with an “ideal self” as opposed to the 
real person. Both of these problems are directly connected to our intuitive ideas on autonomy. 
I will consider these problems in conjunction with our intuitive ideas on autonomy in section 
3.5.4. This section will only deal with the third problem, that of regress. The problem of 
regress is a theoretical problem. It might be assumed that theoretical problems have no place 
in this thesis as it primarily concerned with the relationship between autonomy and informed 
consent. However, I will show that this assumption is false. I will argue that it would be futile 
to base informed consent on respect for any concept of autonomy that has irresolvable 
problems limiting the usefulness of the concept. Two solutions will be offered to the problem 
of regress. Firstly, I will argue that the problem of regress dissolves away in practice. 
Secondly, I will argue that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy is a hybrid concept and this 
blocks the path to regress. 
Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy appears to suffer from a problem associated with 
infinite regress. Cuypers (2000) summarises part of Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy as 
follows: 
 
The harmonious mesh between a person’s second-order volitions and his first order desires is, 
then wholly sufficient for the autonomy of his first-order psychology. In short, autonomy 
consists of self-identification and volitional harmony (Cuypers, 2000, page 229). 
 
Accepting the above appears to lead to the problem of infinite regress: 
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First-order desires are made autonomous by acts of identification, but what, in turn makes 
these second-order acts autonomous? (Cuypers, 2000, page 229) 
 
It follows that if the above explanation of Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy is accepted as a 
complete explanation of his concept then this concept has a problem connected with infinite 
regress.  
I will now show that if informed consent is based on respect for Frankfurt’s concept of 
autonomy, then the problem of regress appears to be of practical importance. Consider 
someone donating a kidney to a relative. This process has no medical benefit to the donor. It 
follows that it is especially important to be certain that the donor’s decision is autonomous. 
The donor may have an initial first order desire not to donate her kidney perhaps because of 
fear. However let it be assumed on reflection she decides it would be altruistic to donate her 
kidney and as a result of this reflection modifies his first order desire. She decides to donate 
one of her kidneys. It follows that there is now a harmonious mesh between the donor’s 
second order volitions and her first order desires. It further follows that without the problem of 
regress the donor’s desire to donate one of her kidneys might be called autonomous. However 
it seems perfectly possible for the donor to have a third-order volition wishing she did not 
have the altruistic second-order volition to donate one of her kidneys. This leads to the 
conclusion that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy is an incomplete account of autonomy. Let it 
be accepted that informed consent is based on respect for Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy. 
Let it also be accepted, as argued in section 2.2, that to respect autonomy means accepting 
autonomous decisions. It might be concluded in this context that it would be impossible to 
decide whether to accept the patient’s decision to donate one of his kidneys. This points to a 
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second conclusion, namely that it is wrong to base informed consent on respect for Frankfurt’s 
concept of autonomy unless the problem of regress can be solved. 
The problem associated with basing informed consent on respect for Frankfurt’s concept 
of autonomy must be specified. Let it be accepted that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy has a 
theoretical problem associated with infinite regress. However, the problem to be addressed 
here is whether this theoretical problem means Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy cannot form a 
useful basis for informed consent. I will now argue by analogy that in practice this problem 
associated with infinite regress does not limit the concept’s usefulness. If someone makes a 
calculation it is sensible for him to check his calculation, perhaps even double-check it. 
However is it sensible for him to triple-check the calculation or perhaps check it a hundred 
times? Theoretically someone may make a mistake in some calculation ninety-nine times. 
However, in practice, someone would not usually check his calculation a hundred times if he 
always obtained the same answer. Checking loses its point after many checks have been 
carried out because the checker becomes convinced his answer is correct. It follows that while 
theoretically it is possible to check a calculation an infinite number of times, in practice this 
checking becomes pointless. 
It might be argued that, by analogy, the same is true of all hierarchical accounts of 
autonomy including Frankfurt’s concept. Theoretically it is possible for an agent to endorse 
his reflection at one level by reflection at a higher level an infinite number of times. However, 
in practice, this also becomes pointless because the agent becomes committed to his choice as 
pointed out by Frankfurt: 
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For a commitment is decisive if and only if it is made without reservation, and making a 
commitment without reservation means that the person who makes it does so in the belief that 
no further accurate inquiry would require him to change his mind. It is therefore pointless to 
pursue the inquiry any further. This is precisely the resonance effect (quoted in Frankfurt, 
1988, page 168, originally 1987). 
 
It might be objected that my analogy is a poor analogy for two reasons. Someone might argue 
that each calculation is identical whilst each reflection reflects on a different previous 
reflection. I believe this objection is unsound. I accept that the procedure used in each 
calculation check is identical. However, the purpose of each check is different. Consider the 
second calculation check in a series. This is simply a calculation. However the purpose of this 
calculation is to check the previous result. Secondly, it might objected that higher order 
reflections are not connected directly to an agent’s original decision and hence are not 
analogous to calculation checks. I believe this second objection is also unsound. It is hard to 
see any useful purpose to an agent’s higher order reflections unless these reflections are in 
some way checks on the agent’s original decision. It follows that the purpose of each of these 
higher order reflections is to check on the correctness of the agent’s decision. Let it be 
assumed that all an agent’s reflections endorse his decision. It follows that at some stage the 
agent becomes committed to his decision. When this stage is reached, the resonance effect 
means it becomes pointless to reflect further. The kidney donor may question whether his 
higher order desire is endorsed at a still higher level. However, if his questioning always 
endorses his original decision, then eventually he will become committed to this decision and 
further questioning becomes pointless. This thesis is concerned with applied philosophy and, 
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even if the theoretical problem of regress exists, it seems in practice that the problem of 
regress does not limit the usefulness of Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy. 
I have argued that even if Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy suffers from the theoretical 
problem of regress, this does not affect the usefulness of his concept.  Let it be assumed for the 
sake of argument that all purely hierarchical accounts of autonomy suffer from the theoretical 
problem of regress. I will now argue that because Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy is not a 
purely hierarchical concept, it does not suffer from the problem of regress. Kristinsson (2000, 
page 270) notes that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, 
Frankfurt’s concept may be seen as a reflective process by which an agent identifies with his 
first order desires. This would seem to be a hierarchical account of autonomy and open to the 
problem of regress. Secondly, Frankfurt’s concept is defined by what an agent cares about.  
Cuypers (2000, page 226) concurs with Kristinsson’s view and expands on it by arguing that 
Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy is a hybrid concept. He defines this hybrid as a combination 
of voluntaristic and non-voluntaristic components (Cuypers, 2000, page 247). He argues that 
the harmonious agreement between a person’s second-order volitions and his first order 
desires defines the voluntaristic component. He then further argues that the non-voluntaristic 
component consists of what the agent cares about. The agent’s second order volitions are 
autonomous not because they are endorsed at some higher-level, but because the agent cares 
about them wholeheartedly. This means that the agent is satisfied with his volitions, and has 
no desire to reflect further on these volitions: 
 
When a person is fully satisfied with his motivational energies there is no need whatsoever 
that he should also adopt a higher-order attitude towards his self-satisfaction. The state of self-
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satisfaction does not require the adoption of a higher-order attitude to make that state self-
satisfactory (Cuypers, 2000, page 238). 
 
It can be concluded that if it is accepted Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy is indeed a hybrid 
concept that the way to infinite regress is blocked. It can be further concluded that the 
theoretical problem connected to regress does not mean that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy 
cannot form the basis for informed consent. 
 
 
3.5.4. Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy and our intuitive ideas of autonomy 
 
 
This section is concerned with two potential problems connected to Frankfurt’s concept of 
autonomy. These problems are related to our intuitive ideas of autonomy and were outlined at 
the start of section 3.5.3. Firstly, Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy contains a non-voluntaristic 
component. If this was not so, his concept might indeed be open to the theoretical problem of 
regress as argued in section 3.5.3. However, it might be suggested that even if this non-
voluntaristic component helps solve the problem of regress, it clashes with both our intuitive 
ideas of autonomy and informed consent. Secondly, it might be suggested that Frankfurt’s 
concept of autonomy is based on ideas concerning “ideal persons” rather than “real persons”. 
If this is true, it would follow that his concept of autonomy should not be used as a basis for 
informed consent as informed consent deals with real rather than ideal patients. I will accept 
that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy contains a non-voluntaristic component but I will argue 
that this does not clash with either our intuitive ideas of autonomy or informed consent. I will 
not accept that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy depends on the idea of an ideal person. 
   131 
 
 
Frankfurt believes autonomy is based on caring about (1988, page 91, originally 1982) or 
loving something (1999, page 129, originally 1994). Frankfurt’s ideas on caring about and 
loving something may not be identical, however in this thesis I regard them as roughly 
equivalent when they form the basis for his concept of autonomy (see section 3.5.1). Frankfurt 
believes loving is volitionally constrained to some degree: 
 
Roughly speaking, then, when I refer to love I am referring to a concern for the well-being or 
flourishing of a beloved object – a concern that is more or less volitionally constrained so that 
it is not a matter of entirely free choice or under full voluntary control, and that is more or less 
disinterested (Frankfurt, 1999, page 165). 
 
Frankfurt also holds that to love something regardless of any benefits it brings to the agent is 
what it means to be disinterested. If someone loves something, and his desires and interests do 
not affect this loving with respect to what he loves, then he is not free: 
 
In this respect, he is not free. On the contrary, he is in the very nature of the case captivated by 
his beloved and his love. The will of the lover is rigorously constrained. Love is not a matter 
of choice (quoted in Frankfurt, 1999, page 135, originally 1994). 
 
It follows that if informed consent is based on respect for Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy, 
then it is possible for a patient facing some decision to feel he has no real choice concerning 
this decision. It might then be suggested that if someone is faced by some decision and feels 
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he has no real choice, then intuitively his decision is non-autonomous and he is unable to give 
genuine informed consent. 
I believe that the above suggestion is too simplistic and what it means to have no choice 
must be better defined. Someone may have no choice due to either internal or external 
constraints. Frankfurt (1999, page 131, originally 1994) believes an autonomous agent must be 
free from external constraints. Let it be accepted without further argument if a patient’s choice 
is constrained by external constraints his choice is non-autonomous and he is unable to give 
informed consent. but that he may be constrained internally. The question that must be 
addressed is this, are some of an agent’s internal constraints compatible with him making 
autonomous decisions? Wolf (1990) seems to believe a truly autonomous agent must have no 
internal constraints including reason: 
 
A truly autonomous agent would be no more bound by Reason than Desire. Thus a truly 
autonomous agent must have a freedom more radical than that which the ability to act in 
accordance with Reason automatically affords (Wolf, 1990, page 53). 
 
The above position may not completely represent Wolf’s view. Wolf’s reason view of action 
seems very akin to some concepts of autonomy (Wolf, 1990, chapter 4). However she does 
also mention moving from the autonomy view to the reason view (Wolf, 1990, page 71). 
Whatever Wolf’s exact view of autonomy is, the above position seems to be untenable for two 
reasons. Firstly, if this position was accepted, it means children and even the insane might be 
regarded as fully autonomous. It follows that such a radical concept of autonomy cannot 
account for our intuitive ideas of self-government and should be rejected. Secondly, Frankfurt 
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(1999, page 114, originally 1993) argues that if someone has no ideals or values his will is 
anarchic. It might be objected that Frankfurt is wrong and someone’s will is not purely 
anarchic if it is guided by his impulses and desires. Let it be accepted for the sake of argument 
that someone’s will need not be anarchic in these circumstances. However, it does not 
automatically follow from accepting the above, that if someone’s will is guided by his 
impulses and desires, then his will is autonomous. Consider MB and her needle phobia [1997]. 
It follows that if someone’s will is autonomous he must have some ideals.  Frankfurt believes 
someone’s ideals are internal constraints: 
 
Now an ideal is a limit. A person’s ideals are concerns that he cannot bring himself to betray. 
They entail constraints that, for him it is unthinkable to violate (quoted in Frankfurt 1999, 
page 114, originally 1993). 
 
It seems clear that Frankfurt is correct to believe an agent’s ideals or values impose internal 
constraints on his actions. If this were not so in practice his ideals would be indistinguishable 
from his impulses and desires. It can be concluded that an agent’s ideals act as internal 
constraints on his will and compel him to act in a certain manner. 
It might then be further concluded by some such as Wolf that, because these ideals 
mean an agent’s choice is not totally free, he is non-autonomous. I will now argue that such a 
conclusion would be false because these ideals are constitutive of an autonomous agent’s will. 
This means that they are liberating rather than coercive and hence supporting the agent’s 
autonomy rather than opposing it see Frankfurt (1988, page 88). I will argue that these ideals 
not only support an agent’s will but that they also define it. This can explain why MB’s 
internally imposed needle phobia with which she did not identify was coercive whilst 
   134 
 
 
internally imposed constraints with which an agent identifies himself support and define his 
autonomous actions. In section 2.1 I argued that any meaningful concept of autonomy must be 
able to distinguish between those internal controlling influences, which are compatible with 
autonomy, and those influences, which are not. I further argued that this distinction can be 
made by distinguishing between those internal controlling influences an agent identifies 
himself with and those he does not. Frankfurt (1988, page 83, originally 1982) asserts that if 
someone cares about something then he must of necessity identify himself with what he cares 
about (see section 3.5.1). The truth of this assertion depends on what is meant by someone 
identifying himself with something. In order to clarify this, it is important to be clear about the 
differences between being identified with and identifying with something. Certain attributes or 
dispositions might be identified with me. For instance I may be identified as small and bad 
tempered. I possess these attributes and dispositions and am essentially passive with regard to 
them. However, I believe that it would be wrong to hold I am passive with regard to the things 
I identify with. If this were not so there would be no essential difference between being 
identified with something and identifying with something. It follows that identifying with 
something must be connected to action. However, I do not identify myself with all my actions. 
For instance, consider someone who suffers from Tourette’s syndrome. I only identify myself 
with all my reflective actions. Furthermore, it seems that the basis for all my reflective action 
is what I care about. It can be concluded that Frankfurt’s assertion, that if someone cares about 
something then he must of necessity identify himself with what he cares about, is true. 
Accepting Frankfurt’s assertion leads to two further conclusions. Firstly, his concept of 
autonomy is able to distinguish between internal controlling influences which are compatible 
with autonomy, and internal controlling influences, which are not. Secondly an autonomous 
agent’s will must of necessity be subject to some internal controlling influences with which 
   135 
 
 
the agent identifies herself. It follows that even though an agent has some ideals and these 
ideals mean she is not free from internal constraints, this does not mean the agent is non-
autonomous. 
It would also seem internal constraints with which a patient identifies herself are 
compatible with informed consent. Consider again the women who were offered screening for 
the BRAC 1 and 2 gene mutations. These women were subject to no external force requiring 
them to consent to the screening. However, they felt they had an internal constraint compelling 
them to consent because their will was constrained by a need to care about other family 
members (Hallowell, Foster, Arden-Jones, Murday and Watson. 2003, page 81). It is clear that 
these women were constrained by what they cared about. Intuitively these women were 
autonomous and in practice informed consent would consider their decisions as competent. It 
also seems that Frankfurt would regard their decisions as autonomous because these decisions 
were based on their ideals. It can be concluded that in this case the practice of informed 
consent, our intuitive ideas of autonomy, and Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy all concur in 
agreeing that some internal constraints with which the agent identifies herself are compatible 
with autonomous decision-making. It can be further concluded that, because Frankfurt’s 
concept of autonomy is based on caring about, it concurs in general with our intuitive ideas of 
autonomy that an agent must identify herself with her autonomous actions. 
The second objection to Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy forming the basis of informed 
consent is that it is too far removed from our intuitive ideas of self-government and decision-
making to be meaningful. It might be argued that an autonomous decision should just be any 
naturally made decision, as suggested by Waller (2001, page 585). It might be further argued 
that by linking the way a person cares about something with autonomy, we are linking the 
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making of autonomous decisions to ideal rather than actual persons. This danger was 
expounded by Berlin (1969, page 132). He argued that some exponents of autonomy regard 
autonomy as a property of my “real self” as opposed to my empirical or actual self. This might 
lead to the position where someone might think it right to ignore an agent’s intuitively 
autonomous decision because he believes it does not reflect his real self. 
Such a paternalistic position might be particularly easy to adopt in medical practice. Let 
it be assumed that a patient refuses to consent to some proposed treatment. His medical team 
might believe that if the patient truly understood his situation, his “real self” would consent 
and accept the proposed treatment. This belief might cause the medical team to override the 
patient’s refusal of consent in the interests of his “real self”. Let it be accepted that it is wrong 
to base autonomy on some concept of an ideal self. However, accepting this does not mean 
that autonomy as proposed by Frankfurt is based on some ideal self. I have argued above that 
what we care about, our ideals, is constitutive of us as being the particular persons we are. 
Frankfurt (1999, page 162) also regards caring about something as defining us the distinctive 
kind of creatures we are. If caring about something makes all of us the particular persons we 
are, and defines us as the distinctive kind of creatures we are, then it does not follow that 
Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy leads only to some ideal kind of person being regarded as 
autonomous. It follows that Frankfurt’s concept is not based on “ideal persons” but actual 
persons. It can be concluded that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy is not too far removed from 
our intuitive concepts of self-government and decision-making to be a useful concept, and 
might form the basis of informed consent. 
To summarise, Frankfurt’s ideas on autonomy are based on ideas of caring about. 
Frankfurt’s ideas of caring about differ from some of our intuitive ideas of caring because 
caring about is defined as being disinterested. However, caring about has two important 
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consequences connected to our intuitive ideas of autonomy. Firstly, caring about must be in 
some sense persistent. Secondly, caring about of necessity requires that an agent must identify 
with his actions. I have examined three possible objections to Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy 
being the basis for informed consent. I have concluded that each of these objections can be 
overcome and that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy could possibly form the basis for 
informed consent.   
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Chapter 4 
Risk related competence 
 
Chapter 4 will consider how risk affects the standard a patient needs to meet in order to be 
considered competent. I will consider the concepts of risk related symmetric and asymmetric 
assessment of patient competence in conjunction with the ideas of personal autonomy 
developed in chapter 3. This chapter will be split into five sub-sections. 
 
4.1 Internal, risk related symmetric and asymmetric competence assessment 
 
Before examining risk related competence assessments, the different ways in which risk and 
competence assessment can be linked must be clearly set out. This requires defining simple 
internal competence, risk related symmetric and risk related asymmetric competence 
assessments. In most cases of competence assessment the triggering of the assessment is 
asymmetric with regard to the risks associated with the decision. This means a patient is 
usually presumed to be competent when her consent decision does not endanger her health. 
However, if the outcome of her decision involves danger, then an assessment of her 
competence would be triggered. For example when a patient consents to a routine 
appendectomy she would usually be presumed to be competent because the dangers connected 
to her decision are low. If however she refused to give consent to an appendectomy then, 
because this decision endangers her life, her competence to give consent would be assessed. 
This position is generally accepted (e.g. by the Department of Health, 2001, Paragraph 2.1), 
(the General Medical Council, 1999, page 5), and (Buchanan and Brock,1989, page 21). 
However this generally accepted presumption of competence has lead some to conclude that 
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not only is an assessment of a patient’s competence triggered asymmetrically, but her 
competence should be assessed using asymmetric standards, or even that the decision she 
makes should be asymmetric in some way. 
British legal judgments hold the standard required for a patient to be considered 
competent should vary with risk. Lord Donaldson [1992]set out this position in the case of : 
 
What matters at the time was whether at the time the patient’s capacity was reduced below the 
level needed in a case of that importance, for refusals can vary in importance, some may 
involve a risk to life or irreparable damage to health, others may not [1992]. 
 
Lord Donaldson’s judgment means that in practice the capacities a patient requires to be 
considered competent vary with the risks connected to her treatment. However, there are two 
ways in which the capacities a patient requires to be considered competent can vary with risk. 
Firstly, a patient might need extra capacities to understand and evaluate the risks involved in 
her treatment. This definition means that the capacities a patient needs to be considered 
competent vary directly with the capacities she needs to understand the risks involved. 
However, these capacities do not of necessity vary directly with the risks themselves (see 
Buller, 2001, page 101). In the rest of this thesis when I refer to a patient’s capacities varying 
indirectly with risk, I am referring to the above definition. Secondly, the capacities a patient 
needs to be considered competent might not vary with the capacities needed to understand the 
risks involved but vary directly with the risks themselves. Similarly, when I refer to a patient’s 
capacities varying directly with the risks involved in her treatment, I am referring to this 
second definition. 
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Using the first definition it is clear that increased risk does not automatically mean that 
informed consent decisions are more difficult to make. Buller (2001, page 100) accepts that 
some informed consent decisions may involve a greater risk to a patient’s life and well being 
than others. But he argues that just because these decisions involve a greater risk does not of 
necessity make them more difficult to understand than less risky decisions. Indeed, in certain 
situations Buller argues increased risk may actually make a decision easier. In order to make 
this clear consider two examples. Firstly, consider a patient with breast cancer. She is given a 
choice between a mastectomy and a lumpectomy, each being followed by chemotherapy. This 
patient might find it difficult to decide which option to choose because she has difficulty in 
evaluating the risks involved with each option. Because of this difficulty it follows that the 
patient requires increased capacities in order to understand the risks involved. Secondly, 
consider a patient advised to undergo an emergency appendectomy without which she is 
expected to die. This second patient faces a similar risk to her life but the information she 
needs to understand the risk involved in order to make her decision is simple to understand. It 
follows that this patient needs no increased capacities to understand the risks involved. 
In chapter 1 I that showed it was generally agreed that a competent patient must have the 
capacities needed to understand and weigh the information relevant to her condition including 
the risks involved. She must also have the capacity to communicate and a set of goals and 
values. Any patient who has these capacities will be defined as internally competent. There are 
two important characteristics of this definition of competence. Firstly, internal competence 
assessment requires the same capacities from a competent patient whether she consents or 
refuses to consent. It follows that the outcome of a patient’s decision makes no difference in 
any internal assessment of her competence. It further follows that using an internal 
competence assessment a patient cannot be assessed as competent to consent to some 
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proposed treatment but assessed as incompetent to refuse consent to the same treatment (see 
Wilks, 1997, page 419). However, an assessment of these capacities may be triggered 
asymmetrically. This means that whether a patient’s competence is actually assessed rather 
than presumed may depend on the risk involved with the outcome of her decision. Secondly, a 
patient’s internal competence to make a decision is assessed purely on whether she has the 
capacities needed to understand the decision she faces and the risks connected to this decision. 
It follows that any internal assessment of a patient’s competence is only indirectly linked to 
the risks involved. The capacities a patient needs to be considered competent only increase 
with the risks involved if the patient needs these extra capacities to understand the extra risks. 
The appendectomy example I have used above clearly demonstrates that increased risks 
associated with a particular procedure do not automatically mean increased capacities are 
required by a patient to understand and evaluate these increased risks. It also seems that an 
assessment of a patient’s competence based only on assessing her internal capacities to 
understand her condition can deal perfectly adequately with the risks associated with any 
treatment. This follows because a patient must understand her condition if she is to be 
regarded as competent and this understanding must include the risks involved (see the General 
Medical Council’s guidelines, 1999, page 5). It follows that if the standard required for a 
patient to be considered competent automatically increases with increased risk, this increase 
cannot be solely related to the capacities needed by a competent patient to understand and 
evaluate the risk involved. This increase must be related directly to the increased risk itself. A 
risk related standard of competence assessment is defined as follows. A competent patient 
must have the capacities needed to understand and weigh the information relevant to her 
decision, to communicate and have a set of values and goals. In addition, if the risk associated 
with one decision is greater than the risk associated with a second decision, then the patient 
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must have increased capacities to understand and weigh the information relevant to the first 
decision as opposed to the second decision. Moreover, this increase in capacities occurs 
irrespective of whether these increased capacities are needed by the patient to understand her 
decision. It follows that the capacities needed by a patient who is advised to have an 
emergency appendectomy and whose competence is assessed using a risk related standard 
would be high if she is to be considered competent. These high capacities are not required 
because they are needed by the patient to understand the risk involved in the appendectomy, 
but simply because of the high risk attached to her decision. 
Others argue that the capacities a patient requires in order for her to be assessed as 
competent in a risky situation should not vary directly with the risk connected to the outcome 
of the decision she makes. These capacities may be greater than the capacities the patient 
needs to understand the information provided. This gives rise to the idea of asymmetric 
competence assessment: 
 
If we consider a safe, routine treatment for an acute and dangerous condition (as with an 
appendectomy for appendicitis), it is clear that the risk in accepting the treatment is small, the 
benefit great, while the risk in refusing it is great and the benefit in most cases non existent. 
This means that one confronted with this choice would require a higher level of competence to 
say no than to say yes, with, indeed, a very pronounced difference between the levels (Wilks, 
1997, page 417). 
 
Buchanan and Brock (1989, page 51) and Drane (1985, page 100) support Wilks’ position. I 
believe that Lord Donaldson’s judgment in the case of T [1992] also supports this position. It 
might be argued that I am wrong and Lord Donaldson’s judgment only supports the 
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asymmetric triggering of competence assessment. However, such an argument would seem to 
be unsound. If Lord Donaldson was referring to the asymmetric triggering of an assessment of 
a patient’s competence, he would surely have connected refusals of consent directly to the 
assessment of a patient’s competence. He did not do this. He connected refusals of consent 
directly to the capacity a patient needs to be considered as competent [1992]. It follows that 
Lord Donaldson’s judgment in the case of T means the capacities required for a patient to be 
considered competent should depend directly on the risk connected to the outcome of a 
patient’s decision rather than the risk inherent in the decision. It follows that he considered the 
standard used in the assessment of a patient’s competence should be asymmetric with regard 
to risk.  Asymmetric competence assessment is defined as follows. A competent patient must 
have the capacities to understand and weigh the information relevant to her condition. She 
must be able to communicate and have a set of values and goals. In addition, asymmetric 
competence assessment requires that a competent patient must have the above capacities to a 
greater degree if she chooses a risky option as opposed to a less risky option. It follows that a 
patient might be considered competent to choose a safe option but incompetent to choose a 
risky option using an asymmetric competence assessment. In practice this usually means a 
higher standard of competence is required in refusals of consent and a lower standard in cases 
when the patient consents. It is important not to confuse asymmetric competence assessment 
with the asymmetric triggering of a competence assessment. In an asymmetric competence 
assessment the standards employed in actually assessing a patient’s competence vary directly 
with the risks involved with the outcome of her decision. In an asymmetric triggering of a 
competence assessment whether, a patient’s competence is actually assessed or just presumed 
depends on the risks involved with the outcome of her decision. 
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It is generally agreed that a patient must understand the risks she faces if she is to make a 
competent informed consent decision. However, as I have shown above, there is no agreement 
as to the way risk should play a part in the assessment of a patient’s competence. There are 
three possible ways risk might be connected to the assessment of competence. Each of these 
leads to a different concept of competence assessment. These concepts are defined as follows. 
1) Internal competence assessment requires that a competent patient must have the 
following capacities. She must be able to understand and weigh the information 
relevant to her condition including the risks involved. She must be able to 
communicate. In addition to these capacities she must also have a set of goals and 
values.  
2) Risk related symmetric competence assessment requires that a competent patient 
must have the capacities considered necessary for internal competence together with 
a set of goals and values. In addition to possessing these capacities the degree to 
which a patient needs these capacities in order to be considered competent varies 
directly with the risks involved in the proposed treatment. A more risky treatment 
means a patient must have increased capacities in order to be considered competent.  
3) Risk related asymmetric competence assessment requires that a competent patient 
must have the capacities considered necessary for internal competence together with 
a set of goals and values. In addition to possessing these capacities the degree to 
which a patient needs these capacities to be considered competent varies directly 
with the risks involved in the outcome of a patient’s decision.  
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4.2. Does the concept of asymmetric competence exist outside informed consent? 
 
Wilks (1997) contends not only are asymmetric competence assessments possible but 
someone may be asymmetrically competent regarding some decision outside the confines of 
informed consent. In this section I will examine whether Wilks’ claim is true. If it is this will 
not of necessity show asymmetric competence assessment should be part of informed consent, 
but it will support the case for this. However, if his claim is false and the asymmetric 
assessment of competence only applies in the context of informed consent, then it will be 
necessary to show why asymmetric competence assessment should only apply in this context. 
Wilks (1997, page 419) backs up his claim by using two examples. The first example he uses 
is of two tightrope walkers of differing ability . This example though much discussed is 
unlikely to occur in normal life and will not be examined by me. His second example concerns 
a more everyday example of an investment decision: 
 
Say someone offers me a stock deal, on the basis of which I could make, or lose, a great deal 
of money. But I simply do not know enough about this particular stock, or the market in 
general, to leave me convinced of the assurance that accompanies the offer-that my investment 
will yield generously. I am not competent to say yes to the offer because the risk involved is 
considerable, and I do not know enough to justify undergoing it. By contrast, saying no is the 
safe option; I stand to make no money by refusing the, but I stand to lose none either. And for 
precisely this reason I feel myself competent to say no (Wilks, 1997, page 421). 
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I will now examine this example by comparing it with the appendectomy example also used 
by Wilks (1997). The purpose of my comparison is to determine whether both of these 
examples are cases in which the agent is asymmetrically competent. I will conclude that 
Wilks’ example of an investment decision is a case of asymmetric competence. 
There are major differences between these two examples.  Wilks believes that in some 
informed consent decisions, the decision a patient faces splits and he illustrates this split by 
using an appendectomy example: 
 
Sometimes the task involves a simple-yes-or-no decision. But in the sort of case just 
considered that task essentially splits. There are in fact two tasks; the task of making a yes-
decision, and the task of making a no-decision (Wilks, 1997, page 422). 
 
Wilks also argues that the potential investor feels herself competent to say no to the 
investment opportunity but not competent enough to agree to invest. This leads to the first 
difference between these two examples. A potential investor implicitly or explicitly assesses 
her own competence whilst in the appendectomy example, others assess her competence. The 
second difference is that whilst the investment decision also splits, it does not split in the way 
Wilks envisages the appendectomy decision splitting. The investment decision splits into two 
separate decisions. Firstly, the investor implicitly or explicitly assesses her own competence 
prior to deciding whether or not to invest. Secondly, the potential investor decides whether or 
not to invest. However, according to Wilks, the appendectomy decisions simply splits into two 
tasks rather than decisions, the task of making a “yes-decision” and the task of making a “no-
decision”. 
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In the light of these clear differences I will now investigate whether the potential investor 
might be asymmetrically competent. I will present two arguments that seem to show that the 
investor cannot be asymmetrically competent. I believe both arguments fail. In rejecting the 
second of these arguments I use a counter argument to show that an investor may indeed be 
asymmetrically competent in accord with our intuitive ideas. Firstly it might be argued if an 
investor assesses her own competence to make an investment decision then this self-
assessment means she cannot possibly be asymmetrically competent. This argument runs as 
follows. Let it be assumed that the investment decision faced by the potential investor splits 
into two separate decisions. The first decision made by the investor is whether she is 
competent enough to decide to invest. Her second decision is deciding whether or not to 
invest. The first decision the investor makes is symmetric because she can decide she is either 
competent or incompetent. This follows because if the investor decides she is competent she 
also automatically decides she is not incompetent. The same reasoning can be applied if she 
decides she is incompetent. Let it be further assumed that the investor assesses herself as 
competent to make the investment decision. She then makes the investment decision in which 
she is competent to choose either option. This decision is again symmetric. Let it be assumed 
the investor assesses herself incompetent. She then makes no further decision. It might then be 
concluded that the investor cannot only be asymmetrically competent to make her original 
investment decision. This follows because her original investment decision is composed of 
one or two decisions and the investor’s competence is symmetric with regard to choosing the 
options in both of these decisions. The above conclusion is false. 
The above conclusion depends on the following implicit premise. If an investor assesses 
herself as competent to make an investment decision then she must be competent to make that 
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decision. This premise is false. The fact that Wilks’ investor feels competent to invest does not 
of necessity imply she is competent to invest. However, the fact that a competence assessment 
cannot be private does not mean it cannot be internal. It only means the criteria on which the 
assessment is based cannot be private. It follows that the standard of competence applied must 
be capable of being verified by others. It further follows that if an agent assesses her own 
competence this assessment must be capable of concurring with some generally accepted 
standard even if in practice this assessment does not take place. It follows that even though an 
investor assesses herself as competent to choose either option it is possible she might be 
mistaken.  It further follows that if an investor makes an investment decision, the fact that she 
assesses herself as competent to make an investment decision does not guarantee she is in fact 
competent to make this decision. It can be concluded that she might only be competent to 
choose one option. It can be further concluded she might be asymmetrically competent with 
regard to her investment decision. 
I will now present a second argument which seems to show that the potential investor’s 
competence to make an investment decision cannot be asymmetric. In this argument, when 
referring to an agent’s competence, I am referring to her being considered competent rather 
than being assessed as competent. I believe competence assessment should apply in the more 
formal setting of informed consent. However I will assume the capacities someone needs to be 
assessed or considered competent are equivalent. Let it be accepted that an agent can only be 
competent to make some decision if she has the capacities needed to understand which of the 
expected outcomes would best concur with her goals and values. It follows that the potential 
investor can only be competent if she has the capacities needed to understand whether 
investing or not investing would best concur with her goals and values. The following 
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argument is modified from one used by Buller (2001, page 106) who argues against the 
asymmetric assessment of patient competence. Firstly, let it be assumed that the investor fully 
understands the consequences of both investing and not investing. It follows that because the 
investor has the capacities needed to understand which of the expected outcomes would best 
concur with her goals and values, she might be competent to decide whether to invest or not. 
Secondly, let it be assumed that the investor only has the capacities needed to understand 
the consequences of not investing and does not have the capacities needed to fully understand 
the consequences of investing. According to Wilks, it follows that she has asymmetric 
competence. However it has been assumed that a competent investor must have the capacities 
needed to understand the consequences of both investing and failing to invest. If this were not 
so she would be unable to know which decision would best concur with her goals and values. 
It follows that if the investor does not have the capacities needed to understand which option 
would best concur with her goals and values she cannot be competent to make any choice 
concerning the investment. It further follows that if the investor only has the capacities needed 
to understand the expected outcomes of not investing, she is not asymmetrically competent as 
claimed by Wilks but incompetent. This leads to the conclusion that depending on whether the 
investor has the capacities needed to understand the probable consequences of both investing 
and not investing, she is either possibly competent to choose either option or incompetent. It 
can be further concluded that Wilks’ investment example is not an example of asymmetric 
competence. Furthermore it would seem that this argument based on (Buller, 2001, page 106) 
means that asymmetric competence is impossible in all circumstances including cases such as 
the appendectomy used above. 
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I believe this argument is unsound. Consider the example of the investor again. Let it be 
assumed that the potential investor is a complete novice as far as financial affairs are 
concerned. Let it also be assumed that the investment opportunity she is offered is highly 
complex. Finally let it be assumed that the potential investor decides that because she is unable 
to fully understand the investment opportunity, she should decline the offer to invest. 
According to the above argument, she is not asymmetrically competent but incompetent if she 
makes this choice. Intuitively the potential investor’s choice not to invest seems to be a 
competent decision. Moreover, in this context if the investor chooses to invest, intuitively her 
choice would seem to be incompetent. 
Intuitively it appears that Wilks is correct and the potential investor can be considered to 
be asymmetrically competent, however intuition can be misleading. I will now argue that 
whether our intuitive ideas are correct depends on the purpose of the investor’s decision. The 
argument used above is dependent on the premise that an agent can only be considered 
competent to make some decision if she is capable of understanding which of the expected 
outcomes would best concur with her goals and values. If this premise is accepted then the 
argument is a valid argument and the potential investor cannot be considered as 
asymmetrically competent. However, this premise seems to depend on the assumption that the 
purpose of an investor’s decision is to decide which of the expected outcomes would best 
concur with her goals and values. I believe this assumption cannot always be justified. Let it 
be accepted that an investor only understands the consequences of not investing and does not 
fully understand the consequences of investing. In this context it might be questioned whether 
the purpose of her decision is to choose the option that best concurs with her goals and values. 
Let it be accepted that one of the agent’s primary goals is to make a lot of money. However, in 
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the above context the potential investor’s naivety in financial affairs prevents her from 
deciding which option best concurs with her goals and values. It seems possible that in this 
context the potential investor’s purpose when making her investment decision is to choose an 
option which satisfies her. It is important to be clear what is meant by satisfaction in this 
context. Usually someone is said to be satisfied if some state she desires obtains. In this 
context an agent being satisfied simply means her subjective state is such that he has no desire 
to alter her situation. It follows the potential investor might be satisfied with not investing 
because this is a safe option. It further follows that if her purpose is to choose an option that 
satisfies her, then she might be considered as having the requisite capacities she requires to be 
considered as competent, provided she decides not to invest. However, this would not be true 
if she decides to invest. It can be concluded that her decision might be asymmetrically 
competent. It can be further concluded that if agents are concerned with decisions that satisfy 
their goals and values, the concept of asymmetric competence can exist outside the practice of 
informed consent. 
I have used an argument based on Buller (2001, page 106), which seems to show that the 
concept of asymmetric competence existing outside the practice of informed consent is 
nonsense. I then used a counter-argument based on the purpose of an agent’s decision to show 
that this conclusion is false. This counter-argument was based on the idea that the purpose of 
an agent’s decision is not always to choose the best outcome in the light of her goals and 
values but sometimes to choose an outcome that satisfies these goals and values. This idea has 
important ramifications, which I will develop in the rest of this thesis. It is objected by Veatch 
(1995, page 7) that the concept of informed consent is impossible. In section 5.1 I will show 
that the above idea of patients’ satisfying their goals and values can be used to overcome 
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Veatch’s objection. In section 6.4.2 I will use this idea to argue that a competent patient must 
be able to order her goals and values in some way. Finall, it must be noted that it seems 
possible to connect the idea that a patient makes a decision which satisfies her with 
Frankfurt’s idea that an autonomous agent must be satisfied with her decisions developed in 
section 3.5.2. 
 
4.3. Asymmetric competence assessment and “yes decisions” or “no decisions” 
 
Wilks (1997, page 422) argues that  risk sometimes causes informed consent decisions to split 
into two tasks, of making a “yes-decision” and making a “no-decision”. This raises three 
questions. Firstly what is meant by the task of making a “yes-decision” or a “no decision”?  
Secondly whether if it is assumed that the making of “yes decisions” and “no decisions” are 
not real choices might these decisions be a part of medical practice. It might be questioned 
whether these “tasks” are compatible with either informed consent or personal autonomy. 
Lastly, are the tasks of making “yes-decisions” and “no-decisions” a necessary component of 
the asymmetric assessment of competence? 
A patient making a consent decision may give consent or refuse to give consent to some 
proposed treatment by simply saying yes or no. A patient whose competence is 
asymmetrically assessed may also give consent or refuse to give consent in the same way. 
However, in this context when her competence is assessed, she might be found to be 
competent if she said yes and incompetent if she said no. However simple yes or no decisions 
as outlined above are not what Wilks means when he considers “yes decisions” and “no 
decisions”. According to Wilks, these decisions do not just mean different standards of 
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assessment are being applied when a patient consents compared to when she refuses to give 
consent.  These decisions are different tasks: 
 
When a yes-or-no-decision divide in this way one can easily find oneself competent to 
perform one of the two resulting tasks but not the other (Wilks, 1997, page 417). 
 
I will now question what sort of tasks the making of “yes decisions” and “no decisions” could 
be in the specific context of informed consent. Let it be assumed that a patient can give 
consent by making a “yes decision”. Let it be further assumed when she does so she has a real 
choice. It follows that she could have refused to give consent. Let it be still further assumed 
that a patient can refuse to give consent by making a “no decision”. It follows that if the 
patient has a real choice when she consents by making a “yes decision” she could also have 
made a “no decision”. However, Wilks (1997, page 417) argues that the making of “yes 
decisions” and “no decisions” are two different tasks. It can be concluded that the making of 
“yes decisions” and “no decisions” does not involve a patient making a real choice 
In the following discussion only “yes decisions” will be considered and I will assume 
that all the conclusions reached are equally applicable to “no decisions”. Because the task of 
making  a “yes decision” does not involve a real choice, one might ask what sort of task it is. 
If a “yes decision” is not a genuine decision then it might be considered to be something akin 
to authorising, permitting or assenting to treatment. However, even if a patient decides to 
authorise, permit or assent to treatment it might be argued that authorising, permitting or 
assenting to treatment are not genuine tasks. They are the products of a task. This task is the 
task of deciding whether to authorise, permit or assent to treatment. It might be argued that 
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Wilks, in his treatment of “yes decisions”, is equating giving consent with making consent 
decisions. However giving consent is the product of a consent decision. It can be concluded 
that if the making of “yes decisions” only means authorising, permitting or consenting to 
treatment, then it would be wrong to consider the making of a “yes decisions” as a task. 
It is difficult to see what other sort of task the making of a “yes decision” might be. It might be 
argued that the term consent has a specialist meaning within the practice of informed consent, 
as Clarke (2001) argues: 
 
Indeed, there is said to be a ‘doctrine of informed consent’ that is often discussed by medical 
ethicists as if it were mostly a product of the peculiarities of the context of medicine and as if 
it were only very loosely related to the common notion of consent, that permeates other 
aspects of western life (Clarke, 2001, page 174). 
 
It might then be further argued that the task of making a “yes-decision” is a genuine task 
within the practice of informed consent and has a meaning peculiar to this context. Let it be 
still further assumed in this context that this task is related to the making of consent decisions. 
I will now argue that even if the task of making a “yes-decision” has a meaning peculiar to the 
practice of informed consent, this meaning is incompatible with both the ethos of informed 
consent and personal autonomy. 
According to the General Medical Council (1999, introduction 1, a competent patient 
should be able to make a decision to consent or to refuse to consent to some proposed 
treatment. It follows that whatever way consent decisions are defined within the practice of 
informed consent, the ethos of informed consent is committed to allowing patients to make 
genuine decisions. It has been assumed above that in the context of the practice of informed 
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consent, the making of a “yes decision” is meaningful. I have also shown that above the task 
of making a “yes-decision” does not involve any genuine decision-making. It follows that it 
cannot be assumed on the basis of a patient’s “yes decision” that she has made a genuine 
decision to consent to some proposed treatment. It further follows that the fact that a patient 
has made a “yes decision” should not also be considered as her making an informed consent 
decision according to the ethos of the General Medical Council’s guidelines. The Department 
of Health’s (2001, introduction, 1) guidelines on consent state that a competent patient should 
determine what happens to her body. If she is to do so then she must have some genuine 
choice. It follows that if a patient makes a “yes decision”, then this should not be regarded as 
an informed consent decision according to the ethos of the Department of Health’s guidelines. 
It can be concluded that if “yes decisions” have a meaning peculiar to the practice of informed 
consent, and the making of these decisions is regarded as giving informed consent, then the 
practice of informed consent is incompatible with the ethos of informed consent. 
I will now argue that the making of “yes decisions” instead of genuine decisions is 
incompatible with personal autonomy. Dworkin (1988, page 20) believes that autonomy is the 
second-order capacity of persons to reflect on their first-order desires together with the ability 
to accept or attempt to change these desires. Dworkin also believes that an autonomous agent 
must be able to exercise this capacity. However, if the making of a “yes decision” replaces 
genuine choice in the practice of informed consent, then a patient does not have the ability to 
exercise her choice by making a “yes decision”. It can be concluded that Dworkin would not 
regard the making of a “yes decision” as an autonomous choice. Frankfurt (1999, page 87, 
originally 1982) believes that if someone is autonomous then she must care about something 
and guide her conduct in accordance with this caring. It follows that if an agent guides her 
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conduct with regard to what she cares about, then this guidance must involve her in making 
decisions based on what she cares about. It also follows that if an agent guides her conduct 
with regard to what she cares about she must be able to implement her decisions. It might be 
possible for someone to reflect on her decisions passively but she cannot guide her conduct 
passively. It further follows that if a patient is unable to make a consent decision based on 
what she cares about, because she can only make a “yes decision”, Frankfurt would not regard 
her “yes decision” as autonomous. Consider a Jehovah’s Witness who is assessed only to be 
competent to make a “yes decision” about some procedure requiring a blood transfusion. Let it 
be assumed that she refuses to give consent to the transfusion because of her religious beliefs. 
This results in her being considered incompetent. It follows that because she is being 
prevented from implementing her decision made with regard to what she cares about, her 
autonomy is not being respected. It can be concluded that the making of “yes decisions” 
cannot be regarded as part of personal autonomy if this is based on what the agent cares about. 
I have shown above that if “yes decisions” are considered as consent decisions by the practice 
of informed consent, then the practice of informed consent is incompatible with the ethos of 
informed consent. Let it be accepted that the practice of informed consent should be based on 
respect for personal autonomy, as required by the General Medical Council (1999, 
introduction 1). It can be concluded that the replacement of genuine decision-making by “yes 
decisions” should play no part in the practice of informed consent. 
Wilks connects the making of “yes decisions” to the asymmetric assessment of 
competence. I have argued that the making of “yes decisions” should play no part in the 
practice of informed consent. However, the asymmetric assessment of patient competence 
remains a coherent concept without the need for “yes decisions”. Let it be assumed that a 
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patient’s competence is assessed asymmetrically. The patient in this situation can simply say 
yes or no to some proposed treatment. She will base her consent decision on what she 
perceives to be in her best interests or, as I have argued in section 4.2 on what satisfies her. It 
follows that she does not have to make a “yes decision”. However, her competence to give 
consent to the proposed treatment might still be assessed asymmetrically. She might be 
assessed as competent if she consents, says yes, and incompetent if she refuses consent, says 
no. It can be concluded that the asymmetric assessment of a patient’s competence does not 
depend on her ability to make “yes decisions” and “no decisions”. 
 
4.4. Asymmetric and a risk related symmetric competence assessment in practice 
 
Asymmetric competence assessment means that a competent patient must possess the 
capacities needed to understand and weigh the information provided. In addition, the degree to 
which a competent patient must possess these capacities varies directly with the expected risk 
based on the outcome of her consent decision. This concept of asymmetric competence 
assessment is conceptually coherent. However, accepting this does not automatically mean it 
is a useful concept. Risk-related symmetric competence assessment also requires that a 
competent patient must possess the capacities needed to understand and weigh the information 
provided. However, the degree to which a competent patient must possess these capacities 
varies directly with the expected risks involved with the decision she faces rather than the 
outcome of this decision. In this section I will argue that in practice there is no meaningful 
difference between risk-related symmetric and asymmetric competence assessments.  This 
section will be divided into three subsections. 
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4.4.1. The asymmetric triggering of competence assessment and risk related competence 
assessments 
 
Before considering the question of whether there are any meaningful differences between 
symmetric and asymmetric risk-related competence assessments in practice, two things must 
be made clear. Firstly, the way the asymmetric triggering of a competence assessment differs 
from a risk-related competence assessment. Secondly, the differences in the capacities a 
patient requires to be considered competent under both symmetric and asymmetric risk-related 
competence assessments. 
A patient’s competence to give consent is not usually assessed in practice and in most 
cases an adult patient is presumed to be competent unless there are reasons not to do so (see 
the General Medical council 1999, section 19) and the Department of Health, 2001, Paragraph 
2.1). Doctors and medical staff are busy people and competence assessments are time 
consuming. It follows that this presumption of competence might be done for reasons of 
efficiency. Due to this presumption of competence a patient’s competence, is usually only 
assessed in practice when the patient exhibits conditions that suggest she might be 
incompetent. Several conditions may trigger an investigation into a patient’s competence 
(Wear, 1998, page38). For example, a patient might show a lack of understanding, an inability 
to weigh the information provided, or fail to communicate adequately. 
A further reason why a competence assessment might be triggered would be when a 
patient refuses to give consent when the benefits of the procedure she is being asked to give 
   159 
 
 
consent to are clear and her refusal to give consent threatens her well-being, as Drane (1985) 
points out: 
 
These questions arise usually when the patient refuses treatment or chooses a course of action 
which, in the opinion of physician in charge, threatens his or her well-being. (Drane, 1985, 
quoted in Mappes & Zembaty, page 99) 
 
It might be presumed that if a patient appears to act against her best interests then her ability to 
understand her situation is limited. It should be noted that this is only a presumption and may 
be false. However, if a patient appears to act against her best interests this indicates the 
possibility of limited understanding and should usually trigger an assessment of her 
competence. The General Medical Council’s guidelines (1999 section 19) concur and hold that 
a presumption of incompetence should not automatically lead to an assumption of 
incompetence but rather to an assessment of the patient’s competence. It follows in the 
practice of informed consent that a competence assessment may be triggered when a patient 
refuses to give consent and appears to have chosen a risky option which threatens her well-
being. 
Consider a patient who refuses to give informed consent when this refusal might cause 
her great harm. Let it be assumed that her refusal triggers an assessment of her competence. 
The trigger for this assessment is not the patient’s capacities but the fact that harm might occur 
to her. This means that had the patient chosen a safer option this assessment of her 
competence would not have occurred. The triggering of this competence assessment is 
asymmetric. It is important to be clear about the difference between the asymmetric triggering 
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of a competence assessment and the asymmetric assessment of a patient’s competence. The 
asymmetric triggering of a competence assessment simply means that a competence 
assessment actually takes place. However the asymmetric triggering of a competence 
assessment does not determine the standards employed in any subsequent competence 
assessment or the form of assessment employed.  The asymmetric assessment of a patient’s 
competence means the standard applied in any assessment of the patient’s competence varies 
directly with the risk connected to the outcome of her decision. It follows that the asymmetric 
triggering of a competence assessment is conceptually distinct from the asymmetric 
assessment of competence. 
It is assumed by Drane (1985) and Wilks (1997) that the increased risk associated with a 
refusal of consent, which would usually lead to the asymmetric triggering of a competence 
assessment, should lead to an asymmetric assessment of competence. However the 
asymmetric triggering of a competence assessment does not affect the capacities a patient 
needs to make her decision in any way. The form of competence assessment employed 
determines the standards used in this assessment. It follows that the asymmetric triggering of a 
competence assessment does not affect a patient’s autonomous decisions. Let it be accepted 
that the asymmetric triggering of competence assessments would be useful. It further follows 
that the asymmetric triggering of a competence assessment is justified. I have shown above 
that the asymmetric triggering of a competence assessment is conceptually distinct from the 
asymmetric assessment of competence. It follows that the asymmetric assessment of 
competence cannot be justified simply because the asymmetric triggering of competence 
assessment is justified. Both the asymmetric triggering of competence assessments and the 
asymmetric assessment of competence are attempted solutions to the same problem, namely 
that associated with patients making risky decisions by refusing to consent. It further follows 
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that if the asymmetric assessment of competence is to be justified it must be justified by 
reference to this problem without reference to the asymmetric triggering of competence 
assessment. It can be concluded that it is coherent to hold that a competence assessment may 
be triggered asymmetrically and that any competence assessment should not be asymmetric. 
 
4.4.2. Symmetric or asymmetric risk-related competence assessment in practice 
 
 
Before examining symmetric or asymmetric risk-related competence assessments in practice, 
the relationship between the capacities required for a patient to be considered competent under 
these different forms of competence assessment must be set out. Consider a consent decision 
D such as the appendectomy example used by Wilks (1997, page 417). D has a marked 
asymmetry between the risks involved when the patient gives consent and refuses to give 
consent. It is accepted that a patient must have certain capacities in order to be regarded as 
competent. The degree to which a patient must possess these capacities may vary. The degree 
to which a patient requires these capacities in order to be considered competent will be 
referred to as the standard she must meet in order to be considered competent. Firstly, consider 
a patient’s competence with regard to D using an asymmetric assessment of her competence. 
Let it be assumed that the patient must have these capacities to degree C1 in order for her 
consent decision to be simply accepted. C1 is a low standard because of the low risk involved 
in consenting with regard to D. I showed in section 2.2 that respecting autonomy means 
accepting autonomous decisions. Let it be accepted that informed consent is based on respect 
for autonomy. It follows that the practice of informed consent should respect autonomous 
decisions. I will assume here that the standard C1 is determined by the capacities a patient 
needs for her decision to be considered as autonomous. If a patient refuses to give consent 
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then she must meet a standard C2 for her refusal to be regarded as competent. This is a higher 
standard than C1. C2 is directly determined by the expected risks connected to the outcome of 
the patient’s decision. The higher the expected risks connected to the outcome of the patient’s 
decision the higher the standard C2 will set. Secondly, consider the same decision D, only this 
time the patient’s competence is being assessed using a risk related symmetric competence 
assessment. If the patient is to be considered competent to give consent or to refuse to give 
consent with regard to D using a risk related symmetric competence assessment, then the 
degree of the capacities she needs in order to be considered competent is determined directly 
by the risk involved in the procedure. This standard cannot be C1 because this is the standard 
of competence appropriate for a decision involving little risk. The standard employed in a 
symmetric risk related competence assessment should be determined directly by the highest 
risk involved in the decision. It follows that in this context the standard C2 should be applied 
irrespective of whether the patient gives consent or refuses to give consent with regard to D. 
I will now question whether there are any meaningful differences in practice between 
asymmetric and symmetric risk related competence assessment. This will be done in the four 
possible contexts listed below. 
1) When a patient is competent and refuses to give consent to treatment. 
2) When a patient is incompetent and refuses to give consent to treatment. 
3) When a patient is competent and gives consent to treatment. 
4) When a patient is incompetent and gives consent to treatment. 
I will conclude that the treatment a patient receives is identical irrespective of whether her 
competence is assessed using an asymmetric or a symmetric risk related assessment. 
Firstly, consider the outcomes when a competent patient refuses to give consent to some 
procedure and her competence is assessed using both asymmetric and symmetric risk related 
   163 
 
 
competence assessments. Let it be assumed that if this procedure is not carried out her life is 
endangered. I will argue in section 5.3 that surrogate decision-making is only useful in 
circumstances in which irreparable harm may occur to a patient or her life is  endangered. I 
will argue in all other circumstances if a patient refuses to consent, treatment should simply be 
abandoned. In practice an assessment of her competence will be asymmetrically triggered. 
Consider the outcome when this patient is assessed as competent using a symmetric risk 
related standard of competence assessment. Symmetric risk related competence assessments 
always use the higher standard C2 irrespective of whether the patient gives or refuses to give 
consent. It follows that in the above context the patient’s competence would be assessed using 
the standard C2. It also follows that because she is competent, her refusal of consent would be 
accepted. Next consider the outcome when the same patient makes the same decision only this 
time her competence is assessed using an asymmetric risk related standard of competence. 
Because this patient chooses a risky option, the standard C2 will be applied. Once again 
because the patient is competent her refusal of consent would be accepted. It can be concluded 
that when a competent patient refuses to give consent to some procedure without which her 
well-being is threatened, the following holds. The standard of competence required and the 
treatment the patient receives are identical irrespective of whether an asymmetric or a 
symmetric risk related assessment of her competence is used 
Secondly consider the outcomes when an incompetent patient refuses to consent and her 
competence is assessed by both asymmetric and symmetric risk related competence 
assessments. Let it again be assumed that the patient chooses an option which threatens her 
life. This means an assessment of her competence would be triggered. Consider the outcome 
when the patient’s competence is assessed asymmetrically. It follows that because the patient 
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chooses a risky option, then the standard C2 will be used. It further follows that because the 
patient is incompetent a surrogate decision-maker should make the decision on her behalf. 
Next consider the outcome when this patient is assessed as incompetent using a symmetric risk 
related standard of competence. The standard C2 would again be applied. Once again, because 
the patient is incompetent a surrogate decision-maker should make the decision on her behalf. 
It can be concluded in this context the treatment the patient receives and the standards of 
competence applied are identical irrespective of whether her competence is assessed using an 
asymmetric or symmetric risk related competence assessment. 
Thirdly, consider the outcomes when a competent patient consents to some proposed 
treatment using both asymmetric and symmetric risk related competence assessments. Because 
this patient is competent her consent would be accepted using both of these types of 
competence assessment. However, different standards would be applied when assessing her 
competence. If an asymmetric risk related assessment of her competence was employed, the 
standard C1 would be applied. If a symmetric risk related assessment of her competence was 
employed, then the standard C2 would be applied. It follows that in this context a patient 
assessed as competent using an asymmetric assessment of her competence might be assessed 
as incompetent using a symmetric risk related assessment of her competence. 
I will now argue that when a patient consents to some proposed treatment, the treatment 
she receives will be the same irrespective of whether her competence is assessed using the 
standard C1 or C2. Let it be assumed a patient making a consent decision who is assessed as 
incompetent to do so using the standard C2 would be considered as competent using the 
standard CI. Consider the treatment this patient will receive if she is assessed as incompetent 
using the standard C2. In this case a surrogate decision-maker should make the decision on 
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behalf of the patient. Let it be accepted that surrogate decision-making is only meaningful if 
the patient’s life is endangered and a surrogate decision-maker can choose a generally agreed 
best option. If there is no generally agreed best option then the surrogate decision-maker’s 
decision becomes a personal decision. I will deal with the generally agreed best options in 
detail when discussing the domain of informed consent in section 5.3. Let it be accepted that 
surrogate decision-maker chooses this generally agreed best option. Because there is a 
generally agreed best treatment option, this should be the treatment offered to the patient for 
her consent. It follows that surrogate decision-maker should also choose this treatment offered 
to the patient. However if the same patient was assessed as competent using the standard C1 
she would have her consent to the proposed treatment accepted and this treatment would take 
place. It can be concluded that if a patient is assessed as incompetent using the standard C2, 
and she would be considered as competent using the standard CI, she would receive identical 
treatment under both standards. It can be further concluded the fact that a patient assessed as 
competent using an asymmetric assessment of her competence might be assessed as 
incompetent using a symmetric risk related assessment of her competence would make no 
difference to the actual treatment she receives. 
Lastly, consider the outcomes when an incompetent patient consents to an informed 
consent decision. In these circumstances, because the patient is incompetent, a decision should 
be made on her behalf by a surrogate decision-maker. This should occur irrespective of 
whether her competence is assessed using an asymmetric or a symmetric risk related 
assessment of her competence. However, the standards used to assess the patient as 
incompetent are not the same. Firstly, if the patient is assessed as incompetent using a 
symmetric risk related assessment of her competence, she fails to meet the standard C2. 
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Secondly, if the patient is assessed as incompetent using an asymmetric assessment of her 
competence, then she fails to meet the standard C1. It follows that because C2 is a higher 
standard than C1, that a patient who would be regarded as incompetent using a symmetric risk 
related competence assessment might be regarded as competent using an asymmetric risk 
related competence assessment. 
I argued above that if a patient consents to some proposed treatment, the treatment she 
receives will be the same irrespective of whether her competence is assessed using the 
standard C1 or C2. This argument can be applied to show that whichever form of risk related 
competence assessment is used, an incompetent patient should always receive the same 
treatment. The above argument concluded that if a patient was assessed as incompetent using 
the standard C2 and she would be considered as competent using the standard CI, then she 
would receive the same treatment under both standards. This conclusion means that if a patient 
is assessed as incompetent using a symmetric risk related competence assessment, and she 
might be assessed as competent using an asymmetric risk related competence assessment, then 
this difference in her competence assessment would make no difference to the treatment she 
receives. 
This section has shown that the treatment a patient receives is identical irrespective of 
whether an asymmetric or a symmetric risk related assessment of her competence is used. 
However, there is a difference between these two forms of competence assessment. The high 
standard C2 applied to assess a patient’s competence by a symmetric risk related competence 
assessment might mean that in certain circumstances her autonomy would not be respected. 
Moreover had an asymmetric assessment of her competence been employed her autonomy 
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might have been respected because the lower standard C1 would have been applied. I will 
examine whether this difference is meaningful in practice in the next section. 
 
 
 
4.4.3. Risk-related assessments of competence and accepting a patient’s consent 
 
It is clear that a patient who consents and who might be regarded as incompetent using a 
symmetric risk related assessment of her competence might sometimes be regarded as 
competent using an asymmetric risk related competence assessment. However, I have shown 
that the medical treatment provided to this patient would be identical irrespective of which of 
these two forms of competence assessment was used. This thesis is concerned with applied 
philosophy. It might then be questioned if the medical treatment provided is identical, 
irrespective of which form of risk related competence assessment is used, whether this 
difference is of any practical importance? In this section I will show that this difference 
matters. I will then argue that if a patient’s consent decision should always be accepted. I will 
conclude that if a patient’s consent decision is always accepted, then in practice there is no 
difference between asymmetric and symmetric risk related competence assessments. 
I showed in section 4.4.2 that which of these two forms of competence assessment is 
employed might affect a patient’s autonomy. I also showed in section 4.4.2 that the treatment 
the patient receives is identical irrespective of which type of risk related competence 
assessment is used. Let it be accepted that autonomy has instrumental value (see Dworkin, 
1988, page 111). Let it be assumed that the value of autonomy is purely instrumental. It 
appears to follow that the fact that, a patient who consents and whose autonomy might not be 
respected using a risk related symmetric competence assessment might have her autonomy 
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respected using an asymmetric competence assessment, is of no importance. I will now argue 
that this conclusion is false. I will argue that whilst the treatment the patient receives using 
these different forms of competence assessment is identical, the outcome of the treatment 
might not be identical. 
I will now argue that it is not only important what form of treatment a patient receives, 
but also the way this treatment was decided upon. The exercise of autonomy has therapeutic 
value according to Waller (2001, page 586). It follows that even if the treatment a consenting 
patient receives is identical under different types of risk-related competence assessment, the 
outcomes of this treatment might differ. Consider a consenting patient assessed as incompetent 
using the standard C2 employed by a symmetric risk-related competence assessment. Let it be 
assumed that this patient would have been assessed as competent using the standard C1 
employed by an asymmetric risk-related competence assessment. In this situation this patient 
would only have her autonomy respected if she was assessed as competent by an asymmetric 
risk-related competence assessment. It follows that even though the treatment she receives is 
unaltered by the type of risk-related competence assessment employed, the efficiency of this 
treatment might be improved due to the therapeutic value of the patient exercising her 
autonomy if an asymmetric risk-related competence assessment was employed. It can be 
concluded that there is a meaningful difference between these two risk-related methods of 
assessing a patient’s competence even if autonomy is regarded as purely instrumental. 
It might be argued that the therapeutic value of autonomy would be automatically 
respected by simply accepting all of a patient’s freely made informed consent decisions. In 
section 3.1.1 I argued that respecting all of a patient’s freely made decisions meant respecting 
all her autonomous decisions. However, if autonomy only has instrumental value, it is by no 
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means clear why we should accept all of a patient’s freely made informed consent decisions. 
Let it be accepted that autonomy only has instrumental value. It follows that autonomy only 
gains its value from the value of the goods it delivers. It further follows that these goods do 
not have any special value because they are the result of an autonomous action. It can be 
concluded the goods autonomy delivers must be balanced against other goods. In the context 
of informed consent, this means the therapeutic value delivered by a patient acting 
autonomously must be balanced against other goods such as her well-being, which might be 
delivered by non-autonomous means.  
If it is accepted that autonomy only has instrumental value and the goods it delivers do 
not have any special value, then it seems there is no obvious reason why informed consent 
should respect autonomy. For it might be argued that if the goods a patient seeks can be 
delivered more efficiently by her doctors acting beneficently rather than respecting her 
autonomy, then her doctors should act beneficently rather than respect her autonomy. I believe 
such an argument fails because it fails to consider any connection between autonomy and 
beneficence. Beneficent care is concerned with a patient’s interests. These interests are partly 
subjective (see Atkins, 2000, page 72; Veatch, 1995, page 7).  Welie and Welie (2001, page 
130) argue that because of this subjectivity truly beneficent health care should be tailored to 
the unique needs of each individual patient’s life story, expectations and plans. It is of course 
true that in practice medical professionals can offer some beneficent care without the 
autonomous input of patients, but this care is restricted to the domain determined solely by the 
patient’s physical condition. It follows that true beneficence is impossible without considering 
a patient’s autonomous desires. Consider for instance the example used by Mathews (2000, 
pages 61, 62) of a terminally ill cancer patient whose life might be extended slightly by the use 
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of chemotherapy. This patient may choose a shorter life with only palliative care or a longer 
life with the discomfort of chemotherapy (see section 3.2.1). In order to act with true 
beneficence to such a patient, her autonomous desires must be considered. It can be concluded 
that even if autonomy only has instrumental value and the goods it delivers do not have any 
special value, there are still meaningful reasons why informed consent should respect 
autonomy. 
I have shown that there are meaningful reasons why informed consent should respect a 
patient’s autonomy even if autonomy only has instrumental value. However, the same reasons 
could be given as to why informed consent should respect a patient’s freely made decisions. 
Moreover, these reasons for why instrumental autonomy should be respected do not explain 
why respecting autonomy is so central to the practice of informed consent. The reason is 
because autonomy does not only have instrumental value but also has intrinsic value (see 
Dworkin,1988, page 112). Dworkin argues that the intrinsic value of autonomy is connected to 
an agent being recognised as the kind of person capable of determining her own destiny. 
Frankfurt (1999, page 163) agrees by arguing that regardless of whether autonomy delivers the 
goods we seek, it has intrinsic value because of its essential role in making us the distinctive 
kind of creatures we are. Consider again the patient who consents and is assessed as 
incompetent using the standard C2 employed by a symmetric risk related assessment of her 
competence. She might have been assessed as competent using the standard C1 employed by 
an asymmetric risk related assessment of her competence. It follows that if a symmetric risk-
related competence assessment is employed to assess a patient’s competence rather than an 
asymmetric risk-related competence assessment, then she may be denied the intrinsic value of 
her autonomy because she is not recognised as the kind of creature capable of determining her 
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own future. It can be concluded that the intrinsic value of autonomy means there is a 
meaningful difference between these two methods of assessing competence. 
I have given three reasons to show that when a patient consents there are meaningful 
differences between asymmetric and symmetric risk related competence assessments in 
practice. These differences occur because asymmetric risk-related competence assessments 
respect a patient’s autonomy better than symmetric risk-related competence assessments. I will 
now propose that the application of informed consent should be changed so that if any patient 
freely consents to some proposed treatment her consent should always be accepted. I will 
further argue that if this modification to the practice of informed consent is accepted, then 
these differences between asymmetric and symmetric risk related competence assessments 
vanish in practice. 
In section 4.4.2 I argued that even if a consenting patient was assessed as incompetent 
using the standard C2 employed by a symmetric risk-related competence assessment and she 
would be considered as competent using the standard CI employed by an asymmetric risk-
related competence assessment, then the treatment she would receive would be identical in 
both cases. I will now slightly amend this argument to show that if a patient’s consent decision 
is always accepted, the treatment she receives is identical irrespective of which of these two 
forms of risk-related competence assessment is used to assess her competence. 
Let it be assumed that a patient’s competence should only be assessed when there is a 
generally agreed best option for her doctors to propose for her consent. I will argue in chapter 
5 that the domain in which a patient’s competence might be assessed should be restricted to 
contexts in which there is a generally agreed best option for a patient to consent to. Moreover, 
I will argue that the domain in which the practice of informed consent is meaningful is larger 
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than the domain in which competence assessment should apply. Let this generally agreed best 
option for a patient be designated T. The patient’s doctors should propose treatment T for the 
patient’s consent. Consider what happens when a competent patient consents. The patient’s 
consent is accepted and she receives treatment T. Now consider what happens when an 
incompetent patient freely consents to treatment. A surrogate decision-maker should make a 
decision on the patient’s behalf which is in the patient’s best interests. In this context the 
surrogate decision-maker should choose treatment T. It follows that if a patient consents to 
treatment, the treatment she receives is identical irrespective of whether her decision to 
consent is accepted or rejected as incompetent. It further follows that if a consenting patient’s 
consent is always accepted then her interests are not harmed. Let it be accepted that if all 
consent decisions are simply accepted, then the autonomy of all patients capable of making 
autonomous decisions, is respected. It can be concluded that if a patient’s consent is always 
accepted, then her consent is in her best interests and her autonomy is respected. This 
conclusion is subject to the condition that the patient can and wants to take part in the consent 
process. For as Waller (2002, page 259) points out dumping responsibility onto a patient who 
cannot act purposely is not an example of respecting autonomy. In section 6.1.1 I will extend 
this argument to show a patient may make an autonomous decision to delegate her consent 
decision to her doctors that is compatible with the practice of informed consent. It can be 
further concluded that, in this context, and subject to the above condition, there is no reason 
why a consenting patient’s decision should not always be accepted. I therefore propose that 
the practice of informed consent should be altered. If there is a generally agreed best option 
and a patient who wants to take part in the informed consent process consents, then her 
consent should automatically accepted 
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I showed in section 4.4.2 that the standards used by asymmetric and symmetric risk-
related competence assessments are identical if a patient refuses to give consent. It follows 
that there is no difference to the treatment a patient receives when she refuses to give consent 
irrespective of whether her competence is assessed using either of these forms of risk-related 
competence assessment. Let it be accepted that treatment T is generally agreed to be in the 
patient’s best interests. I showed above, in this context, that the treatment a patient receives is 
identical irrespective of whether her consent is accepted or rejected as incompetent. I also 
showed that in this context if a patient’s consent was automatically accepted, then her 
autonomy would be respected. I proposed in this context that a patient’s consent should be 
automatically accepted. If my proposal is accepted, it means in practice that there is no 
meaningful difference between asymmetric and symmetric risk-related competence 
assessments. 
 
4.5. Risk related competence assessments and personal autonomy. 
 
In section 4.4 I proposed that if a patient freely makes a decision consenting to some treatment 
proposed by her doctors, then her decision should simply be accepted without any further 
assessment of her competence. I concluded that if this proposal were adopted then in practice 
there would be no meaningful difference between asymmetric and risk related symmetric 
assessments of a patient’s competence. As a result of this conclusion, in this section 
asymmetric and risk related symmetric assessments of a patient’s competence will be referred 
to simply as risk related competence assessments. It must be noted that risk related 
assessments refers to assessments of competence in which the standard required by a patient in 
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order to be considered competent varies directly with the risk involved rather than the 
capacities the patient needs to understand this risk. In this section I will examine risk related 
competence assessments in conjunction with personal autonomy. I will conclude that a patient 
can make an autonomous decision which might be regarded as incompetent using a risk 
related competence assessment. This leads to the major conclusion of this thesis that 
asymmetric and risk related symmetric assessments of a patient’s competence are 
incompatible with respecting a patient’s personal autonomy. 
When considering risk related competence assessments it is particularly important to be 
clear about the purpose of informed consent and the purpose of assessing a patient’s 
competence. This importance is due to the way risk related competence assessments combine 
the concepts of autonomy and beneficence. The General Medical Council’s guidelines (2001, 
introduction 1) state that informed consent is based on respect for patient autonomy. This 
position is generally accepted in bioethics (see, for instance Silver, 2002, page 458). I will 
now examine what this position involves for the practice of informed consent. Let it be 
assumed that the purpose of informed consent is purely to respect patient autonomy. Let it be 
further assumed that to respect autonomy simply means to accept autonomous decisions. In 
section 3.1.2 I argued that the set of autonomous decisions is a subset of the set of all decisions 
free from external constraints. It follows that a patient’s autonomy might be respected by 
accepting all her freely made decisions. It further follows that even if the concept of risk 
related competence assessment is coherent, this concept seems to serve no useful purpose in 
the context of informed consent. However, it might be argued that respecting a patient’s 
autonomy does not only consist of accepting her autonomous decisions. It might be further 
argued respecting a patient’s autonomy means accepting all her autonomous decisions and 
enabling her to make these decisions. Even if the above is accepted, it does not mean that the 
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assessment of a patient’s competence is meaningful within the context of informed consent. A 
patient’s autonomy could be respected by fully informing her about her condition and simply 
accepting her decision provided it is free from external constraints. Medicine is a practical 
discipline and assessment of patient competence takes time. It can be concluded that if the 
purpose of informed consent is purely to respect a patient’s autonomy, then this could be 
achieved more efficiently and quickly without the need to assess her competence.  
I will now argue that the assumption that the purpose of informed consent is purely to 
respect patient autonomy is false. Not all patients are autonomous. I have shown above that a 
patient’s autonomy can be respected by fully informing her about her condition and accepting 
her freely made decision. Let it be assumed that the practice of informed consent only requires 
that patients are fully informed and their freely made decisions accepted. Accepting this 
assumption would mean that some non-autonomous patients would be deprived of the medical 
help they need, for no benefit to themselves, in order to respect the autonomy of others. 
Consider the case of MB [1997]. MB was intuitively non-autonomous because of her needle 
phobia. MB also refused to give consent. MB was fully informed. If all fully informed and 
freely made consent decisions were simply accepted, then MB’s non-autonomous consent 
decision would have been accepted. It follows that MB would have been deprived of the help 
she needed in order to respect the autonomy of others. MB’s fully informed and freely made 
decisions were not accepted. This example suggests that the purpose of informed consent is 
not purely to respect patient autonomy. Silver (2003) defines the purpose of medicine as 
follows. 
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The proper ends of medicine are to use medical skills and training to maintain or improve the 
condition of the person affected, subject to her autonomous consent. (Silver, 2003, page 209) 
 
Silver’s definition combines autonomy and beneficence. It would seem that any meaningful 
definition of the purpose of informed consent should be concerned with the purpose of 
medicine and also combine autonomy and beneficence. I believe that in practice the purpose 
of informed consent is as follows. The purpose of informed consent is to respect patient 
autonomy and enable patients to make autonomous decisions whilst also allowing non-
autonomous patients to receive the beneficent medical care they need. If this definition is 
accepted, then the assessment of a patient’s competence becomes meaningful. A patient’s 
competence is assessed to ensure her decision is autonomous. However, this does not mean 
that the purpose of assessing a patient’s competence is to respect her autonomy. The purpose 
of assessing a patient’s competence is to ensure non-autonomous patients receive the 
beneficent medical care they need. 
Before risk related competence assessment is examined further, the relationship between 
autonomy and beneficence in any competence assessment, must be made clear. Let it be 
accepted that the purpose of informed consent is to protect a patient’s autonomy by means 
which are compatible with beneficent care being given to non-autonomous patients.  Let it be 
further accepted that the purpose of medicine is to act beneficently to all patients subject to 
their consent as set out by Silver (2003, page 209). In practice the demands of autonomy and 
beneficence may clash. Silver’s definition of the aims of medicine and my definition of the 
purpose of informed consent given above, resolve any clash between the demands of 
autonomy and beneficence in the same way. They give priority to respecting the autonomous 
decisions of patients over acting beneficently. For example, an autonomous decision made by 
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a Jehovah’s Witness who refused to give consent for a blood transfusion which was in her best 
medical interests would be respected, because respecting autonomous decisions is given 
priority over acting beneficently. However, a patient who refused to give consent to a blood 
transfusion due to a needle phobia, would have her decision overruled so she could be treated 
beneficently, because her decision is non-autonomous. 
The capacities a patient requires to make a competent decision using a risk related 
assessment of her competence are determined directly by the risks involved.  It follows that 
the capacities a patient requires to make a competent decision are not directly linked to the 
capacities she needs to understand the risks involved. For example, the capacities a patient 
needs to make a competent decision about an emergency appendectomy are directly 
determined by the risk inherent in the procedure, rather than the capacities needed to 
understand the risks involved in the procedure. Moreover these capacities need not be 
identical. Let it be accepted that Dworkin (1988, page 20) and Frankfurt (1988, page 84, 
originally 1982) are correct and the exercise of autonomy is essentially a reflective process. 
Reflection requires certain capacities. Let it be assumed that the capacities needed by an agent 
to make an autonomous decision are in part directly determined by the risks involved in her 
decision rather than her need to understand the risks involved in her decision. It follows that 
an agent cannot make an autonomous decision about how much risk she is prepared to accept. 
It further follows she is not being treated as the kind of person who can determine her own 
future. However, both Dworkin (1988, page 112) and Frankfurt (1999, page 163) hold that the 
intrinsic value of autonomy is connected to someone being recognised as the kind of person 
who can determine her own future. In section 2.2 I argued that it is impossible for someone to 
completely respect an agent’s autonomy if she does not respect the intrinsic value of the 
agent’s autonomy. I further argued in section 2.2 that this involves recognising the agent as the 
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kind of person who can determine her own future. It can be concluded that the assumption that 
the capacities needed by an agent to make an autonomous decision are in part determined 
directly by the risks involved in the decision, is false. It can be further concluded that the 
capacities a patient needs to make an autonomous decision are solely determined by the nature 
of the decision and only indirectly by the risks involved in the decision. The capacities 
considered necessary for a patient to be considered competent under a risk related assessment 
of her competence are determined directly by the risks involved. It follows that a patient may 
have sufficient capacities to make an autonomous decision, but these capacities might be 
judged as insufficient for her decision to be assessed as competent using a risk related 
standard. This leads to the conclusion that if competence is assessed using a risk related 
standard, then priority is being given to acting beneficently over respecting autonomous 
decisions. 
In order to make clear the change of priorities involved by using a risk related 
assessment of competence, consider the following example used by Drane (1985 quoted in 
Mappes & Zembaty, 1986, page 104)). Bob is an outstanding eighteen-year-old athlete who is 
involved in a road accident which crushes his left foot. Attempts to curb infections in the limb 
do not succeed and these threaten Bob’s life. Bob is asked to consent to the amputation of his 
leg below the knee. Since Bob is no longer a minor, his consent is required for the surgery. 
Bob refuses to consent because he considers that without sport, his life will be meaningless. 
Let it be assumed that Bob fully understands his condition including the probability of his own 
death, without the amputation. Let it also be assumed that Bob understands that in time he 
might find it possible to lead a meaningful life outside sport and he has the ability to reflect 
critically on these facts in the light of his own values. It follows that Bob has the degree of 
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understanding necessary to make his decision to refuse consent autonomous. However, if 
Bob’s competence is assessed by a risk related standard, this standard is determined directly 
by the risk involved. In Bob’s case, because his refusal of consent is extremely risky, the 
required standard will be extremely high. It is probable that this standard will be higher than 
the standard needed for his decision to be considered autonomous. It follows that if a risk-
related standard of competence is applied in Bob’s case, then priority is being given to acting 
beneficently rather than respecting his autonomous decision. It further follows that Bob can 
make an autonomous decision which would be regarded as an incompetent decision using a 
risk related assessment of his competence. It must be noted that Drane would disagree with my 
analysis, and would instead regard Bob’s decision as non-autonomous. 
Cases such as Bob’s might intuitively lead to the conclusion that the priority given to 
respecting autonomous decisions over acting beneficently in informed consent as it is 
currently practiced is wrong. It might be argued that the purpose of assessing a patient’s 
competence should be altered to ensuring that beneficent care is given to patients whilst 
considering patient’s autonomous decisions with priority being given to acting beneficently 
over respecting autonomous decisions. The fact that priority would be given to beneficence 
over autonomy does not mean that autonomy would not be considered. If this were so 
informed consent would become pointless and doctors acting beneficently could simply decide 
upon the appropriate treatment for a patient. 
However autonomy is central to our lives. Dworkin (1988, page 31) argues that 
autonomy defines the particular person someone is and that by shaping her life plans and 
projects she gives meaning to her life. Frankfurt (1999, page 163) believes that the basis of 
autonomy is caring about something. He regards caring about something as having intrinsic 
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value due to its essential role in making us the distinctive kind of creatures we are. The fact 
that autonomy is so central to our lives means it is simply not enough just to consider a 
patient’s autonomous decisions when assessing her competence. It means that her autonomy 
should be respected as required by current medical guidelines. I have argued that the risk 
related assessment of competence requires that acting beneficently must be given precedence 
over respecting autonomy in some competence assessments. I have further argued that because 
autonomy is crucial to making us the kind of persons we are, it is not enough that autonomous 
decisions are simply considered.  It can be concluded that because of the importance of 
autonomy in shaping our lives, respecting autonomy should be an essential part of the purpose 
of assessing competence to give valid consent. It can be further concluded that the risk related 
assessment of competence could only be compatible with the importance of autonomy if it is 
possible at the same time to respect autonomy whilst also giving priority to acting beneficently 
over respecting autonomy. 
Dworkin (1988, page 15) considers autonomy to be a global concept which can only be 
assessed over an extended portion of a person’s life. He also believes the promotion of 
autonomy in the long term may require sacrificing autonomy in the short term (Dworkin, 
1988, page 114). It might then be argued that respecting autonomy should mean respecting a 
patient’s capacity for autonomous action rather than her individual autonomous decisions. Let 
it be assumed that respecting an agent’s autonomy in the long term could be achieved simply 
by the promotion or protection of her capacity for autonomy (see section 2.2). It might then be 
argued that giving priority to acting beneficently over accepting individual autonomous 
decisions is compatible with respecting autonomy in the long-term. If the above is accepted, 
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then it is possible that the risk-related assessment of a patient’s competence is compatible with 
respecting autonomy.  
Consider again the case of Bob. Let it be assumed that Bob’s competence is assessed 
using a risk-related standard. Let it further be assumed that Bob makes an autonomous 
decision to refuse consent and there is a high probability that without treatment he will die. In 
this case because the risk involved with refusing consent is very high, the standard set for Bob 
to be considered competent would also be very high. This follows because acting beneficently 
has been given priority over respecting his autonomous decision. Let it also be assumed that 
this high standard means Bob’s decision is assessed as incompetent. However, it might be 
argued that even though this standard is high, and dictated by the needs of beneficence, it still 
respects Bob’s autonomy in the long term. This follows, because without the amputation, Bob 
will probably die and his capacity for autonomous action will be lost. However if Bob’s 
autonomous decision is sacrificed in the short term for beneficent reasons, his capacity for 
autonomous action will be preserved and hence respected. This example seems to show that 
priority may be given to acting beneficently over respecting autonomous decisions whilst at 
the same time still respecting autonomy. The above is only true if respect for autonomy means 
the promotion or protection of a patient’s capacity for autonomous action. 
The example of Bob intuitively shows that the idea of risk-related competence 
assessment might be compatible with respecting patient autonomy. This possibility means 
priority may be given to acting beneficently over respecting individual autonomous decisions. 
It depends on the premise that respect for autonomy means the promotion or protection of a 
patient’s capacity for autonomous action. I will now examine the example of Bob in greater 
detail to question this intuitive position. Let it be assumed that if Bob consents to the 
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amputation, his chances of dying are very small. It follows that the risk involved with his 
consenting is minimal. Let it also be assumed that if Bob refuses to consent to the amputation, 
his chance of dying is high with a probability of 80%. It follows that the risk involved with his 
refusing to consent is high. Let it be still further assumed Bob fully understands the prognosis 
for each option and the probabilities of his survival with both options. Lastly let it be assumed 
that Bob decides he is prepared to accept the 80% probability of his death in the 20% hope that 
attempts to save his limb will eventually succeed and that he refuses to consent. Bob’s 
competence is then assessed using a risk related assessment of his competence. Because Bob 
has made a dangerous choice, acting beneficently will take priority over respecting his 
autonomous decision and a high standard of competence will be applied. Finally let it be 
assumed that Bob’s decision is judged to be incompetent and his leg is amputated. It follows 
that Bob has had his autonomous decision overruled and this overruling has preserved his 
capacity for autonomous decision-making. However, our intuitive ideas are altered when 
Bob’s case is examined in greater detail. The preservation of Bob’s capacity for autonomous 
action seems intuitively insufficient to respect his autonomy. 
It has been assumed that respect for autonomy might simply mean the promotion or 
protection of a patient’s capacity for autonomous action. Bob has had his capacity for 
autonomous action protected. The following question may now be asked. Why does Bob 
intuitively appear not have had his autonomy respected even though his capacity for 
autonomous action appears to have been protected? The reason for this is that autonomy does 
not simply have instrumental value. Autonomy also has intrinsic value (see section 2.2). The 
instrumental value of autonomy is clearly respected in Bob’s case. The intrinsic value of 
autonomy involves an autonomous agent being respected as the kind of person who can 
determine his own future. The intrinsic value of autonomy involves an autonomous agent 
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exercising her autonomy according to Dworkin (1988, page 112). This means respecting an 
agent’s capacity for autonomy only partially respects her autonomy. In order to fully respect 
someone’s autonomy, one also must respect her autonomous decisions. Intuitively Bob’s 
autonomy was not respected because his autonomous decision was not respected. 
Next, consider a mountaineer called Bobby. Bobby has a child and decides to continue 
climbing. This decision involves considerable dangers for Bobby. However, let it be assumed 
she fully understands the risks involved and that her partner can adequately care for their 
child. Let it be assumed that Bobby’s decision is autonomous. Bobby’s decision differs from 
Bob’s decision because she assesses the risk she is prepared to take whilst others assess the 
risk Bob can take. Bobby’s decision might be regarded as both uncaring and dangerous. Her 
friends, acting from beneficent motives, might seek to persuade Bobby to change her decision. 
However, if her friends fail in their attempt to change Bobby’s autonomous decision they 
would have to respect this decision.  It can be concluded that in this case Bobby’s autonomous 
decision would be respected rather than her capacity to make autonomous decisions in the 
future. This conclusion would seem to apply to all autonomous decisions made by adults 
outside the practice of informed consent. 
It has been argued by Clarke (2000, page 174) that some concepts connected to informed 
consent are only loosely related to the meaning of these concepts in contexts outside the 
practice of informed consent. It might then be argued that the meaning of “respect for 
autonomy” is different in the context of informed consent, to the meaning of “respect for 
autonomy” in contexts outside the practice of informed consent. However, even if the meaning 
of “respect for autonomy” is different in the context of informed consent compared to its 
meaning in other contexts, it should be possible to give a reason for this difference. Perhaps it 
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might be argued that in the context of informed consent, a patient’s capacity to make 
autonomous decisions should be respected rather than her actual autonomous decisions 
because of the possibility of her death. However, the example of Bobby clearly shows the 
possibility of an agent’s death is connected to her decisions in contexts outside the practice of 
informed consent. Moreover, in these contexts an agent’s autonomous decision is respected 
rather than her capacity to make future autonomous decisions. It seems hard to advance further 
reasons why respect for autonomy in the context of informed consent should differ from 
respect for autonomy in other contexts.  
It has been assumed that in the context of informed consent, respect for a patient’s 
autonomy simply means respecting her capacity to make future autonomous decisions. Let it 
be accepted that respect for autonomy should have the same meaning in all contexts unless 
reasons can be advanced for why respect for autonomy should have different meanings in 
different contexts. I have argued above that it is hard to see any reason why respect for 
autonomy should have a different meaning in the context of informed consent compared to 
other contexts. It follows that one of the following two options should hold. Firstly, respecting 
autonomy should only mean respecting an agent’s capacity to make future autonomous 
decisions. If this first option is adopted, then respecting autonomy, in all contexts, should 
mean respecting an agent’s capacity to make future autonomous decisions even if this means 
sacrificing some of her autonomous decisions. Secondly, respecting autonomy should mean 
respecting an agent’s autonomous decisions. 
I will now present two arguments to show that if respect for autonomy should have the 
same meaning in all contexts then respecting autonomy should mean respecting an agent’s 
autonomous decisions. Firstly adopting the first option would mean autonomous decisions 
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such as that of Bobby would not be respected. This option would seem to be impractical as it 
would change the entire ethos of western culture. However, accepting this argument does not 
mean that it would be wrong to respect autonomy by respecting an agent’s capacity to make 
future autonomous decisions. 
I will now present a second argument to show that respecting autonomy should mean, 
respecting an agent’s autonomous decisions. My argument is based on the intrinsic value of 
autonomy. In section 2.2 I showed that the intrinsic value of autonomy is connected to 
respecting autonomous decisions. Let it be accepted happiness has intrinsic value. A utilitarian 
might argue it would be right to sacrifice some happiness in order to promote greater 
happiness. Moreover a utilitarian might justifiably argue such a sacrifice is perfectly 
compatible with respecting the intrinsic value of happiness. It might then be argued by 
analogy that respecting the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy might mean sacrificing 
some of her autonomous decisions. I believe such an argument by analogy is unsound due to 
the nature of the intrinsic value of autonomy. I argued on pages 53, 54 that in order to respect 
the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy all of his autonomous decisions must be accepted. 
In section 2.2 I showed both Dworkin (1988, page 112) and Frankfurt (1999, page 163) 
believe that the intrinsic value of autonomy is connected to the desire to be recognised as the 
kind of creature capable of determining her own destiny. I believe Dworkin and Frankfurt’s 
position is essentially the correct one. It follows the recognition that someone is the kind of 
creature capable of determining her own future cannot be graduated. Clearly someone is either 
recognised as the kind of creature who is capable of determining her own future or as someone 
who is not. It further follows if I promote someone’s capacity to make future autonomous 
decisions by sacrificing some of her autonomous decisions then I fail to respect the intrinsic 
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value of her autonomy. However if I promote someone’s happiness by sacrificing some of her 
happiness it might still be argued I respect the intrinsic value of her happiness. It can be 
concluded the above argument by analogy is unsound. If these arguments are accepted then it 
can be concluded that it would be wrong to respect a patient’s autonomy by simply respecting 
her capacity for autonomous action. 
In this section I have argued that the risk-related assessment of a patient’s competence 
can only be compatible with respecting his autonomy if the following premise is true. It is 
possible to respect autonomy whilst at the same time giving priority to acting beneficently 
over respecting autonomous decisions. I further argued that this is only possible if respecting 
autonomy means only respecting a patient’s capacity for autonomous action. I still further 
argued that it is meaningless to only respect a patient’s capacity for autonomous instrumental 
action. It follows the above premise is false and a risk-related assessment of a patient’s 
competence to give consent is incompatible with respecting his autonomy. This also leads to 
one of the major conclusions of this thesis. All competence assessments tied directly to risk of 
a procedure are incompatible with respecting patient autonomy because sometimes they 
must give priority to acting beneficently over respecting autonomous decisions.  Giving 
priority to acting beneficently over respecting autonomous decisions is incompatible with 
respecting autonomy. It follows that if informed consent is based on respect for autonomy 
the concepts of asymmetric and risk related symmetric assessments of patient competence 
should play no part in the practice of informed consent. 
Accepting the above conclusion leads to the following further conclusion. British case 
law on informed consent is incompatible with respecting patient autonomy. Lord Donaldson in 
the case of T stated that a patient’s capacities should vary with the risks involved in his case 
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[1992]. I have argued the capacities a patient needs to be considered competent may indeed 
vary with the risks involved. In some circumstances a patient may need higher or extra 
capacities to understand the risks involved in her treatment. However, in order to respect a 
patient’s autonomy, I have shown the capacities a patient needs to be considered competent 
should only be linked indirectly to the risk involved in her treatment. Lord Donaldson’s 
judgment in the case of T concentrated directly on risk because it concentrated on the risks 
concerned with refusals of consent. I have concluded above that if risk is linked directly to the 
standard of competence in any competence assessment, then this assessment of competence 
gives precedence to acting beneficently over respecting the patient’s autonomous decision. I 
have further concluded that respecting autonomy is not compatible with giving precedence to 
acting beneficently over respecting autonomy decisions. These conclusions lead to the second 
major conclusion of this chapter. Current medical law as set out by Lord Donaldson in the 
case of T on consent involving risk is incompatible with respecting patient autonomy. 
It is of course true that the risk involved in a procedure still plays a major part in the 
assessment of a patient’s competence to give consent to that procedure. Firstly the risk 
involved in the outcome of a patient’s decision is important in triggering any assessment of 
her competence. This triggering may be asymmetric with regard to risk. The asymmetric 
triggering of competence assessments is perfectly compatible with respecting a patient’s 
autonomy. Secondly, a patient must understand certain information relevant to his condition in 
order to make an autonomous decision. This information should include the risks involved in 
his decision.  
This chapter reached the following conclusions. 
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1) The asymmetric triggering of competence assessments is compatible with respecting 
patient autonomy. 
2) Asymmetric and risk related symmetric assessments of a patient’s competence are 
directly linked to risks involved in the procedure. This means that acting beneficently 
is given precedence over respecting patient’s autonomous decisions.  
3) In circumstances when there is a generally agreed best option for a patient to choose. 
A patient’s freely made decision to consent to some proposed treatment should be 
accepted regardless of whether the patient is competent or incompetent. 
4) Asymmetric and risk related symmetric assessments of competence should not used 
to assess patient competence because they do not respect patient autonomy. 
5) Current law as set out in the case of T on consent involving risk is incompatible with 
respecting patient autonomy. 
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Chapter 5 
The purpose of informed consent decisions and the context in which these decisions are 
made 
 
This chapter will examine the purposes behind making informed consent decisions. Firstly I 
will examine the purpose of a patient when making an informed consent decision. Secondly I 
will examine the purpose of assessing a patient’s competence to make an informed consent 
decision. This chapter will also examine the context in which assessing a patient’s competence 
to make informed consent decisions is meaningful. This examination will be carried out 
against the background of what it means to be competent. I will argue that in some contexts, in 
which the assessment of patient competence appears to be a coherent concept, it would be 
wrong to automatically conclude that it is a useful concept. I will further argue that if the 
assessment of patient competence is to be a useful concept, then it must be linked to the ability 
of surrogate decision-makers to make good decisions on behalf of incompetent patients. This 
will lead to a major conclusion of my thesis. I will conclude that in certain contexts, when it is 
impossible for a surrogate decision-maker to choose a generally agreed best option on behalf 
of an incompetent patient, the idea of assessing the patient’s competence to give informed 
consent is not a useful one and should be abandoned. I will argue that in these contexts a 
patient’s decision should always be accepted. However, I will also show that in these contexts, 
even if the assessment of a patient’ competence should be abandoned, this does not mean that 
the idea of informed consent should also be abandoned. This chapter is divided into four sub 
sections. 
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5.1 
The patient’s purpose when making informed consent decisions 
  
Before I examine the relationship between personal autonomy and the practice of informed 
consent further, the purpose of a patient’s decision when she gives informed consent must be 
made clear. This is important when considering the information requirements needed to enable 
patients to make informed consent decisions. I will discuss these requirements in detail in 
section 6.1.However, I will argue in section 5.2 that the purpose of a patient’s decision when 
she gives informed consent, is unimportant when considering the purpose of assessing her 
decision for competence. 
The informed consent decision a patient faces is not to decide which form of treatment is 
in her medical interests. Patients do not have sufficient expertise to make such decisions. 
Fortunately informed consent decisions are not medical decisions as pointed out by Dworkin 
(1988): 
 
Decisions about what form of treatment to undergo, the probabilities of cure and the side 
effects, judgements about how the body will react after various forms of surgery, whether to 
spend one’s last days in hospital or at home – these are not technical medical judgements 
(Dworkin, 1988, page 113). 
 
Intuitively a patient’s informed consent decision is concerned with whether consenting or 
refusing to consent to some proposed treatment is in her best interests. Veatch (1990) defines 
consent as follows: 
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Consent means approval or agreement with the actions or opinions of another; terms such as 
acquiescence and condoning appear in the dictionary definitions. In medicine, the physician or 
other health care provider will, after reviewing the facts of the case and attempting to 
determine what is in the best interests of the patient, propose a course of action for the 
patient’s concurrence (Veatch, 1995, page 5). 
 
Let it be assumed that Veatch is correct in his analysis. It follows that the purpose of a patient 
making an informed consent decision is to decide whether consenting or refusing to consent to 
some proposed treatment is in her best interests. 
Veatch further concludes that if informed consent means a patient makes a decision 
based on her best interests, then the treatment her doctors propose must also be in her best 
interests. He argues that this is impossible. He argues that if it is possible for doctors to 
determine what is in the best interests of a patient, then they must be capable of the following: 
 
First the clinician must be expected to determine what will best serve the patient’ medical or 
health interests; second the clinician must be expected to determine how to trade off health 
interests with other interests; and third the clinician must be expected to determine how the 
patient should relate the pursuit of her best interests to other moral goals (Veatch, 1995, page 
7). 
 
If it is accepted that a patient’s best interests are a combination of these three different 
elements then it follows that doctors might well be unable to determine what is in her best 
interests. It further follows that if Veatch’s conclusion, that it is necessary for doctors to make 
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recommendations which are in the patient’s best interests, is true then the process of informed 
consent cannot get started. Because of these reasons, Veatch rejects the concept of informed 
consent as meaningful. He argues that a patient should place her trust in doctors with whom 
she has paired herself on the basis of their mutual goals and values. These doctors would then 
make a decision on the patient’s behalf.  Veatch (1995, page 11) argues that this process, 
based on pairing and doctors deciding, should replace the practice of informed consent. 
However, I argued in section 4.2 that some intuitively competent decisions are made by agents 
deciding what would satisfy them rather than what is in their best interests. It follows that the 
conclusion, that the purpose of a patient making an informed consent decision is to decide 
whether consenting or refusing to consent to some proposed treatment is in her best interests, 
needs revising. It might be concluded that the purpose of a patient making an informed 
consent decision is to decide whether consenting or refusing to consent to some proposed 
treatment would satisfy her. It might then be argued, if this revised conclusion is accepted that 
a patient’s doctors would only need to propose a treatment that will satisfy her rather than a 
treatment which is in her best interests. However, in most circumstances the problem remains 
because a patient will only be satisfied if she believes her decision is in her best interests. 
Let it be accepted that a patient usually bases her informed consent decision on her best 
interests. Because of this Veatch concludes that a patient’s doctors must be able to make a 
recommendation which is in her best interests. I will now argue that accepting the former does 
not mean Veatch’s conclusion is true. Let it be further accepted that Veatch is correct to 
believe a patient’s doctors cannot know what is in her best overall interests. However, a 
patient’s doctors can make a recommendation which is in her best medical interests. Consider 
a patient giving consent. This patient might accept her doctors’ recommendation that some 
form of treatment is in her best medical interests. According to Wear (1998) the patient should 
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integrate this recommendation with her other interests to decide whether her doctors’ 
recommendation is in her best overall interests: 
 
Evaluating the data presented seems much more difficult, for one must first prioritize and 
relativize it to one’s own personal circumstance. The patient must then attempt to array all this 
as a coherent fabric from which a specific decision can be generated (Wear, 1998, page 20). 
 
It seems to be impossible for a doctor to prioritise and relativise a patient’s medical interests 
with her other interests. However, this is something a patient can do. It follows that Veatch is 
correct and a patient’s doctors cannot make a recommendation which is in her best overall 
interests. However, he is wrong to conclude this makes informed consent impossible. Let it be 
accepted that it is possible for doctors to make a recommendation which is in a patient’s best 
medical interests. Let it be further accepted that a patient may then make a consent decision 
based on what she believes to be in her best overall interests. These interests would be based 
on her best medical interests and what she cares about. It can be concluded the purpose of a 
patient making an informed consent decision is to decide whether consenting or refusing to 
consent to some proposed treatment would satisfy her. It can be further concluded that in most 
circumstances a patient will only be satisfied if she believes her decision is in her best overall 
interests. 
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5.2. The purpose of assessing patient competence 
 
I argued in sections 2.1 and 4.5 the purpose of informed consent is to respect patient autonomy 
whilst also ensuring non-autonomous patients receive beneficent care. It is often assumed in 
medical ethics that the purpose of assessing a patient’s competence is to determine whether 
her informed consent decision should be accepted (see, for instance, Buchanan & Brock, 1989, 
page 28). In this section I will firstly examine our intuitive ideas of what competence 
assessment means in conjunction with personal autonomy. After completing this examination I 
will question the purpose of assessing a patient’s competence to give consent as outlined by 
Buchanan and Brock. I will conclude that the reason why a patient’s competence is assessed 
should concur with the purpose of informed consent as defined in section 4.5. The purpose of 
assessing a patient’s competence should be to respect her autonomy if she is autonomous, and 
to allow her to receive beneficent care if she is non-autonomous. I will use this conclusion in 
later sections of this chapter to show that in some circumstances, the assessment of a patient’s 
competence serves no useful purpose. 
There are some concepts of autonomy that refer to autonomous persons (see, for 
instance, Dworkin,1988, page 15), and some concepts that refer to autonomous decisions (see, 
for instance, Christman, 1991, page 3). This division also applies to our intuitive ideas of 
competence. There can be global competence which refers to competent people. Competence 
can also refer to a specific task. For instance, someone may be competent to run her life as she 
sees fit (global competence) but she may be incompetent to drive a car (task related 
competence). Buller (2001) defines the relationship between global competence and 
someone’s competence to do a particular task as follows: 
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On this usage, the judgement that a person is competent or not to perform a particular task is 
based not on the particular features of the task, but simply on the fact that the person is 
competent (or not) (Buller, 2001, page 92). 
 
However it is also possible to assess someone’s competence to do a particular task directly by 
questioning whether she has the capacities needed to undertake this particular task 
successfully. It follows that prior to examining the purpose of assessing a patient’s 
competence to give informed consent, a further question must be answered. Does assessing a 
patient’s competence to make an informed consent decision involve assessing her global 
competence, or directly assessing her competence to make a specific decision? 
I will now argue that it would be wrong simply to assess a patient’s global competence 
when assessing her competence to make an informed consent decision. Intuitively someone is 
competent if she is skilful, efficient, or capable of undertaking some task. Intuitively it follows 
that someone is globally competent if she is capable of running her own life. It has been 
assumed above the purpose of assessing a patient’s competence is to decide if she should 
retain the right to accept or refuse treatment. Prima facie it might be concluded that provided a 
patient is competent to run her life, she should be competent to give informed consent and her 
decision should be accepted.  However, just because a patient has the capacities needed to run 
her own life it does not automatically follow that she can run own her life. Her decisions may 
be constrained. These constraints include internal constraints as illustrated by the case of MB 
[1997] who had a needle phobia. It follows from this that prima facie conclusion needs 
amending. Prima facie it might now be concluded that if a patient is competent to run her life, 
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and the decisions she makes are not constrained, then she should be competent to give 
informed consent. I believe that this amended prima facie conclusion should also be rejected. 
Let it be accepted that if someone is competent to run her own life she must be capable of 
making reasonable decisions. Let it also be accepted the reason we respect any decisions she 
makes is because we expect these decisions to be reasonable. However, even if someone is 
competent to run her own life it does not automatically follow that all her decisions are 
reasonable decisions. Someone who is competent to run her own life may make bad decisions 
when faced by strange and unusual circumstances in which her understanding of issues is 
limited. The circumstances of giving informed consent are strange and unusual to most 
patients. It follows that in the context of informed consent, we do not have reason to respect 
the decisions of a patient who is competent to run her own life because we always expect these 
decisions to be reasonable decisions. It can be concluded that the amended prima facie 
conclusion that, if a patient is competent to run her own life and the decisions she makes are 
not constrained, then she should retain the right to accept or refuse treatment, is false. 
However the above conclusion, concerning the amended prima facie conclusion, might 
not be true in all circumstances. Buller (2001) points out much that the same abilities are 
needed to make all decisions: 
 
In fact there seems something odd in the notion of decision relative competence as a whole for 
although it is obvious that different tasks require different skills, it is far less obvious that 
different decisions do. Whereas it is clear that cooking a meal at least requires some different 
skills to composing an opera, one can make an argument that that exactly the same skills are 
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needed to financial decisions as educational ones, namely attention to detail, appropriate 
weighing of options, understanding the implications etc (Buller, 2001, page 96). 
If Buller is correct, and the same skills are needed to make informed consent decisions as are 
needed to make other decisions, then it might be argued that competence should refer to 
decision making in general rather than to specific decisions. This would mean that even if the 
idea of global competence were rejected when applied to generally competent persons, a 
restricted form of global competence might apply to persons competent to make decisions. For 
instance, someone may be an incompetent driver but a competent decision-maker. It might be 
argued that if someone is competent to make important decisions, such as whether to marry or 
which career to follow, then she should be competent to make other important decisions which 
might affect her. Accepting the above leads to the conclusion that the amended prima facie 
conclusion should be further amended as follows. If a patient is a competent decision maker 
and the decisions she makes are not constrained, then she should automatically retain the right 
to accept or refuse treatment. 
I will now present three arguments to show that this further amended prima facie 
conclusion is false. Wicclair (1991) points out that not all decisions require the same cognitive 
skills and capacities; 
 
The requisite skills and abilities vary according to the specific decision, and the standard of 
decision-making capacity therefore should be decision or task related. It is unlikely, for 
example, that there are no significant differences between the cognitive skills and capacities 
required to make a reasoned decision concerning life sustaining medical treatment, on one 
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hand, and the cognitive skills and capacities that are required to make sound financial 
investments, on the other hand (Wicclair, 1991, page 92). 
It might then be argued that the fact that a patient is a competent decision maker when 
generally running her life, does not of necessity mean she has the cognitive skills to make a 
reasonable informed consent decision. However, it is by no means clear that different 
cognitive skills are required for different types of decisions, as pointed out by Buller above 
(2001, page 96). What is different is the type of information needed by the decision maker in 
different situations. One purpose of informed consent is to supply enough information to 
enable a patient to make a reasonable decision. It follows that my first argument, to show the 
further amended prima facie conclusion is false, fails.  
Secondly, I will argue by analogy that the further amended prima facie conclusion is 
false. This conclusion relies on the implicit premise that by providing someone who usually 
makes competent decisions with information, when she is in strange and unusual 
circumstances, we can enable her to understand her situation. It might be argued that this 
implicit premise is false because information can only be understood against a background of 
knowledge. It might then be argued that it is pointless to provide someone with information, 
pertinent to some decision she is making, unless she already has the background knowledge 
necessary to understand the information provided. For instance, a banker making an 
investment decision needs not only to understand the information specific to her particular 
investment decision, but she must also have a background knowledge of financial markets and 
institutions. It might then be argued by analogy that a patient making an informed consent 
decision must not only understand the information specific to her particular.  decision but also 
have a background of medical knowledge. However, as pointed out by Dworkin (1988, page 
113) informed consent decisions are not medical decisions. Intuitively someone’s competence 
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to make investment decisions requires both understanding the decision and a specialist 
background. However, someone’s competence to make informed consent decisions only 
requires that the patient understands her condition against the background of her normal life. It 
can be concluded that this argument by analogy fails. 
My third argument runs as follows. Let it be assumed that an unconstrained patient is 
competent to make decisions such as whether to marry or which career to follow. If the further 
amended prima facie conclusion is correct, and provided this patient is suitably informed 
about her medical condition, then she should also be competent to give informed consent. Let 
it be further assumed that all of these decisions require similar understanding and cognitive 
abilities. I argued above that the further amended prima facie conclusion is dependent on the 
implicit premise that by providing someone who usually makes competent decisions with 
information, when she is in strange and unusual circumstances, we can enable her to 
understand her situation. I believe that this implicit premise is false. Decisions such as those 
concerning marriage and careers are not generally made in the same circumstances as 
informed consent decisions. Patients making informed consent decisions are often in strange 
and unusual circumstances. These circumstances can affect both their cognitive abilities and 
understanding. It follows that the further amended prima facie conclusion that, if a patient is a 
competent decision maker and the decisions she makes are not constrained then she should 
automatically retain the right to accept or refuse treatment, is false. It is of course still true that 
a patient’s past decisions may be a guide to her competence to make informed consent 
decisions. It can be concluded that when assessing a patient’s competence to make an 
informed consent decision, her competence to make this specific decision should be assessed 
and not her global competence. 
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Let it be assumed Buchanan and Brock (1989) are correct and the purpose of assessing a 
patient’s competence is to determine whether her informed consent decision should be 
respected. A further question then might be asked. Why is it necessary to assess whether a 
patient retains the right to accept or refuse to accept a particular medical procedure? Silver 
(2002) asks the same question and then provides an answer: 
 
The ideal answer is rather obvious and uncontroversial: we value a patient’s autonomy and if 
they are capable of exercising it, we want patients to make the ultimate decisions about their 
health care (Silver, 2002, page 458). 
 
Silver argues that purpose of competence assessment is to allow autonomous patients to make 
autonomous decisions. The General Medical Council (2001, introduction 1) support Silver’s 
position. However, as O’Neill (2002, page 26) points out the idea of patient competence was 
developed in conjunction with the concept of informed consent and is only loosely connected 
to the philosophical concept of autonomy. Moreover, as I showed in section 3.1.2 that all 
autonomous decisions are members of the set of all freely made decisions. In section 2.2 I 
argued that respecting an autonomous decision simply means accepting that decision. I 
concluded in section 3.1.2 that if all freely made decisions are simply accepted, then there is 
no need to assess a patient’s competence in order to respect her autonomy. I further concluded 
that in practice autonomous decisions could be respected more efficiently by simply respecting 
all freely made decisions. However, let it be accepted for the sake of argument that if the 
purpose of assessing a patient’s competence is to determine whether her informed consent 
decision should be respected, then this respects patient autonomy. Even if the above is 
accepted, it is by no means clear why the decisions of non-autonomous patients should not be 
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respected in all circumstances. It might be argued that some decisions by non-autonomous 
patients should accepted (see Law, 2003, page 54). In the light of the above, I believe that the 
purpose of assessing a patient’s competence should not be simply to determine whether she 
retains the right to accept or refuse a particular medical procedure.  The purpose of assessing a 
patient’s competence should be to respect her autonomy whilst also allowing her to receive 
beneficent care if she is non-autonomous. 
 
5.3 The domain in which the assessment of informed consent decisions is meaningful 
 
I concluded in section 5.1 that the purpose of a patient making an informed consent decision is 
to decide whether consenting or refusing to consent to some proposed treatment would satisfy 
her. I concluded in section 5.2 that the purpose of assessing a patient’s competence should be 
to respect her autonomy whilst also allowing her to receive beneficent care if she is non-
autonomous. In practice, informed consent tries to satisfy both of these purposes. These 
purposes are connected. However, I will argue that the conditions in which these different 
purposes may be meaningfully satisfied are not the same. The circumstances in which a 
patient may be meaningfully enabled to make an informed consent decision are broader than 
the circumstances in which her competence may be usefully assessed. In this section I will set 
out the circumstances in which it is useful to assess a patient’s competence. 
 
5.3.1. Useful competence assessments 
 
In general, if the assessment of someone’s competence to do a task is to be a useful concept, 
then it must be possible for a third party to assess her competence to do the task in question. 
The question now naturally arises of how a third party assesses someone’s competence to do 
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some task well. In what follows I will argue that informed consent remains meaningful even if 
it is impossible to say one outcome is preferable to another. However, I will argue that if any 
assessment of a patient’s competence to give informed consent is to be useful then it must be 
possible to say that one outcome is preferable to another. 
The General Medical Council’s (1999, page 5) guidelines hold that all that matters when 
assessing a patient’s competence to give informed consent is her internal capacity to 
understand the information provided. The Department of Health’s (2001, section 2.1) 
guidelines also hold that what matters when assessing a patient’s competence is whether she 
has the capacities needed to make the decision in question and the outcome of her decision 
should play no part in this assessment. This position is also supported in law by the C test [C, 
1992]. It follows that medical guidelines may regard the outcome of a patient’s decision as 
important in triggering an assessment of her competence. These guidelines, however, hold that 
the outcome of a patient’s decision should play no part in the actual assessment of her 
competence. Intuitively this seems to be a strange conclusion. Normally we assess someone’s 
competence to do some task by how well she completes the task or similar tasks. I will argue 
that even if any account of competence based purely on a patient’s internal abilities is a 
coherent account, it is not a useful one.  
The methods used to assess patient competence, as outlined in the guidelines given by 
the General Medical Council and the Department of Health, do not apply when assessing 
someone’s competence to drive. Someone’s competence to drive is not assessed by whether 
she has the capacities required to drive but by the outcome of a driving test. The driver’s 
capacity to drive is not assessed directly, her driving is. A driver is only presumed to have the 
capacities required to drive after successfully passing her driving test. Wilks (1999, page 157) 
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uses the example of a painter to intuitively argue that any assessment of her competence to 
paint can only be meaningful if it is possible to assess whether she has made a good job. He 
argues that in general we do not assess whether someone is competent to complete some task 
by inquiring whether she has the capacities necessary to do the task, but by how well she 
completes the task or a similar task. This is also true in medicine. A surgeon’s competence is 
assessed by the results of her operations rather than by whether she has the capacities needed 
for surgery. However, according to medical guidelines on informed consent, in any assessment 
of a patient’s competence to make an informed consent decision, all that matters is whether 
she has the capacities needed to make the decision in question. The actual outcome of her 
decision should play no part in the actual assessment of her competence. It might be argued 
that the standards applied in other forms of competence assessment should also be applied to 
the assessment of a patient’s competence to give informed consent. If this argument is to be 
rebutted, then it must be possible to give reasons why the assessment of a patient’s 
competence to give informed consent based purely on her capacities should differ from the 
assessment of competence to do other tasks such as driving, painting and surgery. However, it 
is possible to give a reason why the assessment of a patient’s competence should differ from 
the assessment of competence in other fields. The circumstances in which a patient’s 
competence is assessed differ from the circumstances in which someone’s competence to 
perform these other types of action are assessed. The actions of drivers, surgeons and even 
painters, take place in circumstances in which other people may be harmed. Because of this it 
is right that the standard of competence of drivers, surgeons and painters should be assessed 
by how well they perform their task. It might then be argued that because a patient’s informed 
consent decision, with some exceptions, does not harm others, it need not be assessed by how 
well she performs this task. 
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It might be argued that accepting the above does not mean a patient’s competence can be 
assessed differently to other forms of competence assessment. It means there is not the same 
reason to assess a patient’s competence. I have shown that the practice of informed consent 
requires that a patient’s competence should be assessed purely on the basis of whether she 
possesses certain capacities. If the above is accepted, it follows that the practice of informed 
consent uses no standards based on the outcome of a patient’s decision to assess her 
competence. However, Wilks (1999) argues that normative standards are usually an essential 
part of what it means to assess someone’s competence to do some task: 
 
The point is that whenever we call someone competent at any thing we do it with the thought 
in mind they do something well, and in doing so we will always have in mind some relevant 
standard of wellness. This sort of normativity is built into all assessment of competence, which 
is itself, in my view an irreducibly normative notion. A practice for which the issue of 
normative standards does not arise will have practitioners for whom the issue of competence 
does not arise (Wilks, 1999, page 157). 
 
It appears to follow that Wilks believes that if the practice of informed consent bases the 
assessment of a patient’s competence purely on whether she possesses certain capacities, then 
this assessment of her competence is meaningless. Whether this belief is correct depends on 
what Wilks means by “the issue of competence”. If Wilks means by this that the assessment of 
someone’s competence is a coherent concept, it would seem his belief is false. Assessing 
someone’s competence to do some task by simply questioning if she possesses certain 
capacities is a coherent concept. However if he means it is not useful to assess someone’s 
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competence to do some task without any agreement about what it means to do the task well, I 
will argue that Wilks is correct. 
I will base my argument on an example I have previously used that derives from 
Mathews (2000, page 61). Consider a terminally ill cancer patient whose life might be 
extended slightly by the use of chemotherapy. However this patient might prefer a shorter life 
with only palliative care. For this patient there is no general agreement as to which of these 
options is preferable. The patient may of course subjectively believe one option is better than 
the other. Let it be assumed that the assessment of a patient’s competence to give informed 
consent is based purely on whether she possesses the capacities needed to make the requisite 
decision. It follows that the idea of assessing this patient’s competence is coherent. Let it be 
further assumed that this patient does not have the capacities needed to be considered 
competent and is assessed as incompetent. It follows that a surrogate decision-maker should 
make a decision on the patient’s behalf. The surrogate decision maker will either be a parent 
or a court appointed guardian. In most cases the court appointed guardian would be the 
patient’s doctor.  The surrogate decision maker should usually make her decision in 
consultation with the patient and her relatives. She should act beneficently by choosing the 
option which is in the patient’s best interests, according to the General Medical Council’s 
guidelines (1999, section 25) and also take into account any previously expressed desires the 
patient has made (1999, section 22). In this particular case there is no generally agreed best 
option. It follows that a surrogate decision-maker cannot act truly beneficently by choosing an 
option which would be generally agreed to be the best option for the patient as required by the 
General Medical Council’s guidelines. In these circumstances a patient’s competence may be 
assessed. However, in these circumstances such an assessment is not linked to the ability of a 
surrogate decision-maker to make a truly beneficent decision. It can be concluded that in these 
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circumstances any assessment of the patient’s competence fails to serve the purpose of 
assessing patient competence as set out in section 5.2. It can be further concluded that if the 
assessment of patient competence is to be a useful concept it must take place in circumstances 
in which a surrogate decision-maker has the ability to act beneficently by making a decision 
which is generally agreed to be in the patient’s best interests. If this conclusion is not accepted, 
then the assessment of patient competence in these circumstances seems to be no more than a 
gesture. It can be still further concluded that in these circumstances the idea of assessing a 
patient’s competence to give informed consent is not a useful concept and should be 
abandoned. 
5.3.2. Useful competence assessments and informed consent 
 
In this section I will examine the conclusions reached above in greater detail by examining 
what is meant by “a generally agreed best option” and the circumstances in which the above 
conclusions are true. It seems that “a generally agreed best option” cannot mean a particular 
option is in the best objective interests of the patient. One reason for this is that autonomous 
agents determine, at least in part, what is in their best interests (Frankfurt, 1988, page 92, 
originally 1982). Because of this I argued in section 5.1 that it is impossible for a third party to 
know what is in a patient’s best objective interests. It follows that if “a generally agreed best 
option”, means an option which is in the patient’s best objective interests, then a surrogate 
decision-maker could never make a decision which is “generally agreed” to be in a patient’s 
best interests. It further follows that Veatch (1995, page 11) might be correct (see section 5.1) 
and the idea of informed consent should be abandoned. 
I will now argue that “a generally agreed best option” should be defined by some 
practice. This can be made clear by the use of an example. Consider the statement that Doctor 
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Jones is a competent surgeon. The truth of this statement cannot be simply validated by some 
objective fact connected to Doctor Jones. The truth of this statement can only be validated in 
some practice. The truth in the case of Doctor Jones depends on the criteria agreed to by 
medical practice. It might then be argued by analogy the truth of whether a surrogate decision-
maker can choose “a generally agreed best option”, depends not on some objective fact but on 
the criteria agreed by some practice. In the case of Doctor Jones the practice that agrees the 
criteria on which her competence is assessed is clear. However, in the case of a patient giving 
informed consent, it is not so simple to see which practice validates whether some decision is 
the “generally agreed best option” for the patient. Moreover as Dworkin (1988, page 113) 
points out, the informed consent decisions patients face are not technical or medical 
judgements. It follows that the practice which agrees the criteria that define “a patient’s 
generally agreed best option” ought not to be medical practice. I argued in section 5.1 that a 
patient making an informed consent decision is deciding whether consenting or refusing to 
consent to some proposed treatment would satisfy her. I further argued that in most cases this 
means a patient is deciding whether some medical intervention is in her best overall interests. 
It follows that her decision is a decision about how she will lead her life. People usually make 
their own decisions about how they should lead their individual lives. It can be concluded that 
in the context of informed consent, the practice which agrees the criteria by which it is 
possible to decide if a patient’s decision is in her “generally agreed best interests” should be 
people in general deciding how to lead their lives.  
It might be objected that the idea that people in general can decide if something is “a 
generally agreed best option” is nonsense because people in general never agree about 
anything. It would appear to follow, in the context of informed consent, that a surrogate 
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decision-maker could never choose “a generally agreed best option” on behalf of a patient. If 
the above is accepted and it is also accepted that, the assessment of a patient’s competence is 
only useful in circumstance in which a surrogate decision-maker can choose “a generally 
agreed best option” on behalf of an incompetent patient, then the assessment of a patient’s 
competence is never useful. However, it is not true that people in general can never choose “a 
generally agreed best option”. Consider the case of a patient in need of an emergency 
appendectomy. This operation carries very little risk. Without the appendectomy the patient 
will almost certainly die. In such a case people would generally agree that the patient’s best 
option would be to have the appendectomy. It follows that there are some circumstances in 
which people in general can choose a generally agreed best option. It further follows in these 
circumstances a surrogate decision-maker could choose “a generally agreed best option” on 
behalf of a patient. It still further follows that in these circumstances the assessment of a 
patient’s competence might be useful. Unfortunately it is also clear in certain other cases, such 
as that of the terminally ill cancer patient whose life might be extended slightly by the use of 
chemotherapy, that a surrogate decision-maker cannot choose an option which would be 
“generally agreed” to be in the patient’s best interests. It seems possible in certain 
circumstances for a surrogate decision-maker to know whether her choice would be “generally 
agreed” to be in the patient’s best interests. However a problem remains. How could it be 
possible for a surrogate decision-maker to know if her choice would be “generally agreed” to 
be in the patient’s best interests in less clear cut cases? Before I attempt to answer this 
question, it must be made clear the circumstances in which the practice of informed consent 
means surrogate decision-making would be useful. 
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Consent applies to all medical interventions involving touching a patient. For instance 
the need for a patient’s consent applies equally to doctors taking blood pressure or performing 
an appendectomy, as pointed out in my introduction. In many cases the patient’s consent is 
implicit. For instance a patient rolling up her sleeve to permit her blood pressure to be taken 
would be an implicit form of giving consent (see the Department of Health’s guidelines, 2001, 
section 12). In practice, if a patient consents she is usually presumed to be competent (General 
Medical Council, 1999, page 5). Hence when a patient consents the question of surrogate 
decision-making usually does not arise. Moreover I argued in section 4.4.3 that when a patient 
consents it is pointless to assess her competence and her decision to consent should always be 
accepted. It follows that surrogate decision-making is only useful in circumstances when 
consent is refused. However, accepting the above does not automatically mean surrogate 
decision-making would be useful in all cases when a patient refuses consent. For example, if a 
patient refused to have her blood pressure taken her competence would not be assessed. This 
applies in more serious cases. Consider a patient suffering from back problems who is advised 
to have an operation on a damaged disc. Let it be assumed that without this operation she will 
probably be confined to a wheelchair. In practice if this patient refuses to consent, a surrogate 
decision maker would have no role to play. The operation would simply not go ahead. Legal 
judgments consider that refusals of consent vary in importance depending on the risk to the 
patient’s life or irreparable harm being done to her health [T, 1992]. This distinction is 
mirrored in medical practice and a patient’s competence is usually only assessed when her 
refusal of consent means there is a threat to her life or a danger of irreparable damage being 
done to health. It follows that a surrogate decision maker would only be useful in 
circumstances when the patient refuses to consent and there is threat to her life or of 
irreparable damage being done to her health. In addition surrogate decision-making would 
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only be useful in the above circumstances provided treatment is capable of removing the threat 
to the patient’s life or irreparable harm being done to her health. In most medical interventions 
treatment is expected to be able to return a patient back to her normal life undamaged. An 
appendectomy would be an example of this. However in some cases treatment may alter a 
patient’s condition permanently meaning she will be unable to return to her former life. An 
example of this would be a patient offered radiotherapy for a brain tumour. This treatment 
might affect her speech meaning the patient could not resume her former life. Bearing in mind 
these two possible outcomes I can now define the context in which a surrogate decision-maker 
can make a decision on behalf of a patient that would generally be accepted to be in the 
patient’s best interests. 
First, consider the circumstances in which a patient’s condition threatens her life or will 
irreparably damage her health and in which treatment is expected to enable the patient to 
return to her former life. Let it be accepted here without further argument that it is generally 
agreed to be in someone’s best interests if she can follow her own interests, provided these 
interests do not harm others. Let it be assumed that a patient, in the above circumstances, is 
offered treatment and refuses to give her consent. I have argued that if a surrogate decision-
maker cannot make a decision which is generally agreed to be the best option for a patient, 
then the assessment of her competence becomes pointless. However, in the circumstances 
outlined above a surrogate decision-maker could choose a generally agreed best option. 
Treatment in these circumstances would enable the patient to follows her interests and a lack 
of treatment would mean she would be unable to so. It can be concluded that if treatment is 
expected to enable a patient to return to her former life, then it would be generally agreed 
treatment is the best option for the patient and that the assessment of her competence would be 
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meaningful. It is important to note that accepting the above does not mean that the patient’s 
decision is necessarily incompetent.  
Secondly, consider the circumstances in which a patient’s condition threatens her life or 
will irreparably damage her health. Let it be assumed that treatment is expected to save the 
patient’s life or prevent irreparable damage being done to her health. Let it be further assumed 
that in these circumstances treatment is not expected to enable the patient to return to her 
former life. In section 5.1 I showed Veatch (1995, page 7) believes a doctor must be able to 
balance a patient’s medical, moral and other interests when proposing treatment for the 
patient’s consent. He argues this is impossible. I have argued above that if, after treatment a 
patient is expected to be able to return to her former life, it would be generally agreed that 
treatment is in her best interests. It follows that in the above context it is possible to choose a 
generally agreed best option on behalf of a patient without the need to balance the patient’s 
medical, moral and other interests. However, in other contexts it would seem that Veatch is 
right to believe it would be necessary to balance these interests in order to choose a generally 
agreed best option. Moreover, it would seem to be impossible for someone to balance a 
patient’s medical, moral and other interests in these other contexts. It might be objected that 
Veatch is wrong to believe a patient’s best interests are defined by balancing these three 
elements. Even if this objection is accepted, it still seems the things a patient cares about must 
partly define her best interests. However, it might be argued that a surrogate decision maker 
could be made aware of what the patient cares about. Perhaps the patient simply informs the 
surrogate decision-maker. Even if this argument is accepted, it seems to remain impossible for 
a surrogate decision-maker to make a judgement that is in the patient’s best interests if this 
decision conflicts with the patient’s decision. This follows because the surrogate decision 
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maker has no means to balance what the patient cares about with the patient’s other interests 
without accepting the patient’s input on balance. If she accepts the patient’s input on balance 
then she must accept that the patient’s decision is in the patient’s best interests. It can be 
concluded that if treatment is expected to alter a patient’s condition, making it impossible for 
her to return to her former life, then there is no generally agreed best option for a surrogate 
decision maker to choose on behalf of the patient and the assessment of her competence is 
pointless.  
In practice, treatment may be expected to damage some of a patient’s interests whilst 
leaving others unaltered. This means that a patient in these circumstances may be able to make 
a partial return to her former life. The following question now arises. If treatment is expected 
to allow a patient to partially return to her former life, is it possible for a surrogate decision 
maker to make a decision which would be generally agreed to be in the patient’s best 
interests? In section 4.5 I considered the case of Bob, an eighteen-year-old athlete who is 
involved in a road accident. Bob is asked to consent to the amputation of his leg below the 
knee. It is clear that amputation will mean Bob can only partially return to his former life and 
interests. However, it seems inconceivable that Bob has no interests outside athletics. 
Intuitively a surrogate decision-maker could decide that amputation would be Bob’s best 
option and it would generally be agreed that this decision was in Bob’s best interests. It seems 
it would generally be agreed to be better for someone to partially return to their former life 
allowing them to follow some of their interests rather than none. It can be concluded that if 
treatment is expected to allow a patient to partially return to their former life, then a surrogate 
decision-maker could make a decision which would be generally agreed to be in their best 
interests. 
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It is now possible to set out the circumstances in which surrogate decision-making would 
be useful. 
1) Surrogate decision-making would only be useful in the circumstances in which the 
patient refuses to consent and her life is threatened or irreparable damage may be 
done to her health. 
2) Surrogate decision-making is only useful in the circumstances in which treatment 
will leave the patient able to return to a substantial part of her former life. 
However, medicine is a practical discipline and in many cases some decision must be made 
even when there is no generally agreed best option for the patient. It follows that even if the 
above conclusions are interesting, they appear to be of little practical consequence. I now will 
argue that this is not so. 
Let it be accepted that in certain cases a surrogate decision-maker is unable to make a 
decision which would be generally agreed to be in a patient’s best interests, as outlined above. 
Accepting the above does not mean, of course, that a surrogate decision maker, or even an 
entire medical team treating a patient, do not believe she or they cannot make a decision which 
she or they believe is in the patient’s best interests. This can be illustrated by the case of Ms B 
[2002]. Recall Ms B wished to have her ventilator switched off. Ms B’s medical team had 
become emotionally involved with her (Hale, 2003, page 143). They believed it was in Ms B 
best interests to continue on the ventilator. However, any decision made by a surrogate 
decision maker in this context would not be generally agreed to be in the patient’s best 
interests, as outlined above. Consider a hypothetical Mr B whose condition is identical to that 
of Ms B with one exception. The courts found Ms B to be competent and let it be assumed that 
Mr B is incompetent. Mr B wishes to be removed from the ventilator and a decision must be 
made whether to comply with his wishes. Let it be assumed, in the case of Mr B, his medical 
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team also believe it would be best for him to continue on the ventilator. Once again their 
decision would not be generally agreed, as outlined above, to be in Mr B’s best interests. A 
decision must be made. It might be assumed, in the above case, that a decision made by his 
medical team should not be given preference over any decision made by the incompetent Mr 
B. I will now argue that such an assumption would be false. Buller (2001, page 109) argues 
even if someone is incompetent to make a decision about her future welfare, it does not follow 
that her preferences count for nothing. The General Medical Council (1999, section 25) and 
Buchanan and Brock (1989, page 52) support Buller’s position. Let it be accepted that  a 
surrogate decision maker when making a decision on behalf of an incompetent patient should 
take into account the patient’s preferences and values. However, even if this is accepted, it 
does not of necessity mean that a surrogate decision maker must accept these preferences 
when making her decision.  A surrogate decision maker, when making a decision on behalf of 
Mr B, might seriously consider Mr B’s desire to have his ventilator switched off but still 
decide Mr B should continue on the ventilator. She might genuinely believe her decision is in 
Mr B’s best overall interests. It might be concluded that it might be right for a surrogate 
decision maker to make a decision contrary to a patient’s preferences after carefully 
considering these preferences in circumstances when there is no generally agreed best option 
for the patient. 
I will now argue that the above conclusion is false. I will argue that when there is no 
generally agreed best option for a patient, it would be wrong for a surrogate decision maker to 
make a decision contrary to the patient’s preferences. Let it be accepted without further 
argument that it is generally agreed that respecting someone benefits her. In section 2.2 I 
showed that according to Kant’s practical imperative respecting someone means to treat her as 
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an end in herself and not simply as a means. I further showed in section 2.2 that Buss (1999, 
page 536) believes that treating a person, any person not just an autonomous person, as an end 
in herself means taking that person’s perceived ends into account. Accepting the above means 
that a surrogate decision maker must take into account any preferences the patient has 
expressed when making a decision on her behalf. It also means that respecting a patient’s 
preferences has generally agreed value, irrespective of whether the patient is competent or not. 
However, as I have pointed out above, this does not automatically mean that a surrogate 
decision maker must always satisfy a patient’s preferences if this is possible. Sometimes a 
patient’s preferences might harm her and a surrogate decision maker, acting beneficently, 
might believe avoiding this harm outweighs the benefit of satisfying these preferences. Let it 
be assumed that there is no general agreement as to whether treatment or no treatment is in an 
incompetent patient’s best interests. Let it also be assumed, in the above circumstances, that a 
surrogate decision maker making a decision on behalf of an incompetent patient, chooses an 
option other than the patient’s preferred option. It follows in these circumstances that the 
surrogate decision maker has chosen an option, on the patient’s behalf, when there is no 
general agreement that this option is in the patient’s best interests. It has been accepted that it 
would be generally agreed that respecting someone benefits that person. It further follows, in 
the above circumstances, that if a surrogate decision maker chooses an option other than the 
patient’s preferred option, then she denies the patient a generally agreed benefit for no 
generally agreed reason. It follows that if someone does not accept a person’s decision, when 
there is no generally agreed reason why she should not do so, then she does not seriously take 
that person’s ends into account. I have argued above that to respect someone means seriously 
taking her ends into account. It therefore further follows that in the above circumstances, the 
surrogate decision maker does not respect the patient. It can be concluded that in the context 
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of when there is no generally agreed best option for an incompetent patient, surrogate decision 
making is pointless and a patient’s decision should always be respected. This conclusion 
would mean that the number of patients whose informed consent decisions might be overruled 
would be low, see page 221. See also my discussion on 225 and 234. It should be noted that 
the above conclusion differs from the Department of Health’s (2001, Paragraph 2.1) 
guidelines. These guidelines state, that if there is any doubt about a patient’s competence to 
make a particular decision, then the health professionals involved should assess her capacity to 
make the decision in question. If this conclusion is accepted, then in the case of the 
incompetent Mr B, his preference to be removed from the ventilator should be respected, even 
if other competent persons believe his decision is wrong. Moreover the above conclusion 
seems to suggest that in certain circumstances it might be right to respect an anorexic patient’s 
refusal to eat and let her die. I will deal with the competence of anorexic patients on page 257 
and pages 263 and 264 and examine the circumstances in which I believe the above suggestion 
might be true. 
There are two exceptions to the above conclusion. Firstly, when the patient has 
conflicting preferences, and secondly when the patient’s decision might harm others. Consider 
the case of someone, like MB [1997], who alternately consents to some proposed treatment 
and then refuses to give consent. In such a case, the patient is ambivalent about her choices 
and unable to make a clear decision. It follows that a surrogate decision maker cannot make a 
decision based on the patient’s persistent preferences. It would seem that in such a case the 
patient’s medical team, after giving serious consideration to all her preferences, should make a 
decision on her behalf. In such a case an application to High Court should be made through the 
Official Solicitor,(see Department of Health, 2001, page 14). Secondly, consider an 
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incompetent patient with an infectious disease who refuses to consent to treatment. Her 
condition threatens the life of others. A surrogate decision maker in this context should not be 
bound by this patient’s preferences. She must balance any harm done to the patient against any 
harm done to society.  
I have concluded above that when there is no generally agreed best option for an 
incompetent patient, then surrogate decision making becomes pointless and a patient’s 
decision should always be respected. I will now examine the consequences of accepting this 
conclusion for the practice of informed consent. Buchanan and Brock (1989, page 28) hold 
that the purpose of assessing a patient’s competence is to decide whether her informed consent 
decision must be respected. It follows that if a patient is competent, presumed or otherwise, to 
give informed consent, then she retains the right to accept or refuse a particular medical 
procedure. It also follows that if a patient is incompetent then her consent decision does not of 
necessity have to be accepted. However, I have shown that it is not true that the decisions of 
only competent patients should always be accepted. I argued that in circumstances in which a 
surrogate decision-maker cannot make a decision which would generally be accepted to be in 
the patient’s best interests, a patient’s persistent decision should always be accepted. In section 
5.2 I argued that the purpose of assessing a patient’s competence is to respect her autonomy 
whilst at the same time allowing her to receive beneficent care if she is non-autonomous. In 
the above circumstances there would be no general agreement as to which option should be 
chosen by a surrogate decision-maker acting beneficently on behalf of an incompetent patient. 
Autonomy can be respected by simply accepting the persistent consent decisions of all patients 
(see section 3.1.2). Moreover, I argued above that respecting a person benefits that person. I 
further argued, in the above circumstances, it is impossible to respect a person without 
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accepting her consent decision. It follows that, in these circumstances, acting beneficently 
towards any patient means accepting her persistent consent decision. It can be concluded that, 
in circumstances in which a surrogate decision maker cannot make a decision which would 
generally be accepted to be in the patient’s best interests, the assessment of a patient’s 
competence should play no part in the practice of informed consent. Accepting the above 
conclusion does not mean that the practice of informed consent becomes meaningless in these 
circumstances. Let it be accepted that there is no point in assessing the patient’s competence to 
give informed consent in Mathew’s (2000, page 61, 62.) example of someone deciding 
whether to extend her life slightly by chemotherapy or to accept palliative care. However, this 
patient has an important decision to make about balancing the quality and length of her life. In 
order to make a decision that satisfies her, she needs to be informed about how long her life 
might be extended by chemotherapy, together with details of the unpleasant side affects of this 
treatment. She must also give her consent for any treatment to be lawful. It can be further 
concluded that, in the above circumstances, the practice of informed consent is useful even if 
the assessment of the patient’s competence is not useful. 
This thesis is concerned with applied philosophy. I will now show that these issues are of 
practical importance by considering again the case of Ms B. The Hospital trust in question 
held the view Ms B did not have the capacity to decide whether her ventilator should be 
switched off. The Trust held this view because Ms B’s medical team believed her to be 
incompetent. Subsequently Butler Schloss [2002] ruled that Ms B did have the capacity 
considered necessary to make this decision because she was competent. Both the Hospital 
Trust and the Courts seemed to concur with Buchanan and Brock (1989, page 28) by believing 
that whether or not Ms B’s preference to have the ventilator switched off should be respected 
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depended solely on deciding whether Ms B was competent. Let it be accepted that if a patient 
is competent to give informed consent she retains the right to accept or refuse treatment.  
However, according to the argument I have developed in this chapter, whether Ms B should 
have retained the right to decide whether to have her ventilator switched off, should not have 
only depended on assessing her competence. If my argument is accepted, then what should 
have been questioned first was whether the assessment of Ms B’s competence was useful in 
such circumstances.  
It might be concluded from the above that, when a patient refuses to give consent to some 
treatment proposed by her medical team and her competence might be questioned, this team 
should first ask themselves the following questions to establish whether any competence 
assessment would be useful. 
1) Does the patient’s condition threaten her life or might it cause irreparable damage to 
her health?  
2) Is it possible for a surrogate decision-maker to make a decision on behalf of the 
patient that would be generally accepted? This question might be answered by 
considering whether the proposed treatment would for the most part allow the patient 
to continue with her former life. If these questions cannot be answered affirmatively 
it is pointless to assess the patient’s competence and her decision should simply be 
accepted. 
I believe these questions are perfectly compatible with the purpose of assessing patient 
competence if this purpose is to respect autonomy and ensure non-autonomous patients 
receive beneficent care. I further believe that if these questions became part of the practice of 
informed consent, a great deal of time and money could be saved. 
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Law (2003, page 54) doubts that the fact that a patient is simply non-autonomous can 
be used to justify treating her against her will. I have shown that Law is correct and that a non-
autonomous patient should not be treated against her will in circumstances when there no 
generally agreed best option for a surrogate decision maker to choose. In these circumstances 
acting beneficently means accepting a patient’s decisions and doing so automatically respects 
her autonomy. Accepting this conclusion would permit a larger number of patient’s decisions 
to be accepted in the above circumstances. However, in other circumstances, respecting 
autonomy might clash with acting beneficently. This clash might occur because, as Silver 
(2002, page 461) points out, autonomy is concerned with an agent identifying with her 
decision rather than whether her decision is a good decision. In section 2.2 I argued that 
respecting autonomy is central to an agent’s life and this involves accepting her autonomous 
decisions. I further argued, in section 4.5, that the purpose of assessing a patient’s competence 
is to respect her autonomy whilst at the same time ensuring that non-autonomous patients 
receive beneficent care. It follows that non-autonomous patients might be treated against their 
will for beneficent reasons. It would seem to be preferable that the number of patients, treated 
against their will should be as low as possible in all circumstances. This raises problems in 
circumstances where only autonomous consent decisions are automatically accepted according 
to Beauchamp and Childress (1989): 
 
To chain informed consent to fully or completely to autonomous decision making stacks the 
deck of the argument and strips informed consent of any meaningful place in the practical 
world. (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989, page 69) 
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Let it be accepted that in circumstances other than when a surrogate decision maker is able to 
choose a generally agreed best option, Beauchamp and Childress’s assertion may be correct. It 
follows that if informed consent is chained completely to autonomous decision making, very 
few patients would be judged as competent in these circumstances. However, there are 
different concepts of autonomy. Whether Beauchamp and Childress’s assertion is correct 
depends on which concept of autonomy underlies the practice of informed consent. It might be 
argued that Beauchamp and Childress’s assertion depends on equating fully autonomous 
decision-making with good decision-making. I agree with Silver (2001) when he argues that 
autonomy is concerned with an agent identifying with her decision rather than making a good 
decision. If Silver’s position were accepted, then this would nullify Beauchamp and 
Childress’s concerns.  It might then be possible to choose a concept of autonomy to underlie 
the practice of informed consent which would permit as large a number of persons as possible 
to be considered as autonomous. This in turn would mean that the number of patients whose 
informed consent decisions might be overruled by the practice of informed consent would be 
low. 
I argued in section 2.2 that autonomy has both instrumental and intrinsic value. Let it be 
accepted that the instrumental value of autonomy, like the value of rationality, is concerned 
with good decision-making. However I also argued in section 2.2 that respect for autonomy 
must mean respecting the intrinsic value of autonomy. I further argued that the intrinsic value 
of autonomy lies in the recognition of the agent as the kind of creature who is able and ought 
to decide her own future. It follows that the intrinsic value of autonomy is not directly 
concerned with good decision-making. It further follows respect for autonomy must be 
concerned with what an agent desires or cares about. Accepting the above suggests that a 
concept of autonomy, such as that of Christman or Frankfurt, should underlie the practice of 
   222 
 
 
informed consent. Both of these concepts would permit a large number of informed consent 
decisions to be regarded as autonomous and hence accepted. Silver argues that an agent must 
regard an autonomous decision as her own. However I argued in section 3.4.3 that this might 
not necessarily be true using Christman’s concept. Moreover, I argued in section 3.4.3 that 
problems connected to the way an agent identifies with her desires, means that Christman’s 
concept does not concur with the intuitive notions of autonomy that I outlined in section 2.1. 
Because of these problems, Christman’s concept of autonomy should not form the basis for 
the practice of informed consent. I believe it follows that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy 
should form the basis for informed consent. Adopting this concept I believe would minimise 
the number of patients whose informed consent decisions might be overruled. 
Wicclair (1991) argues competent patients must be able to give reasons that would be 
accepted by others for their consent decisions: 
 
The competent patient must be able to give reasons for the decision, which shows that he has 
thought through the medical issues and related this information to his personal values. The 
patient’s reason need not be scientific or publicly accepted, but neither can they be purely 
private or idiosyncratic (Wicclair, 1991, page 92). 
 
It follows that any patient who is unable to give such a reason should be regarded as 
incompetent. The guidelines on informed consent hold the following. Firstly, the fact that  a 
patient’s choice appears irrational is not evidence in itself that the patient is incompetent 
(General Medical Council, 1999, section 19). Secondly, a patient may refuse to give consent 
for reasons that are rational, or irrational, or for no reason [Sidaway v Board of  Governors of 
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the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital, 1985]. It follows that Wicclair’s 
assertion conflicts with informed consent guidelines. I will now argue that in circumstances 
when there is a generally agreed best option for a patient to choose, if a patient does not 
choose this option and is unable to give a reason for her choice, then it would be accepted by 
others that she should be presumed to be incompetent. 
Let it also be assumed that, in the above circumstances, a patient refuses to give her 
consent. Practical rationality is defined as the kind of thinking which best helps people to 
achieve their goals (Baron, 1988, page 29). Let it be accepted that practical rationality is the 
type of rationality that people use to run their lives. I will deal with patient rationality in detail 
in section 6.4. It follows that people normally govern their lives by following their goals as far 
as they are able. It further follows that, in these circumstances, treatment would enable the 
patient to follow her previous goals and a lack of treatment would mean she would be unable 
to do so. Prima facie it might be concluded that this patient’s apparent lack of practical 
rationality is evidence that she is unable to govern herself and hence is non-autonomous. It is 
important to note that this prima facie conclusion is open to rebuttal. The patient in these 
circumstances must be able to give reasons for her refusal that others would agree with. 
However, these reasons need not be generally agreed by others including the patient’s health 
team. For instance, a patient might give as the reason for her refusal of consent the fact that 
she is a Jehovah’s Witness and the treatment offered involves a blood transfusion. I suggest 
that in these circumstances if a patient is unable to give any or any coherent, reason for her 
decision to refuse consent, then the above prima facie conclusion should be accepted. It might 
be argued that accepting this prima facie conclusion fails to respect the patient’s autonomy. 
However simply saying no, or making no coherent response, does not seem to be part of a 
patient exercising her autonomy. Autonomy involves reflective activity according to Dworkin 
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(1988, page 17) and Frankfurt (1999, page 87, originally 1992). It can be concluded that, in 
circumstances when there is a generally agreed best option for a patient to choose, if a patient 
does not choose this option and is unable to give reasons that would be accepted by others, 
these reasons need not be generally accepted by others including the patient’s health team and 
she should then be presumed to be incompetent. This conclusion highlights the need for good 
two way communication between the patient and her health team. I will deal with 
communication in detail in section 6.3. 
In this section I concluded that if it is impossible for a surrogate decision-maker to make 
a decision on behalf of a patient that would be generally accepted, then the patient’s decision 
should simply be accepted. In these circumstances I believe it is pointless to question whether 
the patient is autonomous. As a result of this conclusion I further concluded that if it is 
possible for a surrogate decision-maker to make a decision on behalf of a patient that would be 
generally accepted, the following should hold: If a patient refuses her consent and is unable to 
give a reason for her refusal that would be accepted by others, she should be presumed to be 
incompetent. This presumption should be open to rebuttal.  
 
 
5.4. Informed consent decisions requiring the patient’s ongoing co-operation 
 
I argued in section 5.3 that in circumstances in which it is impossible for a surrogate decision-
maker to choose a generally agreed best option on behalf of a patient, the assessment of her 
competence to give informed consent is not a useful concept and ought to be abandoned. In 
this section I will extend the circumstances in which the assessment of a patient’s competence 
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is not a useful concept. I will argue that, in circumstances when treatment is an ongoing 
process requiring the patient’s ongoing co-operation, the assessment of her competence is also 
not a useful concept. 
Lidz, Appelbaum and Meisel (1991) see all informed consent decisions as an ongoing 
process: 
 
This involves using the routine, ongoing discussion of patient’s problems as an opportunity to 
discuss both sides’ expectations and understanding of the illness, values and expectations for 
the treatment; and of course their views of the advantages and disadvantages of the various 
treatment options (Lidz, Appelbaum and Meisel, 1991, page 109). 
 
The idea that informed consent decisions should be seen as a process is supported by Wear 
(1998). Let it be accepted that when a patient gives consent to any major medical procedure, 
she needs to understand the advantages and disadvantages of this procedure. Let it also be 
accepted that a patient’s doctors seeking her consent should also try to understand her beliefs 
and culture when proposing treatment (see the General Medical Council, 1999, section 6). For 
instance, it would be pointless to propose the termination of a pregnancy to a woman whose 
beliefs preclude abortion. Understanding a patient’s beliefs requires dialogue according to the 
General Medical Council (1999, section 3) and dialogue is a process. However, even if it is 
accepted that the giving of informed consent is a process, it does not of necessity mean that it 
is an ongoing process. For example the giving of informed consent for a heart valve 
replacement is a finite process. In this example the patient’s ongoing co-operation is required 
in the consent process however when treatment begins this process ends. The process ends in 
   226 
 
 
the patient making a consent decision and whether treatment does or does not takes place 
depends on the outcome of her decision. However, some treatments, such as chemotherapy, 
are ongoing and require both the patient’s ongoing consent and co-operation. This section is 
only concerned with the circumstances in which treatment is an ongoing process requiring the 
patient’s ongoing co-operation. I will argue that in these circumstances, the idea of assessing a 
patient’s competence to give informed consent is not a useful concept and should be 
abandoned. 
Consider a patient suffering from lupus and who is advised to have chemotherapy. 
Lupus is a disease of the immune system. It is expected that if chemotherapy is carried out, the 
patient will have an excellent chance of continuing to lead a meaningful life. This prognosis is 
in contrast to the example of the terminally ill cancer patient used in section 5.3 who would 
only have her life extended slightly by the use of chemotherapy. In the case of the cancer 
patient, I argued that a surrogate decision maker could not make a choice which would be 
generally accepted to be in the patient’s best interests. In the case of the patient suffering from 
lupus, she is expected to be able to continue to lead a meaningful life. It follows that in this 
case, a surrogate decision-maker could make a decision on behalf of the patient which would 
be generally accepted to be in her best interests. Let it be assumed that the patient suffering 
from lupus refuses to give consent to chemotherapy and her competence is assessed.  Let it be 
further assumed this assessment finds the patient to be incompetent and a surrogate decision-
maker decides that the patient should receive chemotherapy. However, such a competence 
assessment would seem to be a mere gesture. This follows because if the patient refuses to co-
operate, it would be impossible to implement this treatment. It can be concluded that in 
practice the lupus patient’s consent decision alone determines whether any proposed 
chemotherapy is given irrespective of her competence. It can be further concluded that even if 
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the assessment of the lupus patient’s competence is a coherent concept, it is not a useful 
concept. These conclusions can be generalised to all treatments which are an ongoing process 
requiring the patient’s ongoing co-operation. It follows that if a patient’s doctors propose a 
course of treatment for her which requires her ongoing co-operation, then the outcome of the 
patient’s consent decision should alone determines whether the proposed treatment can be 
given.  It further follows that, in these circumstances, even if the assessment of a patient’s 
competence to give informed consent is a coherent concept, it is not a useful concept and 
should be abandoned. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Competence, informed consent and personal autonomy 
 
It is usually assumed that a patient’s competence determines whether he has the right to accept 
or refuse some proposed medical treatment (see Buchanan and Brock, 1989, page 28); 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 1989, page 80).  I argued in chapter 5 that this assumption is not 
true in circumstances when a surrogate decision maker could not choose a generally agreed 
best option for the patient or when the patient’s treatment requires his ongoing co-operation. 
However, I accept that in all other circumstances this assumption is true. Informed consent 
guidelines hold that a competent patient must possess certain capacities, (see for instance the 
Department of Health, 2001, section 2.1). In chapter 4 I argued that these capacities, provided 
the purpose of informed consent is to respect patient autonomy whilst ensuring non-
autonomous patients can receive beneficent care, should be identical to the capacities a patient 
needs to make an autonomous decision. These capacities should not be determined directly by 
the risk involved in any procedure the patient is consenting to. In chapter 4 I did not specify 
what capacities a patient needs to make an autonomous consent decision. In this chapter I will 
rectify this omission by comparing the capacities a patient needs to be regarded as competent 
according to current informed consent guidelines and the capacities he requires to make an 
autonomous decision. This comparison will be made together with an examination of the 
beliefs and values of an autonomous patient in four sub-sections. Each sub-section will make 
recommendations for the practice of informed consent. 
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6.1. A competent patient’s capacity to understand the information supplied to him 
 
In practice if a patient is to be considered competent then he must understand the information 
provided to him concerning his condition. A patient clearly does not have to understand all the 
information on which his proposed treatment is based. If this was not so he would be being 
judged on his ability to make a medical decision and this is both impractical and unnecessary 
(see Dworkin,1988, page 113). The amount of information considered necessary for a 
patient’s consent to be considered as valid, from a legal perspective, is based on Bristow’s 
judgment in Chatterton v Gerson: 
 
In my judgement once the patient is informed in broad terms of the nature of the procedure 
which is intended and gives her consent, that consent is real. [1981] 
 
The Department of Health’s (2001, section 4) guidelines also require a competent patient 
understands the information provided in broad terms. Defining the information a competent 
patient must understand in broad terms is imprecise. This section will examine how much 
information a competent patient must understand in broad terms by examining how much 
information he needs to make an autonomous decision.. The Department of Health’s 
guidelines also state that it is not enough for a patient to merely have the ability to understand 
the information provided in order to be considered competent. He must actually understand the 
information provided. In this section I will also question whether a competent patient only 
needs the capacity to understand this information provided or whether he must actually 
understand it.  
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6.1.1 Must a competent patient actually understand the information provided? 
 
 
Patients for the most part have only a limited knowledge of medical matters and need 
information to enable them to make competent consent decisions. Part of the purpose of 
informed consent is to supply this information. It might also be argued that part of the purpose 
of informed consent is to ensure patients understand the risks involved in any treatment they 
are consenting to in order to minimise complaints. The following question might then be 
asked. Must a competent patient actually understand this information or need he only have the 
capacity and opportunity to understand it? Clarke (2001) points out that, in most 
circumstances outside the practice of informed consent, someone is usually considered to be 
competent to make a decision provided he has the capacity and opportunity to understand 
information relevant to this decision: 
 
In the circumstances examined above, it is having the opportunity to base a decision to consent 
on sufficient relevant information that is important to the legitimate granting of consent, not 
the actual use of sufficient relevant information in a decision to consent (Clarke, 2001, page 
176). 
 
For example if someone agrees to a contract to buy a house he must be given the opportunity 
to fully understand any planning restrictions applicable to the property. In practice a buyer 
need not actually understand this information. For instance, he may pay no attention to this 
information or trust his solicitor to do so. However, he must be supplied with the relevant 
information if any agreement is to be regarded as valid. Moreover he must also have the 
capacity to understand this information. For instance, if the vendor of some house sold the 
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property to someone incapable of understanding any relevant planning restrictions, then the 
purchaser’s agreement might not be regarded as valid. The above seems to be true of most 
agreements. It follows that Clark is correct when he points out that, in most circumstances, the 
validity of an agreement depends on two factors. Firstly, someone agreeing to a contract must 
be given the opportunity to understand the information relevant to this contract. Secondly, he 
must have the capacity to understand this information. It is not important whether the 
contracting party actually understands the information provided.  
However this is not the position as far as informed consent is concerned according to 
Clarke (2001): 
 
In medicine, however a patient is expected to submit to compulsory listening before her 
decision to consent is deemed to be legitimate (Clarke, 2001, page 176). 
 
In addition to this compulsory listening the practice of informed consent requires that a 
competent patient must actually understand the information provided. The fact that a patient 
possesses the capacity needed to understand this information is insufficient to guarantee his 
competence (see the Department of Health, 2001, section, 2) and the case of C [1994]). It 
follows that the practice of informed consent differs from other types of consensual agreement 
by requiring that a competent patient actually understand the information relevant to his 
consent decision. 
I will now question whether the requirement that, a competent patient must actually 
understand the information relevant to his consent decision is compatible with respecting his 
autonomy. Dworkin (1988, page 31) argues that someone’s autonomy shapes his life and gives 
his life meaning. Let it be accepted that if someone’s decision is a conscious decision to shape 
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his life, then this decision must be based on information relevant to that decision. Random 
choices wantonly made cannot be part of shaping someone’s life. It would appear that in the 
context of informed consent unless a patient understands the information provided to him by 
his doctors he is inadequately informed for his consent decision to play a part in shaping his 
life. It further follows that if a patient’s decision plays an inadequate part in him shaping his 
own life this decision is non-autonomous. In section 5.3 I argued Frankfurt’s concept of 
autonomy should form the underlying basis for the practice of informed consent, in order to 
permit as large a number of patient’s consent decisions to be accepted as autonomous as 
possible. It might then be questioned whether the requirement that a competent patient must 
understand the information pertinent to his condition is compatible with respecting Frankfurt’s 
concept of autonomy. Frankfurt (1988, page 91, originally 1982) believes someone expresses 
his autonomy by caring about certain things more than others. Frankfurt also holds that if 
someone cares about something he must identify himself with what he cares about. One of the 
aims of informed consent is to provide information to patients to enable them to make their 
own decisions. Let it be assumed that when a patient consents or refuses to give consent to 
some proposed treatment he refuses to consider any information relevant to this decision. In 
section 5.1 I argued that a patient’s purpose when making an informed consent decision is to 
make a decision that satisfies him. I further argued that this usually involves a patient making 
a decision about what is in his best interests. However, if someone makes a decision, about 
which choice will satisfy him with an inadequate basis for his choice, then it is difficult to see 
how he can identify with his choice. His decision again appears to be randomly made and that 
of a wanton (see Frankfurt, 1999, page 106, originally 1992). It follows that Frankfurt would 
regard such a decision as non-autonomous. It further follows that the requirement that a 
   233 
 
 
competent patient must actually understand the information relevant to his condition when 
making his consent decision is compatible with respecting autonomy. 
Let it be accepted that a patient’s decision cannot be autonomous unless the patient is 
satisfied with his decision. Satisfaction in the context of autonomy means the agent has no 
restlessness to change his decision or resistance to his decision (see Frankfurt, 1999, page 103, 
originally 1992) and section 3.5.2. I argued above that a patient cannot make an autonomous 
consent decision without actually understanding the information relevant to his condition. This 
argument depends on the implicit premise that a patient cannot be satisfied with his decision 
without understanding this information. I will now argue that in some contexts, this premise is 
false. Dworkin (1988) makes the following assertion: 
 
If a patient has knowingly and freely requested of the doctor that he is not to be informed or 
consulted about his course of treatment then to seek to obtain informed consent would itself be 
a violation of autonomy (Dworkin, 1988, page 118). 
 
If Dworkin’s assertion is accepted then it would appear to follow that the requirement that, a 
competent patient must actually understand the information relevant to his decision is 
incompatible with respecting his autonomy. I will now argue that Dworkin’s assertion is 
correct but only in certain circumstances. Firstly, I believe that Dworkin only meant his 
assertion to apply in circumstances when a patient decides to accept his doctor’s 
recommendation. In these circumstances it would seem perfectly possible for a patient to 
freely make a decision to consent and have no restlessness to change this decision. It follows 
that such a decision would be an autonomous decision. However, if a patient refused to 
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consent to his doctor’s recommendations it would seem to be impossible for a patient to be 
satisfied with rejecting his doctor’s advice without understanding the basis of this advice. It 
follows that there must be some modification to the conclusion that, a competent patient must 
actually understand the information relevant to his condition when making his consent 
decision is compatible with respecting autonomy. This modification is as follows. 
 
1) The requirement that a competent patient must actually understand the 
information relevant to his condition is compatible with respecting his 
autonomy when he refuses to give consent.  
2) The requirement that a competent patient must actually understand the 
information relevant to his condition is incompatible with respecting his 
autonomy when he consents. 
 
The second conclusion reached above does not mean that a patient may be treated against his 
will. However it does mean a badly informed patient’s consent should be accepted. On page 
230 I argued that part of the purpose of informed consent might be to ensure patients 
understand the risks involved in the treatment they are consenting to in order to minimise 
complaints. It would appear to follow my second conclusion is at odds with the purpose of 
informed consent. However I agree with Dworkin in believing that when a patient consents 
even if he is not fully informed his decision may nonetheless be autonomous. For instance a 
patient might make an autonomous decision on the basis of trusting his doctors. It follows if 
informed is primarily based on respect for autonomy my second conclusion should be 
accepted.  I will set out the consequences for the practice of informed consent of accepting 
these two conclusions. 
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Consider the circumstances when a patient consents to some proposed treatment and does not 
understand the relevant information. I concluded above that when a patient gives consent his 
decision can be autonomous even if he does not understand the information relevant to his 
condition. I concluded in section 4.4.2 that in circumstances when a patient’s life is threatened 
or irreparable damage might occur to his health, if he consents his competence need not be 
assessed because the outcome would be the same irrespective of whether he was assessed as 
competent or incompetent. It follows that when a patient consents without understanding the 
information relevant to his decision in circumstance, when his life is threatened or in which 
irreparable damage might occur to his health, the practice of informed consent should 
simply accept his decision. This practice would be compatible with the purpose of informed 
consent, as set out in chapter 4, to respect patient autonomy whilst ensuring non-autonomous 
patients can receive beneficent care. However, I do not believe this conclusion should apply in 
circumstances when a patient consents to some proposed treatment and does not understand 
the relevant information, and in which neither the patient’s life is threatened nor will 
irreparable damage be done to his health. I accept that in these circumstances when a patient 
consents his decision may be autonomous even if he does not understand the information 
relevant to his decision. In situations when a patient’s life is threatened or irreparable damage 
might occur to his health it seems inconceivable his doctors should refuse to offer him 
treatment for his condition provided this is possible. In situations in which neither the patient’s 
life is threatened nor will irreparable damage be done to his health I believe that doctors can 
refuse to offer a patient some previously proposed treatment if he does not understand the 
information relevant to his condition. It follows that when a patient consents without 
understanding the information relevant to his decision and in circumstances in which 
neither his life is threatened nor irreparable damage might occur to his health the patient 
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should not be offered the proposed treatment. Furthermore by refusing to offer a patient 
treatment his doctors do not fail to respect his autonomy. Lastly, consider the circumstances in 
which a patient refuses to consent to some proposed treatment and does not understand the 
relevant information. I have argued that in such cases the patient’s decision is non-
autonomous. In circumstances in which the patient’s life is threatened or irreparable 
damage might occur to his health I believe he should be treated beneficently and this could 
mean overriding his refusal of consent. In circumstances in which the patient’s life is not 
threatened and irreparable damage will not occur to his health he should also be treated 
beneficently and this would usually mean accepting his refusal of consent. 
I argued above that if a patient consents to some proposed treatment without 
understanding the information relevant to his decision in circumstances when his life is 
threatened or irreparable damage might occur to his health, the practice of informed consent 
should simply accept his decision. However, a patient may consent to treatment without 
understanding the information relevant to his decision in circumstances when another’s life is 
threatened or irreparable damage might occur to the other’s health for altruistic reasons. This 
could occur for instance in the case of kidney donation to a close relative or someone the 
donor loves. Moreover, such a decision could be freely made, persistent and one the donor is 
satisfied with. It follows that such a decision might be autonomous. The question that now 
arises is whether one should accept such a decision. This question cannot be answered by 
arguing that in these circumstances such a decision should simply be accepted because if it 
was not a surrogate decision-maker would also choose the same treatment. This question can 
only be answered by considering whether truly beneficent treatment can be offered in such 
circumstances. I believe every effort should be made to encourage the donor to understand the 
relevant information. If the donor fails to try understand the relevant information, one might 
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question whether his motives are truly altruistic and hence autonomous. It can be concluded 
that in these circumstances the proposed treatment should not be offered. 
 
6.1.2. How much information must a competent patient actually understand? 
 
 
I argued in section 6.1.1 that if a patient consents without understanding the information 
relevant to his decision in circumstances when his life is threatened or irreparable damage 
might occur to his health, the practice of informed consent should simply accept his decision. 
In all other circumstances a patient must actually understand the information provided if he is 
to make an autonomous decision. In this section I will examine what information he must 
actually understand in these other circumstances. I will use an example used by Clarke (2001) 
to investigate the minimum amount of information a patient needs to understand in order to 
make an autonomous decision: 
 
Consider the case of ‘Squeamish John’. Squeamish John cannot bear to hear the details of 
medical procedures; hearing these make him feel weak at the knees and dramatically 
diminishes his capacity to make sensible decisions. Nevertheless he does not wish to abrogate 
responsibility for his decision about whether or not to undergo an operation. Squeamish John 
wishes to participate in a restricted informed consent process in order to make his decision. He 
wishes to make a decision based only on the disclosure of the risks and benefits of the 
operation couched in cold, impersonal, statistical language. He does not wish to have any 
significant details of the procedure described to him (Clarke, 2001, page 177). 
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I argued in section 4.5 that the purpose of informed consent is to respect patient autonomy 
whilst ensuring non-autonomous patients can receive beneficent care. I further argued that this 
is achieved in practice by giving priority to respecting autonomy over acting beneficently. I 
still further argued that if some autonomous decisions were not respected then priority must 
have been given to acting beneficently over respecting autonomy. It follows that the minimum 
amount of information a patient must understand in order to make a competent informed 
consent decision must be identical to the amount of information he needs to make an 
autonomous decision. In section 2.2 I argued that our intuitive ideas of autonomy require that 
an autonomous decision is freely made, has persistence and is one with which the agent 
identifies. Let it be accepted that Squeamish John’s decision is freely made and has 
persistence. It would also seem that Squeamish John could identify with such a decision if he 
only understands the risks and benefits of the operation. Indeed, it seems he might be better 
able to identify himself with a decision about which he has limited understanding rather than 
one with which he has greater understanding. Intuitively it follows that Squeamish John’s 
decision seems autonomous. 
Squeamish John wishes to make a consent decision based only on him understanding the 
risks and benefits of the operation couched in cold, impersonal, statistical language according 
to Clarke (2001, page 177). Let it be accepted that if Squeamish John understands the risks 
and benefits of the operation this means he must understand his doctors’ prognosis and the 
likely prognosis if his condition is not treated. It might be questioned whether he can make an 
autonomous decision based on such limited information. This question can only be answered 
by considering the circumstances in which the decision is made. Consider again a patient 
consenting to an emergency appendectomy. In the light of my discussion in section 6.1.1, in 
these circumstances, if Squeamish John consents to treatment then his decision should simply 
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be accepted. However, the acceptance of his decision is not based on respect for his autonomy 
but is simply based on the fact that any decision by a surrogate decision-maker would result in 
the same treatment. The question that I am attempting to answer is this:  Does Squeamish John 
understand enough information to retain the right to accept or refuse the proposed 
appendectomy? In this example the patient’s doctors’ prognosis is that with treatment he will 
be able to return to his normal life and without treatment he will probably die. In these 
circumstances, because the outcomes are so clear, Squeamish John could possibly identify 
himself with a consent decision because he could be satisfied with his decision. Moreover, if 
such a decision were also freely made and persistent it might possibly be autonomous. This 
example can be generalised to reach the following conclusion. In circumstances in which 
treatment is expected to enable a patient to return to his former life, and in which 
without treatment he will probably die, it is possible for a patient to make an 
autonomous decision based only on him understanding his doctors’ prognosis and the 
likely prognosis if he is not treated. 
In section 4.5 I used the example of Bob who was asked to consent to the amputation of 
his leg below the knee. In these circumstances treatment is not expected to enable Bob to fully 
return to his former life. The question may again be asked in these circumstances. What is the 
minimum amount of information needed, in these circumstances, to enable a patient to 
possibly make an autonomous decision? I have argued that a decision is autonomous if it is 
freely made, persistent and the agent identifies himself with it by having no restlessness to 
change his decision. It follows that the answer to this question depends on the minimum 
amount of information needed for it to be possible for a patient to be satisfied with his 
decision. A patient who understands that treatment will change his life cannot possibly be 
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satisfied with any decision which does not take into account the expected life changing 
consequences of this treatment. It follows that in these circumstances any decision he makes 
based purely on his understanding of his doctors’ prognosis and the likely prognosis if his 
condition is not treated, cannot possibly satisfy him and hence is non-autonomous. It would 
seem to be possible for a patient to be satisfied with his decision in these circumstances if he 
can understand all the possible outcomes, resulting from both treatment and no treatment, 
together with the risks, benefits and probabilities of these possible outcomes. It can be 
concluded that, in circumstances in which a patient is expected to be unable to fully 
return to his former life, the minimum amount of information he possibly needs to make 
an autonomous decision are as follows. A patient must understand all possible outcomes 
of treatment and the expected outcome if he refuses treatment together with the risks, 
benefits and probabilities of these possible outcomes. 
However, accepting this conclusion does not mean that any decision based on the patient 
only understanding all the possible outcomes of treatment and the expected outcome if he 
refuses treatment together with the risks, benefits and probabilities of these possible outcomes, 
is autonomous. For instance, a Jehovah’s Witness might not be satisfied with any consent 
decision based solely on these criteria. He would also want to know that the proposed 
treatment would not involve a blood transfusion. It follows that the minimum possible amount 
of information some patient actually needs to understand in order to make a autonomous 
decision cannot, in all circumstances, be based on them only understanding all the possible 
outcomes of treatment and no treatment together with the risks, benefits and probabilities of 
these possible outcomes. However it does not automatically follow that the above is also the 
minimum possible amount of information a patient needs to understand in order to make a 
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good decision. I mention this conflict on page 234 and discuss how this conflict might be 
resolved on page 248. 
It might be argued that a patient’s autonomy has not been fully respected if on reflection 
he feels his decision would have been different had he been better informed. This idea is 
supported by the Royal Liverpool Hospital Children’s Inquiry. This support occurs in the 
specialist context of parents giving consent to the post mortem examination of their deceased 
children: 
 
A practical test for the clinician in considering whether he has given full information is to 
question whether any significant detail not mentioned could have lead to a different decision 
by the next of kin. If so the test for fully informed consent will not have been met. (The Royal 
Liverpool Children’s Inquiry, 2001, chapter 11, section 1.4) 
 
It might then be suggested that the minimum amount of information a patient actually needs to 
understand, in order to make a competent decision in all circumstances, should include all 
significant details, without which, a patient make might make a different decision. I will argue 
that the practical test mentioned by the Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry should not be 
adopted by the practice of informed consent. If this test was adopted in practice it would be 
difficult for a patient’s doctors to know what would be a significant detail. For instance, if a 
patient’s treatment involved stem cells, how these cells were obtained might be an 
insignificant detail to some patients but of major concern to a fundamental Christian. It 
follows that if this test was adopted, then a patient’s doctors might be inclined to include all 
relevant details irrespective of whether they personally regard them as significant or not. Such 
   242 
 
 
a course of action would be wrong for three reasons. Firstly, adopting such a course would be 
costly in time and medical resources. Secondly, most patients neither want nor need to be so 
comprehensively informed. Thirdly, informing a patient, such as Squeamish John, 
comprehensively fails to respect his autonomy. Accepting the above suggests that a patient’s 
doctors should attempt to tailor the information given to the patient’s particular requirements. 
I suggest that the tailoring of information to a particular patient’s needs should be done 
as follows. All competent patients must always be informed about, and actually understand, 
the possible outcomes of both treatment and no treatment. Competent patients must also 
always be informed about and actually understand the risks, benefits and probabilities 
associated with these possible outcomes. I have argued above that without actually 
understanding this minimum amount of information no patient can make an autonomous 
decision. This understanding need include no details of the actual procedure or treatment the 
patient is consenting to. In addition, it must be made clear to all adult patients that if they 
require additional information in order to make autonomous choices, then they should request 
this information. For instance, most patients would be interested in the immediate short term 
effects of treatment. Any adult patient requesting such information should be supplied with the 
information. I believe that my suggestion would respect the autonomy of all patients. 
Others might suggest that the tailoring of information to a particular patient’s needs 
could be better achieved as follows. All patients should normally be automatically fully 
informed. Prior to being fully informed all patients must be made aware that they have the 
right to make a decision based on a restricted amount of information. If a patient requests that 
the information he receives is restricted, this should be done. However, if a patient is to make 
a competent decision, this information may not be restricted below the level needed to make 
an autonomous decision as outlined above. It might then be argued that this second way of 
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tailoring a patient’s information needs, would enable patients’ to make better decisions whilst 
also respecting their autonomy. I believe that this argument fails. It fails because, whilst it is 
possible to specify the minimum amount of information all patients require in order to 
possibly make autonomous decisions, it appears impossible to specify the amount of 
information all patients need to make autonomous decisions. The above leads to the 
conclusion that a patient should be informed as follows. 
1) All competent patients must always be informed about and actually understand 
the possible outcomes of suggested treatments and the expected outcome if no 
treatment takes place. 
2) Competent patients must also always be informed about and actually 
understand the risks, benefits and probabilities associated with these possible 
outcomes.  
3) It must be made clear to all adult patients that if they require additional 
information in order to make autonomous choices concerning their treatment, 
then it is their right to request this additional information 
4) If a patient requests additional information about his treatment, this request 
should be satisfied.  
 
6.2. Must a competent patient believe the information supplied to him? 
 
One of the conditions of Thorpe’s [1994] C test is that the patient must not only understand 
but also believe the information provided to him by his doctors if his decision is to be regarded 
as competent. This requirement that a competent patient must believe the information 
provided was not mentioned when the “C test” was subsequently applied in the case of MB 
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[1997]. In this section I will argue that Thorpe was right and that a competent patient should 
believe the information provided by his medical doctors. I will also argue that in practice it is 
impractical to assess whether a patient actually believes the information supplied to him. 
I have shown that the purpose of informed consent assessment means all autonomous 
decisions should be regarded as competent decisions. I will now argue that a patient should 
believe the information provided to him by his doctors in order to make an autonomous 
decision. Whether a patient believes the information provided is connected to him trusting the 
medical team who supply this information. Let it be accepted that if someone you trust 
provides you with information that you must also trust this information. Let it be further 
accepted if you trust some piece of information you must also believe it. O’Neill (2002) 
argues that if trust is impossible, normal decision-making becomes impossible: 
 
Just as total scepticism would produce a total paralysis of belief, and is untenable in practice, 
so an inability to place trust would produce a total paralysis of action, and is untenable in 
practice. In practice we have to take a view and place our trust in others for some purposes” 
(O’Neill, 2002, page 12). 
 
It is important to be clear about what sort of action O’Neill believes would be paralysed 
without trust in the context of informed consent. It is clear that even if a patient fails to believe 
the information provided and does not trust his doctors, he may still act and make a consent 
decision. He might act on other information for example, from friends, the internet, a hunch or 
at random. However, unless a patient has specialist medical knowledge he would seem to 
ignore the best information available to him in order make a good decision or, as will be 
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argued below, an autonomous decision. It follows that when O’Neill talks of actions being 
paralysed without trust, she is referring to good or autonomous actions. 
I will now question whether O’Neill’s assertion that, an inability to place trust results in 
a paralysis of action is true when the actions in question are autonomous decisions made in the 
context of informed consent. Let it be assumed that, in the context of informed consent, a 
patient actually understands the information provided to him by his medical team. Let it be 
further assumed that he does not believe this information. It follows that, in this context, the 
patient is deprived of the information he needs to make a good decision. On page 120 I argued 
that an autonomous agent must be wholehearted concerning an autonomous decision and this 
must be reflected by his satisfaction with his decision, see Frankfurt (1999, page 103, 
originally 1992). It might then be questioned if a patient is aware he is deprived of the 
information he needs to make a good decision whether he can be satisfied with his decision. It 
might then be argued any such decision was not an autonomous decision. It might then be 
further argued that, in the context of informed consent, a competent patient must of necessity 
trust the information provided by his medical team if he is to make an autonomous consent 
decision.  
I will now show that any assessment of a patient’s competence should not include any 
assessment of whether he believes the information supplied to him by his medical team. Any 
assessment of whether a patient actually understands the information supplied to him cannot 
simply depend on asking him if he understands this information. Similarly, assessing whether 
a patient actually believes the information supplied cannot depend on asking him if he believes 
this information. However, there are problems with directly assessing whether a patient 
believes the information supplied because this assessment seems to depend on evaluating 
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unobservable mental processes, as pointed out by Maclean (2000, page 280). It might be 
argued that assessing whether a patient believes the information supplied might be done 
indirectly by considering the outcome of his decision. For instance, if a patient chooses a good 
outcome, then it might be assumed that he believed the information provided. Similarly, if a 
patient chooses a bad outcome, then it might be assumed he did not believe this information. I 
believe that such an argument is unsound. Accepting the above argument would mean that a 
patient’s competence would be partly assessed on the outcome of his actual decision rather 
than on his ability to make this decision, contrary to the Department of Health (2001, section 
2.3) and the General Medical Council (1999, section 19) guidelines. The purpose of these 
guidelines is to respect patient autonomy. In section 2.2 I showed that respecting autonomy 
means accepting autonomous decisions. Let it be assumed that the assessment of whether a 
patient believes the information supplied to him depends on the quality of the outcome of his 
decision. It follows that what is being assessed is whether a patient is making a good decision. 
I have argued throughout this thesis that autonomous decisions need not be good decisions, 
(see Silver, 2002, page 461). It can be concluded that any attempt by this method to indirectly 
assess whether a patient believes the information supplied to him is incompatible with 
respecting his autonomy. Moreover, because whether a patient believes the information 
supplied cannot be assessed directly, it can be further concluded that any assessment of 
whether a patient actually believes the information supplied to him should not form part of the 
practice of informed consent. 
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6.3. The patient’s capacity to communicate 
   
Informed consent is concerned with a patient’s decisions and it follows that unless a patient is 
able to communicate his decisions the concept of informed consent is meaningless. This 
means that a competent patient must have the capacity to communicate his decision. However, 
the practice of informed consent means that a competent patient needs a greater capacity to 
communicate than that required to concur or refuse to concur to some proposed treatment.  
Firstly, a patient might need to communicate with his medical team in order to enable him to 
make an autonomous decision. Secondly, a patient may sometimes need to communicate the 
reasons for his decision in order to demonstrate his competence. 
I argued in section 6.1.2 that a patient should only be automatically supplied with the 
minimum amount of information with which it might be possible for someone to make an 
autonomous decision. I further argued that, in some circumstances, a patient might require 
more information than this minimum amount in order to make an autonomous decision. I still 
further argued that if a patient requires additional information, then this information should be 
supplied through dialogue. This dialogue should concern how treatment, or lack of treatment, 
will impinge on what the patient cares about. It follows that in some circumstances a 
competent patient’s capacity to communicate must include an ability to express what he cares 
about. A patient’s medical team must then be able to explain in the dialogue how treatment is 
expected to affect his concerns.  
Breier- Mackie (2001) points out patients often cannot verbalise their needs: 
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Patients who are confronted with the autonomy/paternalism dichotomy are often unable to 
verbalize their needs and wants to their doctors either because they are intimidated by the 
doctors’ perceived power, or because the doctors lack the time to listen to their concerns 
(Breier- Mackie 2001, Page 513). 
 
Because of this Breier- Mackie argues that nurses might assist a patient to clarify his concerns 
and needs. The provider of treatment has a duty to obtain a patient’s consent (see the General 
Medical Council’s guidelines,1999, section 14 and the Department of Health, 2001, section 9). 
The provider of treatment will in many cases be a medical team and the leader of this team 
will ultimately be responsible for obtaining a patient’s consent. Both of these sets of 
guidelines agree that this duty may be delegated to a suitably qualified person. It follows that 
Breier-Mackie’s suggestion that suitably qualified nurses might play a part in some consent 
processes is compatible with current guidelines. I believe that Breier-Mackie’s suggestion is a 
sensible one. However, the exact role of suitably qualified nurses in the consent process must 
be made more explicit. I have argued that in some circumstances informed consent requires a 
dialogue. I further argued that a patient’s primary role in this dialogue is to express what he 
cares about with respect to the proposed treatment. I believe that a suitably qualified nurse’s 
role must be limited to acting as a patient’s agent by helping him to communicate what he 
cares about. An agent does not make decisions for the person she acts for but must attempt to 
ensure that person’s decisions are acted on. A representative may make decisions which she 
believes are in the interests of the person she acts for.  It follows because a suitably qualified 
nurse’s role is simply to help a patient to make an autonomous decision, she should not act as 
his representative by vocalising what she believes to be in his best interests. It can be 
concluded that a competent patient must have the capacity to communicate both his decision 
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and in some circumstances what he cares about. His capacity to communicate what he cares 
about need only reach a standard which would enable others to vocalise what he cares about 
by acting strictly as his agent. 
In section 5.3 I argued that the concept of autonomy underlying informed consent should 
permit as many patient’s decisions as possible to be regarded as competent. However, some 
patient’s competence should be assessed. This assessment should take place by considering 
whether the patient possesses certain capacities (see Thorpe’s C test [1994]). The Department 
of Health (2001, section 2.5) holds any assessment of a patient’s competence should not be 
based on the outcome of his decision. It follows that, if the patient was prior to his consent 
decision considered competent to lead his own life, this assessment must be based on the 
reasons the patient gives for his decision. I argued in section 5.3 that the reasons a patient 
gives must be recognisable as reasons to those assessing his competence (Wicclair, 1991, page 
92). However, I have argued throughout this thesis that autonomous decisions need not be 
good decisions. It can be concluded that a competent patient must only have the capacity to 
give reasons for his decision that are recognisable as reasons, but that these reasons need not 
of necessity be good reasons for his decision. 
 
6.4. Patient rationality 
 
This section will examine instrumental rationality and a patient’s beliefs and values.  
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6.4.1. Instrumental Rationality 
 
When a patient makes an autonomous consent decision he is not making a decision about what 
to believe. He is making a decision about which course of action he believes would be best for 
him. Baron (1994, page 29) defines instrumental rationality as whatever kind of thinking best 
helps people to achieve their goals. He argues that for an agent to be rational simply means he 
uses effective means to achieve his goals. This could involve following the rules of logic, 
using a heuristic, or even choosing at random in certain circumstances. Let it be assumed that 
the type of rationality a patient uses when making an informed consent decision is 
instrumental rationality. In this section I will examine two objections which challenge this 
assumption. The first objection will argue that it is impossible to use instrumental rationality 
in the context of informed consent. The second objection will argue that it is impossible to 
assess a patient’s capacity for instrumental rationality in the context of informed consent. I 
will conclude that both of these objections fail and that a competent patient should use 
instrumental rationality when making his consent decision. 
Let it be accepted that instrumental rationality is the appropriate type of rationality for 
people to use when making most personal decisions. Consider someone about to purchase a 
car. It follows the potential purchaser’s previous experience in this field means he is able to 
select the means he has found most effective in the past when deciding which option to 
purchase. Next consider someone who is being asked to consent to the donation of a kidney to 
a relative. This is a unique situation he cannot have faced before. It might be argued that 
because the potential kidney donor has no experience of kidney donation, he has no means of 
choosing an effective strategy with which to make his decision. It might be further argued that 
this means the potential kidney donor would find it impossible to use instrumental rationality 
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when making his consent decision. It is certainly true that a patient cannot have a handy 
heuristic for kidney donation. However, it does not follow that a patient in this situation 
cannot use instrumental rationality. The patient may have no experience of kidney donation, 
but he probably will have experience of making decisions in which his understanding was 
limited. For instance, he may have previously faced an investment decision when he had no 
background experience in financial markets (see section 4.2). It follows that he may be able to 
select an effective means to achieve his goals even when his understanding is limited. He 
might, for instance base, his decision on a logical assessment of all the information underlying 
his decision in the light of his goals and values. Alternatively, he might consider whether he 
should trust those advising him. If he decides his advisors are trustworthy then he might 
simply accept their recommendation. This argument can be generalised to all informed 
consent decisions. It follows that it is possible to use instrumental rationality in the specialised 
context of informed consent. 
Let it be assumed that instrumental rationality is the type of rationality used to make 
informed consent decisions. Secondly, let it be accepted that the practice of informed consent 
requires a patient’s competence can be assessed in some circumstances. If this were not so, the 
purpose of informed consent could not be to respect patient autonomy whilst ensuring non-
autonomous patients can receive beneficent care (see section 4.5). It follows that it must be 
possible to assess a patient’s capacity for reason. Thirdly, let it be assumed it is impossible to 
assess whether someone has the capacity for instrumental rationality. These three propositions 
are incompatible. This leads to the following conclusion. If it is accepted that the practice of 
informed consent requires that it is possible to assess a patient’s capacity for rationality, and it 
is also accepted that someone’s capacity for instrumental rationality cannot be assessed then it 
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can be concluded instrumental rationality should not be the type of rationality used when 
giving informed consent.  
I will present two arguments to show that it is possible to assess whether a patient has the 
capacity for instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality is solely concerned with an agent 
having effective means to obtain his goals. However, in practice, assessing how well 
instrumental rationality helps a patient achieve his goals might become confused with an 
assessment of his goals according to Evans and Over (1996): 
 
Can a serial killer, for example be called completely rational if his preference is for murdering 
people and he chooses the optimal way of doing this?” (Evans and Over 1996, page 34) 
 
It is important not to conflate two distinct questions. Firstly, does the serial killer have 
effective means to achieve his murders? Secondly, are the serial killer’s goals rational in some 
sense? In this section I am only interested in answering the first of these questions. Does a 
patient have effective means to achieve his goals? The rationality of his beliefs and values will 
be discussed in section 6.4.2. 
My first argument to show that it is possible to assess someone’s capacity for 
instrumental rationality goes as follows. Dworkin (1988, page 20) regards someone’s 
autonomy as a global property of that person involving reflection. It might then be argued, by 
analogy, that instrumental rationality is also a global property of a person. If this analogy is 
accepted, then a patient’s capacity for instrumental rationality could be assessed by assessing 
how successful he is in achieving his goals in life. It might be assumed that if someone has 
effective means to achieve his goals, in general then he also has effective means to achieve his 
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goals when giving informed consent. This assumption would concur with the presumption of 
patient competence within the practice of informed consent (see the General Medical Council, 
1999, page 5 and the Department of Health, 2001, Paragraph 2.1). However, this assumption is 
not true in all cases. Consider a patient who had effective means to achieve his goals in 
general before he became a patient. However, once he becomes a patient, factors such as fear, 
depression or medication might cause him to lose this capacity for instrumental rationality. It 
follows that my argument by analogy is unsound. 
My second argument runs as follows. I argued in section 5.3 that the assessment of a 
patient’s competence is only useful in circumstances when treatment is expected to return him 
to his former life and interests. This return may be a matter of degree. I further argued in 
section 5.3 that prima facie it could be assumed that a patient’s goal is to return to his former 
life and interests. It follows that if a patient consents to treatment, his decision appears to be 
instrumentally rational. However, it might be argued that, in the above circumstances, if a 
patient understands the information relevant to his condition and refuses to give consent to 
treatment, then his decision is not an effective means to achieve this goal. Prima facie it might 
be concluded that, in these circumstances, a patient’s refusal to give consent is evidence that 
he does not possess the capacity for instrumental rationality. For instance, consider a patient 
who understands he will die without an appendectomy and who refuses to give consent. It 
seems reasonable to assume that such a patient does not possess the capacity to use 
instrumental rationality. It can be concluded it is possible to make a prima facie assessment of 
whether a patient’s refusal to give consent is instrumentally rational in circumstances in which 
treatment is expected to substantially return a patient to his former life and interests. However, 
this prima facie conclusion is open to rebuttal (see section 5.3). I argued there that a competent 
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patient must be able to give reasons for his consent decision. I further argued these reasons 
need not be good reasons but they must be recognisable as reasons (see also Wicclair, 1991, 
page 92). For instance, if a Jehovah’s Witness refused to consent to some life-saving operation 
requiring a blood transfusion, his refusal would not be regarded as evidence that he lacks the 
capacity to use instrumental rationality. However it can be further concluded that, in the above 
circumstances, if a patient understands the information provided and is unable to give some 
reason for his refusal of consent, then he lacks the capacity to use instrumental rationality. It 
might be objected that the above conclusion depends on the outcome of a patient’s decision 
and to use such a decision as evidence of incompetence runs counter to guidelines given on 
informed consent. The General Medical Council (1999, section 19) holds that if a patient’s 
decision appears irrational or not to be in his best interests, then this is not evidence the patient 
is incompetent. See also the Department of Health (2001, section 2.3.) and the judgement in 
Sidaway [1985]. The accepted position, according to these guidelines, is that the outcome of a 
patient’s decision may point to incompetence. The outcome of a patient’s decision may also 
trigger an assessment of his competence (see section 4.1). However, according to these 
guidelines the outcome of a patient’s decision should not be regarded as evidence of a patient 
being incompetent. My conclusion clearly runs counter to the above guidelines. I will now 
argue that my conclusion does not run counter to either the practice of informed consent or 
respect for autonomy. 
Consider a patient who refuses to consent to an emergency appendectomy without which 
he will probably die. Let it be assumed that when refusing consent, this patient simply says no. 
Let it be further assumed that when asked for a reason for his refusal of consent, the patient 
simply says I don’t want to. Let it be still further assumed that these answers are the only 
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communication from the patient to his medical team. In the practice of informed consent this 
patient would be regarded as incompetent. It might be argued that this patient lacks the 
capacity either to understand or weigh the information provided. However, we can question 
whether there is evidence for the patient lacking these capacities. Let it be accepted that if this 
patient had consented his decision would have been accepted. It follows that the only possible 
evidence for his incompetence in these circumstances is the outcome of his decision. 
However, let it be assumed that another patient in the same situation is able to give reasons for 
his refusal of consent. These reasons must include his goals and values. Let it be also assumed 
that the patient understands the information provided and his decision is not an effective 
means to serve his stated goals and values. In practice this patient’s decision would again be 
taken as evidence that he was unable to weigh the information provided and he would be 
regarded as incompetent. It can be concluded that if a patient’s refusal of consent is taken as 
evidence that he lacks the capacity for instrumental rationality, then this does not conflict with 
the practice of informed consent. 
The judgement in Sidaway [1985] states that a patient may refuse to give consent for 
reasons that are rational or irrational, or for no reason. It might be argued that refusing to 
accept a patient’s refusal of consent as valid, even if he is unable to give reasons for his 
decision, means failing to respect his autonomy. This argument again illustrates the need to be 
precise about the system of autonomy underlying the practice of informed consent. It seems 
clear that Christman’s concept of autonomy would regard such a patient’s refusal of consent as 
autonomous provided he did not resist its development subject to certain conditions. I have 
argued that informed consent should be based on respect for Frankfurt’s (1988, page 83, 
originally 1982) concept of autonomy which concept involves reflection which in turn 
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involves reasons. It follows that, provided Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy underlies 
informed consent, failing to respect a patient’s refusal of consent, in the above circumstances 
is not a failure to respect an agent’s autonomous decision. It further follows that instrumental 
rationality could be the type of rationality used to make informed consent decisions. 
Beauchamp and Childress (1989, page 69) believe that it would be wrong to chain informed 
consent to fully autonomous decision making because this robs informed consent of any 
meaningful place in the practical world. I have argued that the truth of this conclusion depends 
on the concept of autonomy employed (see section 5.3). However, if informed consent were 
tied to completely logical decision making this would rob informed consent of any meaningful 
place in the practical world because very few patients might be regarded as competent. For 
this reason I believe that instrumental rationality should be the type of rationality used by a 
competent patient when making informed consent decisions. 
 
6.4.2 
Beliefs, goals and values 
I argued above that a competent patient only needs to have the capacity to use instrumental 
rationality. I also showed that it is possible for someone to be instrumentally rational when 
intuitively he appears to be irrational, using the example of an efficient serial killer. Both the 
Department of Health’s guidelines (2001, Paragraph 2.3) and the legal judgment given in the 
case of Sidaway [1985] agree that a patient may make a decision based on his own goals and 
values and that the rationality of these goals and values cannot be challenged. This position 
might be called the Humean position because reason is simply the slave of the passions: 
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Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other 
office than to serve and obey them. (Hume 1978, page 415, originally published 1739 - 1740) 
 
In this section I will argue that a Humean position would form an inadequate basis for the 
practice of informed consent because informed consent should not be solely concerned with 
rationality and a patient understanding his position. In this section I will consider instrumental 
rationality to be whatever kind of thinking best helps people to achieve their goals as defined 
by Baron (1988, page 29) It might then be argued I am only concerned with a crude form of 
instrumental rationality. However there are two reasons to support my adopting the above 
definition of instrumental rationality. Firstly this definition seems appropriate to the practice 
of informed consent. Secondly, and more importantly this simple definition does not conflate 
the concepts of instrumental rationality and autonomy. In this section I will accept that 
personal autonomy does not impose any constraints on the content of an autonomous agent’s 
goals and values. However, I will argue that personal autonomy requires more than the 
Humean position on rationality because an autonomous agent’s goals and values must have 
some simple structure. 
I will now examine the beliefs of a patient.  The content of beliefs may vary. For 
example, some beliefs concern values such as whether it is right to eat meat. These are beliefs 
about what is of value. Other beliefs concern facts about the world such as whether it is 
raining. These are factual beliefs. The Department of Health’s (2001, section 2.3) guidelines 
state that if a patient bases his decision on a misrepresentation of the facts about the world, as 
opposed to an unusual value system, he is incompetent. It would seem that if a patient 
misrepresents the facts about the world he might be unable to understand the information 
provided to him concerning his condition. For instance, an anorexic patient who believed she 
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was fat when in fact her physical condition was failing would be considered incompetent 
because of this false belief. This concurs with the guidelines of both the General Medical 
Council (1999, page 5) and the Department of Health’s (2001, section 2.1). However, an 
anorexic patient who understood her failing condition and the fact that if she failed to eat 
properly she might die, but who still refused to eat adequately, might be considered competent 
according to Draper (2000, page 133). Let it be accepted that if a patient is unable to 
understand why he needs treatment that he will be unable to make an autonomous decision 
concerning any proposed treatment (see section 6.1). It follows that when a patient’s beliefs 
clearly misrepresent his physical state or his prognosis he should be regarded as incompetent. 
Someone’s beliefs, goals and values are not things existing independently but in a set 
(Wittgenstein, 1969, proposition 141). It might be argued that an anorexic patient who had no 
false factual beliefs, and possessed the requisite cognitive abilities, might be regarded as 
incompetent because of the structure of her general beliefs, goals and values. The structure of 
the set of an autonomous agent’s beliefs, goals and values will now be examined.  
I argued above that if an agent holds an erroneous factual belief concerning his condition 
this affects his ability to act autonomously. I will now consider an agent’s beliefs about what 
is of value. These beliefs define what an agent cares about and in the rest of this section will 
be considered as an agent’s goals and values. Frankfurt (1999, originally 1992) argues an 
autonomous agent’s will must have some form of unity. This he defines as being 
wholehearted: 
 
If ambivalence is a disease of the will, the health of the will is to be unified and in this sense 
wholehearted. A person is volitionally robust when he is wholehearted in his higher order 
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attitudes and inclinations, in his preferences and decisions, and in other movements of the will. 
(Frankfurt, 1999, page 100, originally 1992) 
 
If a person’s will is not wholehearted then he is ambivalent then Frankfurt (1999, page, 
originally 100, 1992) argues an ambivalent agent cannot make up his mind because he does 
not know what he cares about most. Frankfurt regards wholeheartedness as concerned with the 
organisation of an agent’s will: 
 
Wholeheartedness is not a measure of the firmness of a person’s volitional state, or of his 
enthusiasm. What is at issue is the organization of the will, not its temperature. (Frankfurt, 
1999, page 100, originally 1992) 
  
I argued that Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy should form the basis of informed consent in 
sections 3.5.4 and 5.3. It follows that the set of a competent patient’s goals and values must 
have some organisation or structure based on wholeheartedness. What constraints the idea of 
wholeheartedness imposes on a competent patient’s goals and values will be examined next. 
Let it be accepted that someone’s will is concerned with what he cares about and the things he 
cares about must include his goals and values. Frankfurt (1988, page 84, originally 1982) 
argues if someone cares about something he must continue to care about it unless 
circumstances change. It follows that an autonomous agent’s will is concerned with things that 
have persistence. Frankfurt (1988, page 91, originally 1982) also argues if someone’s will is 
not ambivalent he must be able to care about some things more than others. It further follows 
that if someone cares about some things more than others his will must be organised in such a 
way that it enables him to rank the things he cares about. The ability to rank as it is used here 
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only means that an agent can order his goals and values. It does not imply that he must be able 
to give relative weights to different goals and values. It also follows that if a patient makes an 
autonomous informed consent decision he must have the ability to rank his goals and values 
affecting this decision. However, I have argued that a patient’s goals and values concerning 
some particular decision do not exist independently of his other goals and values 
(Wittgenstein, 1969, proposition 141). If this is accepted it leads to the following tentative 
conclusion. An autonomous consent decision can only be made by a patient who is able to 
structure all his goals and values by ranking them. 
It might be objected that my tentative conclusion only imposes a very weak structural 
condition on autonomous decisions. It might be argued that if a person cares about certain 
things, and can rank all the things he cares about, this weak condition is insufficient to 
guarantee that his decisions are autonomous. This would certainly be the position of 
Christman (1991, page 11). He argues the set of autonomous desires should be minimally 
rational by not being manifestly inconsistent. Christman’s idea can be illustrated in practice by 
again considering the case of Ms B [2002]. Recall that Ms B was kept alive by a ventilator and 
wished to have it switched off. Hypothetically, let it be assumed that Ms B desired both living 
and wanting the ventilator switched off. These two desires are inconsistent with one another. It 
follows that, according to Christman’s concept of autonomy, Ms B’s decision to have her 
ventilator switched off would have been non-autonomous because her set of desires was not 
minimally rational. However, had Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy been used to assess Ms 
B’s autonomy in this situation, then her decision might have been regarded as autonomous. 
When an agent cares about an inconsistent set of the things, what is important as far as 
Frankfurt’s concept is concerned, is not that the agent must stop caring about some of these 
things in order to make this set manifestly consistent (Frankfurt 1999, pages 160, 161). What 
   261 
 
 
is important is that the agent is able to decide which of those things he cares about most and 
commit himself to any decision he makes. It follows that had Ms B cared more about having 
her ventilator switched off than life, Frankfurt would have regarded her decision as 
autonomous. This discussion again illustrates the need to be precise about the concept of 
autonomy that informed consent respects. 
I have tentatively concluded that an autonomous agent must be capable of ranking all his 
goals and values. This conclusion has the unfortunate consequence that if someone is unable 
to make one autonomous decision, because he is ambivalent, that he will be unable to make 
any autonomous decisions. In practice it would be difficult to accept such a consequence. 
Consider again the young woman who is diagnosed with leukaemia who cares greatly about 
having a child of her own. This patient has two options. The reasonably good chance of a cure 
provided she opts for immediate treatment, or the more dangerous option of delaying 
treatment so she may possibly have a child of her own. Let it be assumed that she is 
ambivalent with regard to these options because she cannot decide which option she cares 
about most. It follows that she cannot make an autonomous decision in this case. However, it 
seems ridiculous to hold that as a result of this, she is incapable of making any other 
autonomous decisions in her life. Examples cannot be used to show that a proposition is true, 
they may only point to the truth of something. However, examples can show some proposition 
is untrue. It follows that my tentative conclusion, that an autonomous consent decision can 
only be made by a patient who is able to structure all his goals and values by ranking them, is 
false. This tentative conclusion might be modified and replaced by the following conclusion. 
An autonomous consent decision can only be made by a patient who is able to structure 
his goals and values, relevant to this particular decision, by ranking them. 
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This thesis is concerned with applied philosophy, and if my conclusion is to be useful, 
then it must be possible to assess whether a patient can rank his goals and values relevant to a 
particular decision. Frankfurt argues that an autonomous agent is wholehearted about some 
decision if he is satisfied with this decision. Satisfaction in this situation does not mean that 
the agent reflects on his decision rather it means an absence of any restlessness to change the 
decision (Frankfurt, 1999, page 103, originally 1992). This condition mirrors the first of 
Christman’s (1991, page 11) conditions for an autonomous desire. Clearly, if an agent cares 
about a decision, he cannot be indifferent towards it (Frankfurt, 1988, page 83, originally 
1982). Let it be assumed that an agent is unable to rank what he cares about relevant to some 
particular decision. Let it be further assumed that the agent makes this decision. It seems clear 
that if an agent both cares about his decision and is unable decide on the relative importance of 
what he cares about relevant to this decision, then he must have some degree of restlessness to 
change his decision. It follows that if an agent is satisfied with a decision he cares about he 
must be able to rank the things he cares about relevant to this decision. It further follows that it 
is possible to assess whether a patient can rank his goals and values relevant to a particular 
informed consent decision by asking whether he has an absence of restlessness to change his 
decision. 
The practice of informed consent regards a consent decision as competent subject to the 
following conditions. The patient must be able to understand the information provided, 
communicate, and be able to weigh this information when making his consent decision. This 
position is set out by the C test [C, 1994]. I argued in section 1.2 that the C test implicitly 
requires that a patient must be able to use instrumental rationality and possess a set of goals 
and values. These goals and values need have no particular content or structure. I suggested 
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above that this might be called a Humean position. I have also concluded above that an 
autonomous decision can only be made by someone who is able to rank his goals and values. I 
will now examine some of the implications of accepting this conclusion for the practice of 
informed consent. Hume argued that someone could be acting rationally even if he chooses 
one goal at the expense of another goal he cares about more: 
 
“This as little contrary to reason to prefer even my acknowledg’d lesser good and have a more 
ardent affection for the former than the latter.” (Hume 1978, Book II, Section III, page 416, 
originally published 1739 – 1740). 
 
Intuitively such a decision seems incompetent. My conclusion reached above is 
philosophically interesting because it would explain why such a decision is incompetent.  
It might be argued that in practice, people do not use instrumental rationality to obtain 
something they care about a little in preference to something they care about a lot, unless a 
very crude definition of instrumental rationality is adopted. I would merely point out that in 
practice it seems entirely possible for a drug addict to make an instrumentally rational decision 
to choose taking drugs, which he doesn’t care about, in preference to his lover for whom he 
cares a great deal. It follows that someone may indeed use instrumental rationality to obtain 
something he cares about a little in preference to something he cares about a lot. Such a 
decision is incompetent, not because it is irrational, but because it is non-autonomous. It seems 
inconceivable that an autonomous agent might care about two options and choose the option 
he cares about the least. This is because it would imply that the agent could choose the option 
he cared about least without any restlessness to change his decision. It can be concluded that 
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an instrumentally rational decision need not of necessity be an autonomous decision. It can be 
further concluded that informed consent guidelines might regard some non-autonomous 
decisions as competent. 
 In this chapter I have argued that, in the context of informed consent, an autonomous 
decision is one subject to the following conditions. The patient must actually understand the 
information relevant to his decision, must be able communicate and must be able to use 
instrumental rationality. In addition, the patient must possess a set of goals and values, 
relevant to his decision, which he is able to rank. It follows that in the context of informed 
consent respecting the accepted guidelines would automatically respect all autonomous 
decisions. However, I concluded in section 4.5 that the purpose of informed consent is to 
respect patient autonomy and enable patients to make autonomous decisions whilst allowing 
non-autonomous patients to receive beneficent care. I concluded above that informed consent 
guidelines might regard some non-autonomous decisions as competent. It follows that in some 
situations, current informed consent guidelines might respect the decisions of some non-
autonomous patients thereby possibly denying them beneficent care. It might be assumed that 
such situations do not occur in practice. However, such an assumption would be false. Draper 
(2000, page 133) argues that in certain cases, if an anorexic patient fully understands her 
situation, then her decision to refuse food might be regarded as competent see section 1.2. 
Using the accepted guidelines on competence, as set out in the C test, Draper may well be 
correct. However I do not believe all such patients should be regarded as competent. Let it be 
accepted that the purpose of informed consent is to respect autonomy whilst at the same time 
ensuring non-autonomous patients receive beneficent care. It follows only anorexic patients’ 
who understand their position, are instrumentally rational and autonomous should be regarded 
as competent. I concluded above that an autonomous decision can only be made by someone 
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who is able to rank his goals and values relevant to that decision. It follows that only anorexic 
patients’ who understand their position, are instrumentally rational and are able rank their 
goals and values should be regarded as competent. This suggests that Draper is partially 
correct, and some anorexic patients might be regarded as competent if the purpose of informed 
consent is to respect patient autonomy. In the light of the above discussion I believe that, a 
competent patient must be able to rank his goals and values, in order to fully serve the 
purpose of informed consent. 
I argued in section 5.3.2 that the concept of autonomy underlying informed consent 
should allow as many patients as possible to be regarded as competent. It might be argued that 
by adding an additional condition to the current practice of informed consent, I am reducing 
the number of patients who would be regarded as competent. I accept this argument but 
believe this additional condition is a necessary condition if it is accepted that the purpose of 
informed consent is not simply to respect patient autonomy but also to ensure non-autonomous 
patients receive beneficent care. However, even if my additional condition is accepted as part 
of the practice of informed consent, it might still be possible for a small number of anorexic 
patients who fully understood their position, could communicate and whose decisions were 
instrumentally rational, to make competent decisions to refuse food. Whether the decision of 
such an anorexic patient was a competent decision would depend on whether she had an 
absence of restlessness to change her decision. The above conclusion might lead some to 
question whether informed consent should indeed be based on respecting autonomy whilst 
ensuring non-autonomous patients receive beneficent care. It might be suggested that informed 
consent would be better based on respect for persons (see section 2.2). Such a debate is outside 
the remit of this thesis. I have argued that autonomy is central to our lives. For this reason, I 
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would suggest that informed consent should be based on respecting autonomy whilst ensuring 
non-autonomous patients receive beneficent care. 
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